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sharing is or should be legal. John Logie analyzes the public arguments 
growing out of more than five years of debate sparked by the advent 
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utilities like Limewire, KaZaA, and BitTorrent. With Peers, Pirates, and 
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change current copyright law so that it fulfills its purpose of fostering 
creativity and innovation while protecting the rights of artists in an 
attention economy.
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media. Peers, Pirates, and Persuasion identifies the Napster case as a 
failed opportunity for a productive national discussion on intellectual 
property rights and responsibilities in digital environments. Logie closes 
by examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in the “Grokster” case, 
in which leading peer-to-peer companies were found to be actively 
inducing copyright infringement. The Grokster case, Logie contends, has 
already produced the chilling effects that will stifle the innovative spirit 
at the heart of the Internet and networked communities.
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When a new technology strikes a society, the most 
natural reaction is to clutch at the immediately pre-
ceding period for familiar and comforting images. . 
. . What is called progress and advanced thinking is 
nearly always of the rear-view mirror variety.
—Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, 
The Medium is the Massage
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31 Introduction
The Cat Is Out of the Bag
In the Spring of 2000 I was completing a shopping trip to Costco, 
a “warehouse club” located in a Minneapolis suburb, when I got an 
unexpected lesson in the burgeoning popularity of Napster, the peer-
to-peer file-transfer program developed by Shawn Fanning in 1998. 
Costco makes a practice of having employees “check off” the mer-
chandise on your receipt as an anti-theft measure, so the checker is 
effectively reviewing your purchases one by one. The roughly sixty-
year-old man who was checking my receipt noticed I had purchased a 
CD labeling kit. His face brightened.
“Hey, you use Napster?” he asked.
“Sometimes,” I responded, warily.
“Isn’t it the greatest?” he exclaimed. “I’ve been getting all the songs 
on my old records that they won’t put out on CD. I make my own 
mixes!”
He went on to sing the praises of Napster, which was offering him 
and like-minded sexagenarians on opportunity to exchange their fa-
vorite music—mostly obscure album tracks by Bert Kaempfert and 
Herb Alpert and the Tijuana Brass, as near as I could tell—and recom-
mended the service to me as a source for such lost gems.
“Aren’t you worried about copyright?” I asked.
“I bought all these records back in the sixties,” he answered, “and 
if they reissue them on CD, I might buy them again. But right now I 
can’t get this stuff on CD. I know a bunch of people through Napster 
who are trading this music. Maybe the record labels will see how many 
of us like this stuff and get going on it.”
To this point my own image of the stereotypical Napster user was 
epitomized by the self-presentation of Napster’s founder, Shawn Fan-
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ning, who maintained his ballcap-wearing, dorm rat persona well be-
yond the end of his career as a Northeastern University student. I also 
knew many of my own students were fans of Napster. Because my 
academic department has a strong undergraduate program in scien-
tific and technical communication, my technologically inclined stu-
dents are often early adopters of new technologies of all kinds. I had 
discussed Napster with some of them, and as a voracious consumer of 
popular music, I understood their enthusiasm for the kinds of discov-
eries Napster enabled.
But here, in his Costco vest, was another kind of Napster user, 
and one who was not simply using the software, but proselytizing for 
it. When I mentioned copyright as a concern, he had a ready defense. 
Indeed, he went as far as suggesting that his use of Napster was alert-
ing a somnambulant music industry to the presence of a demand that 
they were not adequately addressing. Thus, to his way of thinking (or 
at least within his rationalization) Napster was helping record labels 
understand consumer demand.
While this gentleman may or may not have been absolutely clear 
on the dicey status of his actions with respect to U.S. copyright laws, 
he was clearly aware that Napster’s content was getting better and bet-
ter as more and more people logged on. And even if I didn’t share his 
love for the Tijuana Brass, he understood that increasing the number 
of participants on Napster meant an increased likelihood of finding 
an obscure song via the service. For a brief moment, Napster users had 
a glimpse of the kind of expansive electronic library that copyright 
laws typically preclude . . . everything in no particular order, all day, 
all night, and in stereo. This from a service that had popped onto the 
U.S. public’s radar screen in March of 1999, mere months before my 
trip to Costco.
It is at times difficult to recall an Internet predating the peer-to-
peer networking that is now so commonplace, but Napster, the pro-
gram that popularized peer-to-peer exchanges, arrived fairly late in the 
life of the Internet—a full decade after the development of the http 
protocol that underpins the World Wide Web. Napster incorporated 
in May of 1999. The company’s website “went live” in August of that 
year, offering an elegant user interface for locating and downloading 
music files compressed in the MP3 format via the Internet. As word 
spread among savvy Internet users Napster’s network experienced ex-
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ponential growth. Napster’s users began transferring not only current 
popular music, but also arcane, hard-to-find, and out-of-print music. 
Within weeks of Napster’s launch, the traffic to and from Napster’s 
servers was becoming a significant problem for network administrators 
at universities across the U.S. Recognizing the significant likelihood 
that much of this traffic was enabling infringements of copyright, the 
Recording Industry Association of America filed suit against Napster 
in December of 1999. In January of 2000, after discovering that some-
where between 20 to 30 percent of all the traffic on its servers was 
Napster-directed, Northwestern University blocked student access to 
Napster on its networks (Gold). In April of 2000, the hard rock band 
Metallica, and hip-hop producer and performer Dr. Dre also sued 
Napster, alleging copyright infringement and racketeering (Borland). 
Napster, in the wake of the publicity afforded by these high-profile 
lawsuits, became far and away the most popular file-transfer service 
on the Internet. This prompted an additional wave of legal go-rounds 
and injunctions, ultimately resulting in the demise of Napster as a 
free peer-to-peer network, when its servers were shut down in July of 
2001.
At its peak, Napster is estimated to have had more than 80 million 
registered users. In just the month of February of 2001, the best esti-
mates suggest that 2.8 billion files were transferred over the network 
Napster facilitated (Kornblum). Because the Internet is international 
in its scope and reach, it is impossible to determine what percentage of 
these transfers were made by United States-based users, but given the 
general distribution of computer technology worldwide, it is almost 
certain that the vast majority of Napster’s users hailed from the U.S. 
And this use of Napster was transpiring despite the users’ awareness 
that the technology at the heart of Napster’s network was based on a 
questionable interpretation of U.S. copyright laws. In fact, Napster 
users’ knowledge of the possibility that a July 29, 2000 injunction 
could shut down Napster’s servers prompted a flurry of download-
ing in the few days before the injunction was to take effect (Kon-
rad, “Napster Fans”). The dramatic spike in downloads suggests that 
Napster fans were actively indulging in a “last call” in anticipation of 
the court ruling Napster to be illegal. When Napster finally did shut 
down, in 2001, similar services, pursuing a second dot-com bubble, 
were leaping to fill the void.
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In 2006, the number of users of post-Napster peer-to-peer ap-
plications including Kazaa, BitTorrent, and various Gnutella clients 
dwarfed Napster’s purported totals. And these users are downloading 
without evident regard for the lawsuits threatened by the Recording 
Industry Association of America. Indeed, peer-to-peer users have, by 
and large, persisted in the same patterns of behavior that they did via 
Napster, and have even extended their napsterization of cultural arti-
facts, freely downloading film, video, and photographic files via cur-
rent peer-to-peer applications. And they are often doing so in defiance 
of the law as it is commonly (mis)understood.
Organizations representing the corporations and businesses associ-
ated with the marketing and sale of creative work, especially music and 
motion pictures, have argued for years that Internet-based transfers of 
media files threaten their livelihood. The particularly vociferous com-
plaints of film studios, as represented by the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America (MPAA) and record companies, as represented by the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) have risen steadily 
as the Internet expanded. In the mid-1990s, as the Internet shifted 
decisively from its early roots in academia (reflected in the preponder-
ance of “dot edu” domains) to a more commercial orientation (“dot 
com”), the consistency with which the film and music industry made 
parallel arguments critiquing Internet practices prompted the coin-
age of the umbrella term content industries, which now functions as a 
shorthand descriptor for the largest and most powerful media compa-
nies. As this book heads to press, the content industries seem to have 
both won and lost these arguments. Most U.S. residents have been 
persuaded (in some cases, incorrectly) that peer-to-peer networks traf-
ficking in copyrighted materials are violating the law. That said, many 
people continue to download copyrighted materials in spite of their 
understanding that this activity is quite possibly illegal.
This book will address the content industries’ arguments, and the 
key terms and metaphors underpinning their arguments. This book 
will also interrogate peer-to-peer enthusiasts’ various responses to these 
arguments, and the limited applicability of this community’s favored 
metaphors and models. In particular, I will endeavor to explain how 
it is that the content industries’ efforts have proven demonstrably per-
suasive in U.S. courts and in the houses of Congress but also have de-
monstrably failed to persuade peer-to-peer enthusiasts to change their 
behavior. The arguments made throughout the peer-to-peer debates 
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are often striking in and of themselves, but this book will place them 
in the broader context of how citizens persuade one another on matters 
of public policy, and the consequences of these persuasive efforts.
My training in rhetorical theory and history offers me consider-
able support in my efforts to understand the peer-to-peer debates. To 
my initial surprise, the peer-to-peer debates have been driven chiefly 
by appeals to emotion and to the personal credibility of the partici-
pants—Aristotle’s pathos and ethos appeals, respectively—at the ex-
pense of the logos appeal. At first blush, the peer-to-peer debate would 
seem resolvable almost solely through recourse to questions of logic 
and reason, the kinds of questions historically recognized as the prov-
ince of logos. Indeed, because the peer-to-peer debates ultimately stem 
from a public policy question, we might anticipate the debate to be 
characterized by the kinds of persuasive strategies conventionally asso-
ciated with logos appeals. In his treatment of logos for the Encyclopedia 
of Rhetoric and Composition, George Yoos offers the following exhaus-
tive list of the logos appeal’s preferred rhetorical strategies: “premises, 
warrants, evidence, facts, data, observations, backing, support, expla-
nations, causes, signs, commonplaces, principles, or maxims” (411). 
Yoos specifies that this list applies only to the disciplines of “oratory 
and public address, argumentation, and forensics,” acknowledging 
that logical operations outside these fields might take on additional 
forms. But even this circumscribed list initially seems adequate to the 
task of unpacking the peer-to-peer debates. Yoos’s fourteen favored 
logos strategies appear to encompass the arc of arguments rising from 
the debate.
But as the peer-to-peer debates unfolded, these persuasive strate-
gies were repeatedly supplanted by arguments grounded in appeals to 
authority (ethos) and emotion (pathos). This narrative offers a telling 
index of the politics of persuasion in the 21st Century. The participants 
in the peer-to-peer debates have largely abandoned logos appeals be-
cause these appeals do not resonate with the general public as power-
fully as ethos and pathos appeals.
In my decade as a rhetorician addressing questions of invention, au-
thorship, and copyright, I have often wondered why arguments about 
copyright generate so much passion. Though most people claim to 
know little about intellectual property law, many also have extremely 
strong opinions about their rights and responsibilities as consumers of 
popular media. Internet discussion groups are filled with individuals 
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raging about digital rights management (DRM) and the decline of the 
public domain. But the stakes of debates over intellectual property are 
never life-and-death, and recent history is, unfortunately, filled with 
examples of actual life-and-death arguments. At times, my research on 
the rhetoric of the peer-to-peer debates seemed trivial when compared 
with potential work on the rhetoric attendant to war, or debates over 
the right to abortion, or the right of habeas corpus, to highlight just 
a few examples. And yet I have persisted, because I’ve come to rec-
ognize that in this case my training as a rhetorician meshes with my 
own history as a music critic, record collector, and exceedingly briefly 
(and ineptly) as a performing musician. In short, my lifelong connec-
tion to popular music intersects with these issues in ways that help me 
understand the discourse of this debate’s participants. And while the 
stakes of intellectual property debates ultimately devolve to who gets 
paid how much and when, the mechanism for assuring fair compensa-
tion—a limited monopoly right—has profound consequences for the 
circulation and availability of cultural artifacts.
Further, I’ve come to sense that the actions of the participants in 
these debates speak more generally to the nature and character of the 
U.S. political process. These debates offer a window into how policy 
is set in the U.S., and the understanding drawn from these debates is 
helpful when one wishes to understand the often-convoluted machi-
nations of the U.S. Congress as it works to make law, or when one 
endeavors to extract some measure of reason from the latest Federal 
verdict in a copyright case. Given the U.S.’s current position as an in-
ternational superpower, the machinations of Congressional leadership 
radiate well beyond this country’s borders. My hope is that by offering 
a clear account of the politics of persuasion in a debate I’m especially 
equipped to interpret, I will also offer readers a sharpened sense of the 
current state of political persuasion in our media-saturated era.
In part, the curious nature of the peer-to-peer debates reflects the 
unusual politics of intellectual property within the U.S. This was driv-
en home for me during my travels as a teacher. In the summer of 2000, 
I journeyed to Ukraine for three weeks as part of an international 
teaching team. During the trip I had a brief opportunity to live in a 
culture largely untouched by Western intellectual property laws, and 
this affected many elements of my stay.
Our Ukrainian hosts were extremely generous with the limited 
computer resources they had, which felt slow and cumbersome to a 
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spoiled U.S. academic used to DSL and T1 lines plugged into his home 
and office computers. Most of the computers I used in Ukraine were 
running on pirated copies of Microsoft’s Windows operating system, 
and the pirated copies were sometimes incomplete. At our first stop, 
in Dniepropetrovsk, I reoriented myself to the Web and e-mail at dial-
up speeds. The Internet had become my medium of choice for com-
municating with friends and family, as the costs and logistical hurdles 
involved in making international telephone calls were discouraging, 
to say the least. (I recall paying what I perceived to be a fair sum for 
what I thought was a 200 minute phone card, only to dial home and 
watch the 200 seconds I had purchased tick down on the phone’s LED 
display.) So, over the course of my stay, I ultimately relied on e-mail to 
keep in contact with my wife, friends, and family. Because the bootleg 
Windows operating system on the local computers was well-removed 
from any opportunities for legal technical support, the computers were 
maintained by immensely talented programmers (most of whom ap-
peared to be in their early twenties) who developed software-based 
bridges whenever they were needed to prop up the operating system. 
Thus the Windows OS—an emphatically proprietary product in the 
U.S.—was functioning on the model of open source software, with 
hackers revising, patching, and improving the software to meet the 
specific needs of Ukrainian users.
At our second stop, in Uzhgorod, my colleagues and I depended 
on a small computer lab stocked with underpowered Windows-based 
computers all sharing a single telephone connection. While I had set-
tled into managing with diminished processing speed in Dnieprope-
trovsk, the Uzhgorod lab connections were much slower, and over time 
I discovered why. In addition to e-mail exchanges and Web surfing, 
the student technicians managing the lab had queued an enormous 
number of MP3 files for downloading to the lab’s fastest machine. 
While we were struggling to compose and send out our daily updates 
to our loved ones, Marilyn Manson’s latest eruptions were streaming 
in.
At the end of the Ukraine trip I had the opportunity to briefly 
visit Kiev’s city center. In one subway station, I saw a salesman with a 
table full of jewel-cased discs. Many of the discs contained obviously 
counterfeit versions of popular software programs, but the remainder 
were music discs, albeit unlike any I had ever seen in the States. Many 
of the music discs were also obviously counterfeit, featuring the same 
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obvious flaws seen in pirated CDs sold in major U.S. cities: blurry re-
productions of cover and disc art, absence of a complete booklet, and 
cheap paper stock. But there was also a “brand” (of sorts) of compact 
disc, with songs recorded in MP3 format, which featured all of the 
records (to that date) released by particular performers. I purchased 
three of these discs, released by a company calling itself “Domosh-
nyaya Kollektsia” (roughly “Home Collection” and hereinafter, simply 
DK), paying roughly $10, U.S. for each disc. The disc for alternative 
rock band R.E.M. comprehensively collected all of its official releases, 
from a 1982 debut E.P. to the 1998 album, “Up.” The disc for pro-
ducer and ex-Roxy Music member Brian Eno similarly encompassed 
fifteen albums from 1973 to 1998. But the most impressive disc was 
the Iggy Pop collection, which incorporated the three official album 
releases of Pop’s work as a member of the Stooges, sixteen of Pop’s sub-
sequent albums, a tribute album to Pop, and, for good measure, a song 
Figure 1. The Ukrainian Iggy Pop MP3 Collection.
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Pop had contributed to the soundtrack of the obscure movie “Arizona 
Dream.” Several of the albums reproduced on this disc are so rare that 
they are nearly impossible to find in the United States.
The DK discs clearly represent the kind of piracy that major re-
cord labels dread. From their perspective, the Iggy Pop disc represents 
over $250 worth of retail purchases (at $15 per CD) compressed onto 
a single disc. These collections are by no means perfect substitutes for 
traditional compact discs. While the disc includes JPEG images of 
each of the CD booklet covers, all of the additional frills sometimes 
found in a CD package are missing. There are no lyrics, no songlists 
(as would typically be found on the “J-card” that typically functions 
as a CD’s back cover), and the music files themselves are mid-quality 
MP3 files—essentially heavily compressed distillations of the original 
recordings.
Then again . . . close enough for rock and roll.
What the DK discs lack in visual content and elegance, they more 
than make up for in musical comprehensiveness and portability. While 
audiophiles can distinguish between compressed MP3 files and the 
richer source versions found on retail CDs, more typical music fans 
have embraced MP3 files without recognizing a significant drop-off 
in their enjoyment. The distinctions between CDs and MP3s, which 
might be apparent in an optimum listening environment quickly, evap-
orate when music is experienced via earbud headphones, or through 
computer speakers, or pumping out of a boombox. For a significant 
percentage of music consumers, the DK discs would be perceived as 
better and more useful than the legitimate releases.
It is difficult to imagine discs like these ever circulating legally 
in the United States. The record industry has largely succeeded in 
habituating consumers to the purchase of 30 to 75 minutes of music 
on a single disc for $15 to $20. At present, there is no real incentive 
for the industry to shift from this distribution model other than the 
clear threat posed by rampant downloading of music via the Internet. 
Sale of single disc MP3 collections would require a radical shift in 
the music industry’s business models, and so far the record companies 
would rather fight than switch.
My trip to Ukraine offered me repeated opportunities to experi-
ence a culture that had, for a range of reasons including brute eco-
nomic necessity, opted out of the Western copyright system. The prac-
tical consequences of Ukraine’s failure to adhere to international copy-
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right laws were, from a consumer perspective, largely positive. The 
Windows operating system, locked down by copyright in the United 
States, was subject to relentless hacking and tinkering in Ukraine, and 
the by-product was a more adaptable and flexible version of the OS. 
In the case of popular music, from a consumer standpoint, Ukraine 
is superficially preferable to the U.S. Though the MP3 CDs I pur-
chased did not feature stellar sound quality, the discs were expansive, 
comprehensive and inexpensive, and, as such, a welcome alternative to 
traditional compact discs. Of course, Ukraine depends on the Western 
copyright regime to produce the discs that served as the bases for these 
pirated editions. And the content industries have argued that without 
fair compensation, artists will simply stop producing. The $10 MP3 
CD collection is detached from the revenue stream that currently sus-
tains record companies, retailers, and (at least in theory) recording art-
ists. It could not become a global norm without a radical restructuring 
of the way content industries distribute their products and the ways 
these products are protected. Because the content industries generate 
enormous income, even with the current levels of piracy, bootlegging, 
and appropriation, there is limited incentive for companies to begin 
this restructuring process. Recent history suggests that record compa-
nies believe they are successfully shifting the terms of the peer-to-peer 
debates in their own favor and that they are gaining traction in their 
efforts to stem the tide of unauthorized peer-to-peer downloads.
The record companies may well be wrong.
In May of 2003, Kazaa Media Desktop claimed the title of “most 
downloaded software in the history of the Internet.” By the end of 
that month, individuals had downloaded over 230 million copies of 
the file-transfer software. They did so despite persistent reports that 
the software included “sneakware” and “spyware’—surreptitiously in-
stalled applications that would appropriate computer processing power 
and monitor computer usage, sending the by-products of both back to 
Kazaa’s parent company. Indeed, at that time the description of Kazaa 
Media Desktop at Download.com, one of the major sources for the 
software, featured the following warning:
Editor’s note: This download includes additional ap-
plications bundled with the software’s installer file. 
Third-party applications bundled with this download 
may record your surfing habits, deliver advertising, col-
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lect private information, or modify your system settings. 
Pay close attention to the end user license agreement 
and installation options. For more information, read 
Download.com’s guide to adware.
Further, these 230 million downloads occurred despite the general un-
derstanding that Kazaa’s software was designed to enable a potentially 
illegal activity: downloading copyrighted music and media files.
In most cases, downloads pursued by Kazaa’s users were of popular 
music in the MP3 format. Though this format was initially developed 
as part of a project for compressing motion pictures (the full name 
of the format is “Motion Picture Experts Group Audio Layer III”) 
the format proved exceptionally useful for the transmission of audio 
files. When the format was developed in 1995, few computers had 
the high-bandwidth connections needed to transmit full motion video 
files, which measured in the hundreds of megabytes no matter how 
dramatic the compression. But audio files, when compressed via the 
MP3 format, typically measured between three and six megabytes of 
data. Files of this size could be transferred over dial-up connections 
in under ten minutes, and, on high-speed connections, a single song 
would typically download in well under a minute.
The American public has since demonstrated a voracious appetite 
for MP3 and MP3-type music files and has persisted in using peer-
to-peer networks to download music despite the implicit threats to 
privacy posed by Kazaa and the possible illegality of their actions (as 
implied by the injunction that closed Napster as a “free” peer-to-peer 
network). This book addresses the questions raised by the American 
public’s continuing and expanding use of peer-to-peer technologies in 
spite of ongoing campaigns to characterize peer-to-peer downloads as 
criminal behavior. While the majority of the public now seems to have 
been persuaded that their actions might well be illegal, they aren’t buy-
ing the larger argument—that they must cease and desist download-
ing. Nor, apparently, are they buying as many compact discs as they 
once did, though this may or may not be attributable to peer-to-peer 
downloading.
For the Internet to reach its full potential, content must be af-
fordable, available, and readily accessible. At present, copyright law is 
functioning as an obstacle to use and circulation of material through-
out the Internet, despite its foundational imperative—as expressed in 
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the U.S. Constitution—to “promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.” In her 2001 book Digital Copyright, legal scholar Jessica Litman 
argues that existing law has become too complex for this purpose:
If ordinary people are to see copyrights as equiva-
lents to tangible property and accord copyright rules 
the respect they give to other property rules, then 
we would need, at a minimum, to teach them the 
rules that govern intellectual property when we teach 
them the rules that govern other personal property, 
which is to say in elementary school. The problem, 
though, is that our current copyright statute could 
not be taught in elementary school, because elemen-
tary school students couldn’t understand it. Indeed, 
their teachers couldn’t understand it. Copyright law-
yers don’t understand it. (Digital 58)
Litman ends her book by concluding: “people don’t obey laws that 
they don’t believe in” (195). And indeed, to the extent that average 
American citizens engage with intellectual property laws, they under-
stand them to be maddeningly complex, unfair, or insignificant, or 
some combination of all three.
This concern becomes particularly pronounced when one acknowl-
edges that the principal users of peer-to-peer technologies for music 
and motion picture downloads are college students. Major research 
universities were among the first institutions to make the significant 
investments in networking technologies needed to make peer-to-peer 
transfers viable. At present, universities are competing with one anoth-
er to offer ever-faster broadband and wireless Internet access through-
out their campuses. A generation of students is growing accustomed 
to the expectation that high-speed Internet access will be available to 
them whenever they open their laptops. Many (if not most) of these 
students regard copyright law with a learned sense of contempt.
In the modern research university we see widespread high-speed 
Internet access colliding with the general academic culture of relative-
ly free circulation of information. While students and their families 
pay increasingly exorbitant tuition, once these bills are paid, students 
have effectively free access to an astonishing array of cultural artifacts. 
A good research library, when paired with digital access to propri-
etary databases like LEXIS-NEXIS (as is common on most campus-
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es), means students can pursue their research questions by locating 
full text articles from most of the magazines on a typical newsstand, 
almost all of the world’s major newspapers, and the ever-increasing 
number of academic journals serving disciplines from aerobiology to 
zootomy. The value and volume of material circulating “freely” on 
college campuses has soared exponentially with the advent of the In-
ternet. And this largely unlimited access to information is dependent 
upon U.S. copyright law’s acknowledgment that “progress” depends 
on a balance between private monopolies and public access. Because 
they are so dependent upon research, academic institutions, for better 
and for worse, are the spaces in which the limits of intellectual prop-
erty law are recalibrated, reevaluated, and, sometimes, revised. But 
academics have not always fully recognized their special obligation to 
shape debates over intellectual property policies.
Since the mid-1970s, U.S. academics have come to rely on what 
is known as the “fair use exception” to copyright law. The exception 
codified a widely recognized principle that educational institutions 
and libraries ought to be granted some leeway in their uses of copy-
righted materials. The 1976 revision of the U.S. Copyright Act speci-
fies “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship,[and] research” as special activi-
ties wherein users may be entitled to make substantial use of copy-
righted materials without making payment or securing permission (17 
U.S. Code, sec. 107). The revision outlines a four-point test to be ap-
plied by courts on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a given 
use is a “fair use or infringement.” Courts are directed to consider:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.
Under the 1976 fair use doctrine, a classroom instructor at a public 
university distributing multiple copies of an excerpt from a copyrighted 
article drawn from a disciplinary journal (thereby potentially stimulat-
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ing interest in the work and thus enhancing its value) would almost 
certainly have been judged to have made a fair use of the copyrighted 
material. But if that same instructor were to compile a coursepack of 
whole articles for a third party to sell to students, courts might well 
find—as a federal district court found in the 1991 case Basic Books 
v. Kinko’s—that such a compilation is too commercial, that it incor-
porates too much (i.e., all) of the copyrighted works, and that it will 
likely have a negative effect on the values of the copyrighted works, 
and, thus, is an infringing use of those articles.
As the Basic Books decision implies, the three decades since the cod-
ification of fair use have been marked by increasingly circumscribed 
opportunities for public access to and use of copyrighted materials and 
by a radical shift in the general perception of what might constitute 
reasonable and legal use of protected works. One among many ex-
amples will serve to illustrate this shift. Universities have, for decades, 
been experimenting with long-distance delivery of their instruction 
to affiliated campuses and students. Prior to 2002, instructors in dis-
tance education classrooms might reasonably have presumed that the 
rules established for face-to-face classrooms would be maintained for 
distance delivery. If, for example, an instructor determined that the 
class would be best served by screening a film, the instructor would 
almost certainly have concluded that the “safe harbor” offered by fair 
use, especially the allowance of “multiple copies for classroom use” 
would eliminate the likelihood of a copyright conflict. The 2002 pas-
sage of the TEACH Act, however, radically complicates the decision-
making process for all instructors involved in distance education. The 
above-cited four-point fair use test has been widely criticized for its 
complexity and for its inability to produce definitive determinations as 
to whether a given use is fair until a case is litigated, but the 1976 Act’s 
fair use “test” is a model of clarity when measured against the TEACH 
Act’s network of interlocking standards and guidelines. The legalese of 
the act itself is alarmingly incomprehensible. Because the Act itself is 
so abstruse, universities are endeavoring to provide guidance to those 
teachers who persist in wishing to make use of copyrighted materi-
als in their classrooms. For example, the University of Texas’s “Crash 
Course in Copyright” features a Web-based guide to the TEACH Act 
and offers this helpful gloss on the new standards instructors should 
employ to determine whether a given use of copyrighted material is 
permitted by the TEACH Act:
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1. The performance or display must be:
a. A regular part of systematic mediated instructional activity;
b. Made by, at the direction of, or under the supervision of the 
instructor;
c. Directly related and of material assistance to the teaching 
content; and
d. For and technologically limited to students enrolled in the 
class.
2. The institution must:
a. Have policies and provide information about, and give 
notice that the materials used may be protected by, copy-
right;
b. Apply technological measures that reasonably prevent re-
cipients from retaining the works beyond the class session 
and further distributing them; and
c. Not interfere with technological measures taken by copy-
right  owners that prevent retention and distribution. 
(Harper)
Any distance education instructor without the patience of Job would 
quickly conclude that the requirements of the TEACH Act far out-
weigh the benefits of making use of copyrighted materials. Indeed, 
the Act seems designed to present a series of obstacles to use, and also 
to tacitly encourage instructors to forego making use of copyrighted 
materials altogether. The above-cited steps 2.a. and 2.b., both fair 
summaries of the Act’s requirements, place instructors in the uncom-
fortable position of policing their institutions’ compliance with the 
TEACH Act. If an instructor determines that her academic institution 
has not yet established clear policies with respect to copyright and not 
yet provided ample notice of copyright protections to students, the 
TEACH Act discourages her from making use of copyrighted mate-
rial in the classroom and implicitly encourages her to begin instigating 
institutional changes.
A dutiful instructor who keeps abreast of intellectual property poli-
cies and teaches in distance education classrooms ends up engaging 
students in conversations like this:
Instructor: At this point, I had hoped to show the film Desk Set, 
which ably speaks to the questions of gender and tech-
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nology that we’ve been addressing in this class, but 
due to the provisions of the TEACH Act, I’m afraid 
I will not be showing it in class, though I encourage 
you to watch it on your own time, if you can get your 
hands on a copy . . . 
Student:  Is it available online?
Instructor: Not legally. There is a copy at our library, but there 
are no copies at the distance sites.
Student:  So why can’t you show it in class?
Instructor: I’m not sure I can meet the TEACH Act’s require-
ment that I somehow prevent additional copies being 
derived from the “broadcast” of the film across our 
campuses.
Student:  (peering up from an open laptop) I just looked that 
movie up on Amazon. It’s only eight bucks used. 
What if I buy it and rip DVD copies for everyone 
who can’t get it from their library? Then you can send 
them the copies and we can discuss the film later this 
semester . . . 
Instructor: That’s a very generous offer, but the TEACH Act re-
ally is directed at ensuring that copies of copyright-
ed materials don’t get into circulation, so I probably 
shouldn’t forward them . . . 
Student:  OK, how about this? You call in sick on Thursday. I’ll 
go up to the podium, hook up my laptop and screen 
the library’s copy of the movie. Then you come back 
Tuesday and we’ll discuss the movie.
Instructor: As pleased as I am with your apparent interest in this 
fifty-year-old film, the point of the law is to prevent 
the kinds of distributions you’re talking about, even 
though we often screen films in face-to-face class-
rooms. Apparently, Congress was really concerned 
about schools facilitating the widespread copying and 
circulation of copyrighted materials.
Student:  But this isn’t like when we watch Spider-Man in a 
friend’s dorm room. It’s not just entertainment. You 
want us to discuss and criticize what’s in the film, 
right? That’s part of the “educational process,” right?
Instructor: That’s the idea, yes.
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Student: And we can’t do that because we’re in a distance class-
room? But you could screen the film in a regular 
class?
Instructor: That’s how I interpret the law.
Student:  That’s bullshit!
This is a lightly fictionalized distillation of a number of conversations I 
have had with students over the past few years. While profanity is nei-
ther common nor encouraged in my classrooms, discussions of copy-
right inevitably seem to end up with a student arriving at this precise 
expletive to describe the strictures of copyright law. And, we should 
note, the TEACH Act is functionally amending laws that date back to 
the U.S.’s first copyright law, entitled “An Act for the Encouragement 
of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts and Books to 
the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies during the Times there-
in mentioned.” The text of the TEACH Act is all the evidence one 
would ever need that U.S. Copyright law is now well removed from 
any meaningful “encouragement of learning.”
Peer-to-peer technologies, when paired with the T1-line access to 
the Internet offered by most universities and colleges, offer a sharp 
counterpoint to increasingly constrained classroom environments. 
Students (albeit at their own peril) are surfing a vast media library 
whose riches rival those envisioned by Jorge Luis Borges in his uni-
versally comprehensive (and necessarily fictional) “Library of Babel.” 
They live in dormitories where access to cultural artifacts is function-
ally unlimited, so long as one turns a blind eye toward copyright law. 
But they work in classrooms where instructors are constrained from 
making the kinds of choices they once made without apprehension 
because it is legally risky for institutions to turn a willfully blind eye 
toward copyright law.
If academics fail to make persuasive cases for the ethical and rea-
sonable uses of copyrighted materials in their classrooms, they are con-
tributing to a culture in which copyright law remains both inexpli-
cable and widely disregarded by the general public. Academia’s failure 
to mount a campaign strong enough to block the plainly unworkable 
TEACH Act (along with the attendant failures to prevent a twenty-
year extension to the term of copyright and the unduly harsh penalties 
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act) have practical consequences 
for the digitally engaged students of the twenty-first century. Because 
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even the most reasonable and ethical uses of copyrighted materials 
trigger copyright concerns, these students are concluding, like Dick-
ens’s Mr. Bumble, that “the law is a ass—a idiot.” And, incidentally, 
Dickens’s Bumble is well-known and often quoted in the U.S. largely 
because books like Oliver Twist were sold in cheap pirated editions 
throughout the U.S. in the mid-to-late nineteenth Century.
The U.S.’s adherence to general principles of international copy-
right has been fitful, and this nation’s heavy emphasis on the public 
benefit (as opposed to rewarding effort by authors and inventors) is 
anomalous in an international context. For many years, the U.S.’s ap-
proach to copyright has been largely successful, fueling considerable 
successes in publishing, film, and music. But at present, I stand with 
many notable scholars in the fields of rhetoric, composition, literature, 
cultural studies, and legal studies (among them Dan Burk, Rebecca 
Moore Howard, Peter Jaszi, Karen Burke LeFevre, Lawrence Lessig, 
Jessica Litman, Andrea Lunsford, James E. Porter, Jacqueline Jones 
Royster, Siva Vaidhyanathan, and Martha Woodmansee) who have 
argued that in the past few decades, the U.S. has lost the balance that 
fueled these successes and that current law no longer serves the Con-
stitutional call for promotion of science and useful arts as effectively 
as it should.
My sense is that the effort to develop informed policies with re-
spect to access to and use of information via the Internet will ben-
efit greatly by increased attention to the language used to shape these 
policies. With this in mind, each of the five core chapters of this book 
addresses a key term or metaphoric frame at or near the center of the 
peer-to-peer debates.
Methodologically, I describe this book as a work of rhetorical histori-
cism. My approach is rooted in the subset of rhetorical criticism Edwin 
Black referred to as historical criticism, focused on the tasks of “authen-
tication of texts and their interpretation in the light of biographical, 
social, and ideological evidence” (37). I undertake these tasks guided 
by Michel Foucault’s admonitions, embedded in his description of his 
archaeological method, to evaluate rhetorical performances by paying 
particular attention to who is speaking, to the institutional sites autho-
rizing discourse, and to the situation of the subject within social net-
works (51–53). My efforts to analyze and critique particular rhetorical 
actions and their relationships within their broader cultural contexts do 
not correspond precisely to Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical 
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methods, but they do resonate with two critical practices that are rooted 
in Foucault’s methodology: Steven Mailloux’s rhetorical hermeneutics 
and Stephen Greenblatt’s new historicism. Mailloux describes rhetorical 
hermeneutics as a practice of “tak[ing] an historical act of interpretation [. 
. .] and do[ing] a rhetorical analysis of the cultural conversations in which 
that act participated” (“Revisited” 238–39) or, more epigrammatically, 
“us[ing] rhetoric to practice theory by doing history” (“Revisited” 233). 
Rhetorical hermeneutics encourages critics to read particular rhetorical 
actions in terms of their participation in broader cultural networks, there-
by offering a greater balance between text and context than competing 
critical methods. Similarly, Greenblatt’s new historicism interprets partic-
ular literary texts in terms of contemporaneous texts and circumstances, 
seeking to understand particular texts not as transcending their cultural 
conversations, but as embedded within and responding to them. Both 
rhetorical hermeneutics and new historicism encourage particular atten-
tion to the operations of cultural power as effected through language. 
My rhetorical historicism shares an attention to the operations of power 
in cultural contexts, but with a particular focus on key terms and how 
their meanings are transformed by particular rhetorical agents over time, 
rather than on texts and their relationships to one another.
The peer-to-peer debates are rich with contested terms. This book 
focuses on five terms that have served as focal points for the competing 
parties in these debates. When these terms are read with attention to their 
position in broader cultural networks, it becomes clear that the rhetoric 
of the peer-to-peer debates fails to meet the ethical and logical standards 
that have long been acknowledged by those who study persuasion. Over 
the course of this book’s central chapters, I argue that the past decade’s 
presentations of peer-to-peer file transfers as “hacking,” “theft,” “piracy,” 
“sharing,” and “war,” consistently distort both the technologies and the 
social behaviors they purport to describe.
By aggressively interrogating the language and the arguments de-
ployed by participants in the peer-to-peer debates, I seek to elevate the 
discourse at the heart of this important conversation. Digital media offer 
opportunities to efficiently archive and access the bulk of artistic and 
intellectual work created since the dawn of humanity. This is not an over-
statement. The potential intellectual and social utility of these now-hypo-
thetical archives is staggering. Our challenge is to engage in a principled 
argument about how best to achieve this goal. To date, as this book will 
document, the rhetoric of the peer-to-peer debates suggests that we have 
yet to meet this challenge. 
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2 Hackers, Crackers, and 
the Criminalization of Peer-
to-Peer Technologies
Of all the shifting, fluid terms used to describe the Internet and its 
associated cultures, no term is more contested than “hacker.” The 
resonances embedded within this term not only proved critical to the 
outcome of the Napster case, they also continue to shape the U.S.’s 
dialogue on whether peer-to-peer technologies should remain legal. 
Peer-to-peer technologies have, effectively, been tarred by their linger-
ing association with the questionable practices of hackers, or, more 
properly, the subset of hackers known in some circles as “crackers.”
In this chapter, I adapt Stephen Mailloux’s rhetorical hermeneutics 
to illuminate the shifting meanings ascribed to the word, “hacker” 
and the social forces responsible for those shifts. As Mailloux explains, 
rhetorical hermeneutics “views shared interpretive strategies not as the 
creative origin of texts but rather as historical sets of topics, arguments, 
tropes, ideologies, and so forth which determine how texts are estab-
lished as meaningful through rhetorical exchange” (Power 15). The 
strategy at the heart of the approach Mailloux outlines is ably summa-
rized by Michael Leff as “thick descriptions of interpretative practices 
that are mindful of the shifting political positions of those who engage 
in them” (197). Accordingly, this chapter will offer a thick description 
of the historical circumstances surrounding the early usage and subse-
quent repurposings of the term “hacker.”
Tracing the shifts in the meaning of “hacker” provides a lens with 
which we can understand the larger cultural shifts associated with the 
Internet and with peer-to-peer technologies in particular. To do so, we 
must work our way back to an understanding of what hacker meant 
to those who coined and used the term before it entered the general 
public’s vocabulary. Once this baseline is established, it will be possible 
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to interrogate why the meaning of the term has shifted so dramati-
cally, and more importantly, who might be responsible for this shift. 
This chapter argues, in part, that shifts in the meanings of key terms 
relating to computers and the Internet do not simply evolve. Rather, 
they are contested sites where interested parties struggle to frame the 
activities at the heart of the term according to their preferences and 
perceived needs.
In the introduction to his 2002 book Hacker Culture, Douglas 
Thomas writes that “the very definition of the term ‘hacker’ is widely 
and fiercely disputed by both critics of and participants in the com-
puter underground” (ix). In a similar vein, in the preface to his 2001 
book, The Hacker Ethic, Pekka Himanen offers a compressed account 
of the key shifts in the use of the term:
[A] group of MIT’s passionate programmers started 
calling themselves hackers in the early sixties. (Later, 
in the mid-eighties, the media started applying the 
term to computer criminals. In order to avoid the 
confusion with virus writers and intruders into infor-
mation systems, hackers began calling these destruc-
tive computer users crackers. (vii-viii)
But Himanen’s account is problematic, in that even the first generation 
hackers have a demonstrable history of “intruding into information 
systems.” In fact, one of the earliest references to “hackers” is found 
in a November, 1963, edition of The Tech, MIT’s campus newspaper. 
The article reports:
The hackers have accomplished such things as tying 
up all the tie-lines between Harvard and MIT, or 
making long-distance calls by charging them to a 
local radar installation. One method involved con-
necting the PDP-1 computer to the phone system to 
search the lines until a dial tone, indicating an out-
side line, was found. (Lichstein)
While these activities border on the kind of collegiate hijinks some-
times dismissed as youthful indiscretions, there was also a clear sense 
that these early hackers were violating the law. A quotation ascribed 
to MIT Professor Carlton Tucker reflects the academy’s apparent am-
bivalence toward these activities:
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Tucker said “If any of these people are caught (by 
the telephone company) they are liable to be put in 
jail. I try to warn them and protect them.” While 
Tucker felt “we don’t have too much trouble with the 
boys; we appreciate their curiosity,” he also said that 
repeated involvement, for instance, caused the expul-
sion from the Institute of one member of the Class of 
’63 one week before his graduation. (Lichstein)
Tucker’s language clearly implies that he viewed the penalties likely 
to be exacted by the telephone company and/or the law as excessive. 
Further, he suggests that the university would reserve its most severe 
punishment—expulsion—for those “boys” who repeatedly engaged in 
the activities described, presumably in the interest of encouraging the 
curiosity these hackers apparently exemplified.
Ultimately the distinction Himanen attempts to draw between 
the first generation of hackers and later so-called crackers hinges on 
a judgment with respect to the participants’ overall intent. First gen-
eration hackers’ intrusions are understood as generally benign and ex-
ploratory in nature, while the activities of those labeled “crackers” are 
understood as, by definition, destructive. Small wonder, then, that ef-
forts to recover an “originary” meaning for the term “hacker” have 
proven demonstrably unsuccessful. For the lay public, the meaning of 
the term is clear, and clearly negative. A hacker is an individual who 
deploys advanced knowledge of computers and the Internet in order 
to invade others’ machines. While the purpose of the hacker’s invasion 
might range from exploration to identity theft, the signature elements 
in the generally understood uses of the term hacker are criminal tres-
pass. The hacker violates someone else’s (virtual) property rights with-
out permission.
While it is already difficult to recall in full the culture and language 
of the first wave of hackers, there are a number of texts that function 
effectively as “time capsules,” offering snapshots of early hackers and 
their activities. Among the most important of these is a 1984 book 
by Steven Levy with the telling title, Hackers: Heroes of the Computer 
Revolution. Levy’s choice of “heroes” is underscored by the paperback 
edition’s front cover blurb, which reads, “What Tom Wolfe did for the 
original astronauts, Steven Levy has done for hackers.” Implicit in this 
comparison is the suggestion that hackers, like astronauts, are explor-
wwwww.parlorpress.comParlor Press
Hackers, Crackers, and the Criminalization of Peer-to-Peer Technologies 25
ers. Levy himself makes this connection in his preface, referring to 
hackers as “digital explorers” and writing:
Though some in the field used the term “hacker” as 
a form of derision, implying that hackers were either 
nerdy social outcasts or “unprofessional” program-
mers who wrote dirty, “nonstandard” computer code, 
I found them quite different. Beneath their often un-
imposing exteriors, they were adventurers, visionar-
ies, risk takers, artists [. . .] and the ones who most 
clearly saw why the computer was a revolutionary 
tool. Among themselves, they knew how far one could 
go by immersion into the deep concentration of the 
hacking mind-set: one could go infinitely far. (7)
Levy’s rhetorical flourishes indicate the degree to which he, and many 
of his contemporaries (including the hackers themselves), positioned 
the first generation of hackers as successors to the exploratory spirit 
embodied in the NASA astronauts. NASA’s last manned mission to 
the moon was in December of 1972. The space shuttle program, a 
comparatively modest endeavor, did not launch its first manned mis-
sion until 1981, and five years later, the explosion of the Columbia 
spacecraft would radically alter a generation’s perceptions of the pos-
sibilities and risks of exploring space. Thus, when the first generation 
of hackers reached the public’s consciousness in the mid-1970s—the 
U.S.’s exploration of what had once been described as “the final fron-
tier” had waned dramatically. NASA was no longer minting a steady 
supply of astronaut heroes, nor was it able to offer steady reassurance of 
the U.S.’s technological superiority. The plaque on one of the legs of the 
Eagle moon landing module reads: “Here men from the planet Earth 
first set foot upon the moon. July 1969 A.D. We came in peace for all 
mankind,” bespeaking an expansive ambition that features—embed-
ded within its language—a wish for a more unified global culture.
Though the astronauts did plant the U.S. flag on the moon’s sur-
face (arguably the most dramatic property claim in human history) 
the plaque’s language avoids referencing the event as a specifically 
American triumph—a choice that is striking given the degree to which 
the “space race” was a tethered to the Cold War politics of the time. 
When, three years later, NASA terminated the Apollo program, can-
celing three scheduled missions (Apollos 18–20) the U.S. was, for a 
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time, left with no real outlet for the exploratory impulse that, since 
at least Lewis and Clark, has been celebrated as fundamental to the 
nation’s ethos.
Levy’s account of the first generation of hackers not only expressly 
positions hackers as the latest in a long line of American explorers, 
it also suggests stridently that their motivations, like those of the as-
tronauts, were ultimately to offer something of value “for all man-
kind.” This is especially apparent in Levy’s codification of the “Hacker 
Ethic,” a summation of the shared principles adhered to by the major-
ity of the first generation of hackers. According to Levy, the generally 
recognized principles of the Hacker Ethic were:
• Access to computers—and anything which might teach you 
something about the way the world works—should be unlim-
ited and total.
• Always yield to the Hands-on Imperative!
• All information should be free.
• Mistrust authority—promote decentralization.
• Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria 
such as degrees, age, race or position.
• You can create art and beauty on a computer.
• Computers can change your life for the better. (39–45)
In Levy’s articulation of the Hacker Ethic it is possible to trace the con-
vergence of the U.S.’s historic valorization of exploration, exemplified 
at the time by the space program, with the idealistic social visions that 
grew out of the youth culture of the 1960s. While at first blush, the 
quasi-militaristic personae of the astronauts would appear to be wholly 
at odds with the politics of hippie/yippie cultures, both NASA and 
hippie leaders foregrounded their commitments to exploration in their 
personal and public presentations. While there is (almost) a world of 
difference between the Eagle lunar lander and the Merry Pranksters’ 
psychedelic tour bus, both share a commitment to traveling as far as 
possible, whether it be in outer space or “inner space.”
Histories of the Internet have long acknowledged the degree to 
which the architects of the Internet understood their work as an exten-
sion of the countercultural movements of the 1960s. In his expansive 
account of the Internet’s development, Nerds 2.01, Stephen Segaller 
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argues that hippie culture thoroughly permeated the Internet through-
out its first decade.
Indeed, the language of Levy’s Hacker Ethic has rhetorical roots 
that extend back at least as far as the 1962 Port Huron Statement, in 
which the college-age members of Students for a Democratic Society 
set the agenda for the tumultuous decade to follow, writing:
Men have unrealized potential for self-cultivation, 
self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity. It is 
this potential that we regard as crucial and to which 
we appeal, not to the human potentiality for violence, 
unreason, and submission to authority. The goal of 
man and society should be human independence. 
(Hayden, et al.)
Like the members of SDS and the youth movements that arose along-
side it, members of the first generation of hackers often had a vexed re-
lationship with the law. The collective commitment to “mistrust[ing] 
authority” carried with it an at times casual disregard for the legal 
principles that function as an expression of cultural authority. Further, 
the high cultural value associated with exploration prompted hacker 
forays into electronic spaces where they were at best unwelcome and 
at worst criminal.
In 1994, Levy composed an afterword for a new edition of Hackers 
in which he acknowledges that even the first generation of hackers—
the hackers he celebrates as “true hackers”—were not consistently re-
spectful of the laws governing their activities. Levy writes:
True, some of the most righteous hackers in history 
have been known to sneer at details such as property 
rights or the legal code in order to pursue the Hands-
On Imperative. And pranks have always been part of 
hacking. But the inference that such high jinks [sic] 
were the essence of hacking was not just wrong, it was 
offensive to true hackers, whose work had changed 
the world, and whose methods could change the way 
one viewed the world. (433)
Levy’s argument is that the transgressions of the first generation of 
hackers should be understood (and implicitly, should be dismissed) 
because these actions were peripheral to the larger goals of “chang-
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ing the world.” Again, the judgment hinges on a determination with 
respect to the hackers’ intent, but in place of Professor Tucker’s “boys 
will be boys” defense, we have Levy’s rather grandiose suggestion that 
the hackers’ visitation of others’ computers was participating in an ex-
pansive process of positive global transformation.
One hacker who arguably deserves Levy’s hyperbole is Richard 
Stallman, whose has worked for two decades as the leader and inspi-
ration for the “Free Software” movement and the chief developer of 
“GNU,” a resolutely free alternative to the proprietary UNIX oper-
ating system. Like Levy, Stallman cites “playfulness, cleverness, and 
exploration” as the signature elements of true hacking (15). Stallman’s 
own account of his efforts bespeaks an idealism rooted in the 1960s 
counterculture, and an overarching commitment to building commu-
nity via electronic spaces. Stallman traces his interest in developing 
GNU to the dissolution of the rich community of first and second 
generation hackers that surrounded him as he pursued his college edu-
cation in the early 1970s. After mourning this loss, Stallman deter-
mined to take action: “I looked for a way that a programmer could 
do something for the good. I asked myself, was there a program or 
programs that I could write, so as to make a community possible once 
again?” (17) Stallman’s “general public license,” which assures that the 
by-products of the GNU Project will circulate under parallel (i.e., free) 
license agreements, has served as a model for a generation of academ-
ics and programmers, including the prominent legal scholar Lawrence 
Lessig. Lessig’s Creative Commons foundation adapts the principles 
of Stallman’s software licenses and applies them to the broad range of 
“properties” subject to copyright protection, offering creators multiple 
opportunities to opt out of copyright’s more problematic “protections.” 
Stallman’s expansive vision remains obscure if measured in terms of 
market share, but highly significant if evaluated in terms of “mind 
share” among academics and others committed to transforming intel-
lectual property policies in favor of public access.
Relative to Stallman’s efforts, the achievements of hippie-inflect-
ed hacking often appear rather modest. While self-identified hackers 
were responsible for developing most of the elements of the Internet, 
Segaller’s history observes that one of the most popular uses of the early 
Internet network known as the WELL was the facilitation of trades of 
cassette-tape recordings of the Grateful Dead. Segaller writes:
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By 1984, as the Macintosh was launched, the hip-
pie origins of networking were once again beginning 
to show themselves. Part of the impetus came from 
an electronic version of the Whole Earth Catalog 
(whose Epilog had come and gone a decade earlier). 
Inevitably, it was Stewart Brand who originated and 
branded what he called the “Whole Earth ‘Lectronic 
Link,” or WELL. Now more users were able to tune 
in and turn on to the highs of networking, attracted 
by the chance to connect with like-minded people—
even “Dead” people. One should not underestimate 
the importance in the history of the Internet of the 
Grateful Dead. (269)
The Grateful Dead, of course, holds special significance in the pre-
history of the peer-to-peer debate. The Dead’s pioneering toleration 
of fans taping its concerts and subsequently trading the tapes is rou-
tinely pointed to as a potentially viable model for the kinds of con-
temporary exchanges of digital media made possible by peer-to-peer 
technologies. The band forbade the unauthorized sale of concert tapes, 
but encouraged fans to trade with one another, and thereby became 
one of the most successful touring bands ever. And the latter portion 
of the band’s career was unquestionably enhanced by the emergence 
of a technologically engaged fan base that would leverage the Internet 
in support of their Dead-focused activities. While the streamlining of 
cassette distribution is of limited cultural value, it is fortuitous that 
the modes and models established by this community radiated out 
throughout the WELL and ultimately, the Internet itself.
The WELL was instrumental in demonstrating the possibility and 
potential of online communities. At a time when the foundational 
1960s efforts to explore outer and inner spaces had surrendered to the 
cultural malaise of the mid-1970s, the exploration of what would come 
to be known as cyberspace offered exciting opportunities for a certain 
stripe of explorer. While not everyone would agree that the Internet 
offers “changed views of the world,” a generation of scholarship on the 
Internet has increasingly acknowledged the importance and value of 
the kinds of communities instantiated by first generation hackers in 
electronic spaces like the WELL.
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Whether or not one accepts these celebratory accounts of first gen-
eration hackers, the critical question raised by Levy’s recapitulation of 
the idealistic rhetoric of the time is this: By what means were the ad-
mittedly illicit but arguably harmless activities of Levy’s “true hackers” 
supplanted, in the public’s consciousness, by the putatively criminal 
activities of a subsequent wave? That this shift in meaning occurred, 
somewhere between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, is acknowledged 
by nearly all who write about the history of hacking. Levy ascribes the 
shift to the term’s increasing popularity blended with a kind of bad 
luck, in which self-described hackers who either misunderstood or ig-
nored the spirit of the Hacker Ethic assumed center stage owing to the 
ignorance of the mainstream media:
[F]or many true hackers [. . .] the popularization of 
the term was a disaster. Why? The word hacker had 
acquired a specific and negative connotation. The 
trouble began with some well-publicized arrests of 
teenagers who electronically ventured into forbidden 
digital grounds, like government computer systems. 
It was understandable that the journalists covering 
these stories would refer to the young perps as hack-
ers—after all that’s what the kids called themselves. 
But the word quickly became synonymous with “dig-
ital trespasser.” (432)
But it is only the publicity associated with the arrests that distinguishes 
these “young perps” from their hacker forebears. Government comput-
er systems have long been attractive targets for hackers. Those hackers 
whose ethical stance mandates exploration without disturbing the sites 
they “visit” typically argue that government sites typically house the 
most elaborate and, thus, most compelling aggregations of software 
and hardware. These cathedrals of code have proven irresistible to gen-
erations of hackers—but first generation hackers were the beneficiaries 
of lax enforcement and general ignorance about computer security. 
In Levy’s account, the shift in the meaning of the word “hacker” is 
attributable to a combination of happenstance, ignorance, and error. 
Thus, Levy offers little to those striving for “thick descriptions that 
are mindful of the shifting political positions of those who engage in 
[interpretative practices]” (Leff, 197). Levy’s account ignores the ques-
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tions of agency and accountability for this shift, thereby implying that 
something like a “natural evolution” had transpired.
By contrast, Andrew Ross’s 1990 article “Hacking Away at the 
Counterculture” offers a bracingly specific account of not only the shift 
in the meaning of the term, but also a clear identification (or, more 
properly accusation) of those responsible for the shift. Ross writes:
[T]eenage hacking has come to be increasingly de-
fined as potential threat to normative educational 
ethics and national security alike. The story of the 
creation of this “social menace” is central to the on-
going attempt to rewrite property law in order to 
contain the effect of the new information technolo-
gies that, because of their blindness to the copyright-
ing of intellectual property, have transformed the 
way in which modern power is exercised and main-
tained. Consequently, a deviant social class or group 
has been defined and categorized as “enemies of the 
state” in order to help rationalize a general law-and-
order clampdown on free and open information ex-
change. (10)
The “state” Ross indicts here is primarily the U.S., then led by the first 
President Bush. And he highlights the degree to which the state de-
pends on the maintenance of stable property lines. According to Ross, 
because hackers illustrate the permeability of property lines in virtual 
spaces, they threaten the state itself.
Ross argues that hackers represent the bleeding edge of a larger 
cultural conflict over the status of property in a post-digital circum-
stance:
In its basic assembly structure, information technolo-
gy is a technology of processing, copying, replication, 
and simulation, and therefore does not recognize the 
concept of private information property. What is now 
under threat is the rationality of a shareware culture, 
ushered in as the achievement of the hacker counter-
culture that pioneered the computer revolution in the 
early seventies against the grain of corporate plan-
ning. (9)
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If one accepts Ross’s argument, digital technologies are incapable of 
sustaining the complex array of property relations we are accustomed 
to in terrestrial spaces. Because digital technologies depend on du-
plication of data, they fundamentally compromise both the concept 
and the operation of property. Additionally, Ross claims that hacker 
culture is, by definition, anti-corporate. Ross’s defense of the hacker 
as countercultural hero neatly explains why, by 1990, it would have 
been important for corporate interests to ensure that the term be re-
positioned as an indictment. And in December of that year, according 
to a front-page story in the Washington Post, a panel of “industry and 
academic experts” warned against the threat posed by hackers, de-
scribing them, in usage that now seems almost quaint, as “high-tech 
terrorists” (Suplee and Richards). While Ross would criticize such re-
porting as exemplifying a “moral panic” that threatened the “technol-
ogy conscious youth culture” he valued, the term hacker would never 
recover its original meaning. The term’s associations with trespass and 
criminality would, during the 1990s, become wholly entrenched. By 
the end of the decade, no thinking person who was not simultane-
ously announcing himself as committed to transgressing the boundar-
ies established by a combination of corporate practice and convention 
would use “hacker” as a self-description.
And yet, that’s just what Shawn Fanning, the principal inventor of 
Napster, did.
That Fanning and the coders he recruited for the Napster project 
saw themselves as hackers should be understood as a matter of his-
torical fact. Though Fanning would ultimately attempt to distance 
himself, and by extension, Napster, from its roots in the hacker subcul-
ture, he depended on a network of fellow coders that he met through, 
w00w00, an online aggregation of talented third-generation hackers 
(“crackers” to their predecessors). Joseph Menn’s All the Rave: The Rise 
and Fall of Shawn Fanning’s Napster offers a window into the w00w00 
culture:
As Shawn learned more and more and worked him-
self up the IRC [ Internet Relay Chat] hacker hier-
archy, he got invited to join a private IRC channel 
called w00w00, which would play a key role in Nap-
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ster’s development. W00w00 was for hackers and 
others interested in security issues who knew what 
they were doing, having already cut their teeth else-
where. It wasn’t full of kids who pulled off hacking 
attacks by running scripts of code they had down-
loaded elsewhere. But it also wasn’t for the established 
old-school hackers, who kept to themselves for fear of 
exposure. (17)
In writing that w00w00 was not “full of kids who pulled off hacking 
attacks by running scripts of code they had downloaded elsewhere,” 
Menn is, importantly, not suggesting that w00w00’s members did not 
attack others’ computers. Rather, he is pointing up the degree to which 
the w00w00 culture valued the composition—rather than use—of 
scripts. Members were expected to produce rather than deploy code. 
And Fanning met this standard, according to Menn:
He wrote programs that took advantage of Unix 
computer network flaws and bore such unambiguous 
titles as “faker.c Dalnet Address spoofer,” which al-
lowed electronic correspondents to misrepresent their 
computers’ locations. “Napscan.c portscanner,” like-
wise, was a tool for checking computers for open lines 
to hack through. (20)
In these endeavors, Fanning was clearly pushing the limits of legal and 
ethical behavior. In his defense, it might also be said that he was learn-
ing the craft of coding.
Members of the hacker subculture have developed a generally rec-
ognized framework to classify one another according to the degree of 
risk they assume in their activities. Drawing on the old Hollywood 
cowboy iconography, the framework stretches from “white hats” (the 
good guys) to “black hats” (the villains). But unlike Hollywood cow-
boys, the hacker hierarchy allows for considerable nuance, as Menn 
demonstrates in his description of Fanning’s friend and co-worker Jor-
dan Ritter:
Ritter wasn’t atypical in protecting Lehigh’s com-
puter system by day and taking it down by night. 
While there are plenty of white-hat security work-
ers and black-hat malicious hackers, who assault large 
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networks like Yahoo! for the thrill of it, the majority 
of people are in the middle, gray hats who create their 
own ethics. (22)
Menn goes on to identify Fanning as falling into this third category, 
though over time he clearly (and wisely) became selective about when 
he would acknowledge his past as a “gray hat” hacker:
In his [. . .] congressional testimony, Shawn said 
nothing of his own hacking background—only that 
he was interested in programming and listening to 
music. When Napster was international news, every 
story missed the fact that Shawn was an aspiring 
hacker who was at best a gray hat. (20)
Menn’s claim that “every story missed the fact that Shawn was an 
aspiring hacker,” is, of course, overstated. An August 2001 article in 
the UK Guardian celebrates the degree to which Fanning embodies 
the stereotypical hacker: “He had left school without telling any of his 
teachers, and was reportedly working on it around the clock, in full 
hacker mode, with little sustenance and even less sleep” (Alderman, 
“FREE”; emphasis added). An October 2001 San Francisco Chronicle 
article captures a moment before Fanning and Napster wholly recog-
nized the importance of distancing the company from Fanning’s iden-
tification with the hacker subculture. Napster CEO Hank Barry even 
felt comfortable suggesting that a mythic “hacker” was the company’s 
role model:
“They may win in the short run and win in the long 
run legally against us, at which point Napster will be 
Achilles, living fast, dying young and leaving a beau-
tiful corpse,” Barry said. “We’d prefer to find our 
model in the original hacker Odysseus, who always 
found a clever way around his problems and led a 
long and wonderful life.” (qtd. in Evangelista D1)
But while the Chronicle article suggests that Fanning and Napster re-
mained comfortable with their connections to the hacker subculture, a 
Time magazine story, from the same week but focusing on the impact 
of the RIAA’s lawsuit on the company, paints a very different picture:
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Since the lawsuit began, Napster has become envel-
oped in something of a siege mentality, an us-vs.-
them attitude toward the record labels and the press 
that has forced Fanning to retreat even farther into 
his shell. He has to monitor carefully what he says to 
whom and even what clothes he wears. “The cdc [the 
Cult of the Dead Cow, a hacker collective] guys sent 
me a shirt, and the lawyers told me I shouldn’t wear 
it,” he says. “It’s just so tightly controlled.” (Green-
feld, “Meet”)
Andrew Ross suggests that hacking, by its very nature, is an anti-cor-
porate enterprise, and here we see Fanning chafing against the restric-
tions that his increasingly corporate context mandated. Fanning was 
in the awkward position of attempting to maintain his hacker identity 
while simultaneously participating in Napster’s increasing attempts to 
announce itself as a responsible corporate citizen. One tangible mani-
festation of the company’s attempt to shed its implicit association with 
“black hat” hacking was the bleaching of the Napster cat logo.
Figure 2. Original and revised versions of the Napster logo. Copyright © 1999, 
2001, Napster, Inc.
Menn’s account of designer Sam Hanks’s development of the Nap-
ster logo reveals the degree to which the original, “black cat” version 
was meant to reinforce Napster’s rebellious, oppositional stance:
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Hanks emerged with a drawing of headphones on a 
face with catlike ears, eyes, and a nose. [. . . T]he 
Napster crew loved it. Hanks thought he was done. 
But [Napster cofounder Sean Parker] called a week 
or so afterward, pointing out that the eyes and nose 
looked like a mustache and a goatee. “So I stuck in a 
little smirk,” Hanks said. Not long afterward, Parker 
called again. “Some of the venture-capital guys think 
it looks like Satan,” he said. Hanks asked what Nap-
ster users thought of it, and Parker said they loved it. 
“Well, who are you selling it to?” Hanks asked, exas-
perated. “The venture guys or the kids downloading 
the music?” Parker decided the logo would stay. Later, 
he thought that the cat image appropriately evoked 
stealth and thievery. Even more appropriately, he re-
alized, cats are risk-takers who escape death. (60)
Thus, according to Menn, one of Napster’s founders approved of the 
original black cat logo’s associations with stealth and thievery, the sig-
nature charges directed against black hat hackers. Little wonder, then, 
that Napster’s attempt to whitewash their logo and recast the black cat 
as a white hat did little to change the company’s already established 
image.
As Napster’s popularity swelled, the company increasingly fore-
grounded Fanning, encouraging the misperception that he had main-
tained a leadership role in the company. But Fanning occupied a fairly 
low position within Napster corporate structure, as reported in Trevor 
Merriden’s 2001 book Irresistible Forces:
While Shawn Fanning is still very much the public 
face of Napster, today he owns less than 10%, has no 
senior management position, isn’t on the board, and 
isn’t involved in the company’s business decisions. In-
stead, he spends all of his time developing the compa-
ny’s software and acting as the company’s public face. 
(Merriden 9)
Menn’s All the Rave corroborates Merriden’s account. Napster main-
tained Fanning as a figurehead and largely excluded him from both the 
operation and the ownership of the company his software had engen-
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dered. Given the value Fanning clearly brought to the Napster brand, 
this was a terrible deal, but Fanning can be excused for having made it. 
He agreed to the arrangement when he was nineteen years old.
Fanning developed the Napster code while a student at Northeast-
ern University. Despite Fanning’s having left the University almost 
immediately after this “Eureka” moment, the company often present-
ed him in circumstances which reinforced a dormitory-based “hack-
er” persona. In a publicity photo that was featured on the company’s 
website, a ballcap-wearing Fanning sits in front of his CD collection 
and what appears to be a handmade flag (a pirate flag?) looking like 
a sophomore with more than a touch of rebel attitude. This position-
ing was transpiring while the “suits” at Napster were busy preparing 
for the company’s initial public offering, and there is an obvious gap 
between Napster’s attempts to develop into “respectable” dot.com and 
the maintenance of Fanning’s ethos as a blend of college-age music fan 
and hacker.
Figure 3. An image from Napster’s website depicting Shawn Fanning in a 
dormitory-like setting. Copyright © 1999, Napster, Inc. 
When Time magazine photographed Fanning for a cover story and, 
later, for its listing of him as one of the finalists for its person-of-the-
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year award, its positioning illustrates the degree to which Fanning 
had become synonymous with Napster. In the picture, he inhabits 
the headphone-wearing pose of the iconic Napster cat logo, and the 
accompanying text points out that “Napster” is both the company’s 
name and a childhood nickname for Fanning. The line between Fan-
ning and the company is further blurred by the title of the October 
2000 article, “Meet the Napster.” While likely intended as a play on 
the cultural tremors that arose in response to “Meet the Beatles,” the 
title also underscores the extent to which Fanning functioned as the 
embodiment of a corporation well removed from his interests and con-
trol.
Given Fanning’s intractable association with the by-then margin-
alized, if not demonized figure of the hacker, one wonders why the 
company continued to foreground him. Fanning was quickly stripped 
of many of the benefits that typically accrue to inventors by the lead-
ers of the Napster corporation. But Fanning was expected to maintain 
his identity as the author of Napster, even as the company moved away 
from his initial vision for the software. Because Fanning’s nickname 
was embedded within the corporation, his identity would, for better or 
worse, shape the popular understanding of the company.
While Napster clearly recognized the dangers presented by Fan-
ning’s continuing identification with the hacker subculture, the com-
pany also realized that the implicitly transgressive aspects of Fanning’s 
public persona offered Napster a point of connection with its antic-
ipated users. A hastily-produced book-length biography of Fanning 
summarizes the key points of connection he offered to Napster’s users: 
“Part of Shawn Fanning’s appeal was that he embodied the look and at-
titude of America’s youth culture. He wore baggy clothes, loved swap-
ping MP3s, and was irreverent when it came to big business telling 
him what to do” (Mitten 64). While Napster’s corporate structure was 
often marred by confusion and disarray, the company proved remark-
ably effective in developing a consistent company ethos, grounded in 
the iconic figures of the Napster cat and the cat’s human counterpart, 
Shawn Fanning.
Classical treatments of ethos cannot wholly account for the ways in 
which Napster established its connections with an audience. Clearly, 
Napster’s stance toward its intended audience was not one grounded 
in the establishment of the Aristotelian triad of good sense (phronesis) 
virtue (arête) and good will (eunoia), as the company’s presentation is 
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grounded, in large part, on a violation of the established order. Rather, 
Napster’s appeals to its audience were grounded in an “outlaw” ethos, 
which obliged the company to foreground its opposition to the music 
industry’s “business as usual.” Napster had t-shirt-wearing fans not be-
cause the company was sensible or virtuous, but because it announced 
itself as an avenue for rebellion, for blows against the empire. Indeed, 
Napster was participating in the same sort of anti-authoritarian stance 
that has become conventional within the rock and hip-hop genres. As 
fans proclaimed, “Napster rocks,” this obliged Napster to maintain an 
orientation toward its fans and join in their rage against the perceived 
corporate machine even as it strove to stabilize its own corporate ma-
chinery.
Michael Coyle and John Dolan’s 1999 article “Modeling Authen-
ticity, Authenticating Commercial Models” illustrates the kind of 
polarities that rock musicians face when turning toward the market-
place:
New sounds are invariably proclaimed as liberations 
from the devitalizing control of industry, even as 
such proclamation generally inserts the new into an 
established pattern. Real rock is always a rebellion, 
always a disrespect to the hierarchy, a blow to the em-
pire. The authentic article is never the commercial 
article. (23)
To the extent that Napster wished to participate in rock’s stance, it was 
precluded from full partnership with the record industry because such 
an alliance would have violated the company’s established ethos.
Its fans developed a particularly strong affinity for Napster because 
Fanning had internalized the first generation of hackers’ focus on com-
munity-building and embedded it in the Napster software. Indeed, 
in Fanning we can see a blend of the expansive community-build-
ing advocated by Stallman, and the more materially-focused com-
munity organizations facilitated by the music traders who gathered 
on the WELL. Thus, while Fanning belonged demographically to a 
generation of geeks that would be criticized as “crackers,” his software 
arguably exemplified the more idealistic principles of early hackers. 
Fanning’s emphasis on the community-building potential of Napster 
is consistent and dates back to the company’s inception. In a 2000 in-
terview, Fanning said:
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I was at Northeastern University playing with the idea 
and getting feedback from my roommates, and then 
started drafting a really basic design idea. It was rooted 
out of frustration not only with mp3.com, Lycos, and 
Scour.net, but also to create a music community. There 
really was nothing like it at the time. (Varanini)
And indeed, Fanning’s software represented an important step for-
ward from other services cataloging and delivering MP3 music files, 
Napster allowed for direct communication among users of the Napster 
software, so an individual downloading a particular song might well 
receive an instant message from the person serving that song to the 
network. Napster consistently spotlighted this feature. Napster’s press 
releases included a boilerplate phrase claiming that Napster “provide[d] 
media fans a forum to communicate their interests and tastes with one 
another.”
The company seized on this functionality when music copyright 
holders like the band Metallica began complaining about the alleged 
theft of their intellectual property via Napster’s network. Napster’s 
first CEO, Eileen Richardson, attempted to maintain a posture of cor-
porate responsibility when she repurposed Shawn Fanning’s “commu-
nity” theme. Richardson said: “It’s about community. Maybe I know 
about this band just in our local town, and you know about them, 
too. I can share that with you directly. It’s not about known artists 
like Madonna” (qtd. in Menn, 226). Richardson was attempting to 
focus attention on one of Napster’s potentially non-infringing uses: the 
sharing of unsigned bands among tiny circles of fans. But at the same 
time, Napster’s website stated that Napster “ensures the availability 
of every song online” and further, that Napster “virtually guarantees 
you’ll find the song you want when you want it [. . .] and you can for-
get about wading through page after page of unknown artists.” This 
implicit invitation to what the major labels describe as piracy and theft 
suggests that Napster’s ethos was not grounded in assertions of virtue, 
but rather in something like Kenneth Burke’s identification, which 
Burke explains most clearly in A Rhetoric of Motives:
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as 
their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he 
may identify himself with B even when their interests are 
not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded 
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to believe so. Two persons may be identified in terms of 
some principle they share in common, an identification 
that does not deny their distinctness. To identify A with 
B is to make A consubstantial with B. (20-21)
Burkean identification offers rhetor and audience the opportunity to 
unite over a shared principle without necessarily verifying the virtue 
of either party. Thus, by maintaining the music-loving hacker Shawn 
Fanning as the public face of Napster, the company promoted an iden-
tification with fans of rock and hip-hop music that maintained the 
anti-corporate, anti-authoritarian stance of those musical genres. This 
proved especially damaging when the debate shifted from a public rela-
tions battle between Napster and the Recording Industry Association 
of America to a pointedly legal battle between Napster on one side and 
Metallica and Dr. Dre on the other.
Metallica describes itself as the “7th biggest selling act in American 
history.” The band’s success is grounded in a close relationship with its 
fan base—so close that when Metallica’s members collectively updated 
their hairstyles, the act was seen as a capitulation to the image-con-
sciousness promoted by MTV, but at odds with Metallica’s anti-corpo-
rate ethos. Metallica’s lyrics, too, position the band as vocal critics of 
a vaguely constructed network of authority figures, including record 
companies, parents, and the U.S. government, a critique which is ex-
pressed most directly on the band’s album, “ . . . And Justice for All,” 
which features the iconic figure of Lady Justice being toppled by four 
ropes (probably corresponding to the four band members). The title 
song’s lyrics also bespeak a frustration with the degree to which “power 
wolves” pollute the justice system with money and influence.
A similarly oppositional stance, albeit one arising from a different 
space within U.S. culture, is everywhere apparent in Dr. Dre’s work. 
Dre’s career can be traced back to his membership in the Los Ange-
les-based group Niggaz With Attitude, whose breakout single, “Fuck 
Tha Police,” was a withering indictment of the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s racist practices, and this critique predated Rodney King 
and the L.A. riots. A producer, writer, and performer—whom Rolling 
Stone has compared to both Phil Spector, the architect of the 1960s 
“Wall of Sound,” and Quincy Jones, the producer of the biggest-sell-
ing record of all time—Dre has crafted an identity that balances his 
success as a performer and entrepreneur with the markers of “street 
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credibility” that allow him to maintain a productive identification 
with his audience. Thus, while Dre was the owner of a record label, 
the label was named “Death Row Records,” associating his work with 
the politics of capital punishment, a practice that the State of Illinois 
suspended in 2000 due to its evidently racist application. In the lyrics 
to his 1999 rap, “Forgot About Dre,” Dre also somewhat disingenu-
ously positioned himself as a struggling small business owner, refusing 
handouts because his company is too “little” and because he is too 
street-smart to be taken advantage of.
Once Dre and Metallica entered the legal arena, the Recording 
Industry Association of America backed away from its aggressive at-
tempts to set the terms of the Napster debate, relying instead on the 
sometimes inarticulate voices of Metallica’s drummer, Lars Ulrich, 
and Dr. Dre to carry the industry’s arguments to the public. At times, 
this undoubtedly proved excruciating for the industry. In one inter-
view, Ulrich compared Napster’s claim that it could not hope to con-
trol whether the technology’s users violated copyrights or not as the 
equivalent of the National Rifle Association’s infamous “Guns Don’t 
Kill People, People Do,” argument. While Ulrich is correct in pointing 
to a superficial similarity between the arguments, the comparison also 
tacitly equates copyright infringement with murder. Clearly, this is 
not an optimal rhetorical presentation. Ulrich’s Senate testimony was 
widely criticized by the band’s fans as a betrayal; indeed, the juxtaposi-
tion of “Mr. Lars Ulrich” with the gentle questioning of Senator Orrin 
Hatch was one of the more irresistible pop culture mind grenades since 
Elvis shook hands with Richard Nixon, and a direct violation of Ul-
rich’s then settled image as a rock and roll wildman.
And while Dre is verbally inventive as a writer and performer, his 
public statements on Napster were disappointingly brief and vague. 
His most direct public engagement with Napster came in a press re-
lease wherein he stated, baldly “I don’t like people stealing my music,” 
without addressing the complex questions arising from peer-to-peer 
technologies (Dansby). Dre’s participation in the argument was fur-
ther complicated by his position as a hip-hop producer who had made 
extensive use of sampling technology on his records, sometimes with 
permission but often without. In fact, at the time of the lawsuit, Dre 
himself was being sued by George Lucas for having sampled the 
“Dolby THX” sound that precedes some films, without first securing 
permission. And given that the sound was followed by a barrage of 
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bong hits and profanity, it seems clear that Lucas, as a family-friendly 
entrepreneur would have denied permission.
Nevertheless, the industry hung back, allowing Ulrich, in particu-
lar, to function in the role of the aggrieved artist, and by so doing the 
industry transformed the Napster argument from a likely loser into an 
argument powerful enough to persuade a crucial district court judge 
to enjoin file-transfers via Napster’s site. Because Metallica and Dre 
so fully inhabited an outlaw ethos which allied them with fans and 
against the same authoritarian, corporate architecture which Napster 
had targeted, the industry succeeded in creating uncertainty and de-
bate within a fan base that, prior to Metallica’s and Dre’s entering the 
argument, was united behind Napster’s implied assertions that music 
ought to be free.
Thus, while Napster initially offered a viable alternative to business 
as usual within the music industry by crafting an ethos that paralleled 
rock’s and hip-hop’s superficial rejection of authority and corporate 
politics, this ethos left Napster with only limited opportunities to re-
position itself as a legitimate business. When, in the midst of this pro-
cess, it faced a challenge from the very performers who had inspired its 
existence, Napster faced an argument it could not win without “selling 
out.” In the music industry, this is a familiar narrative. Like many per-
formers in its favored genres, Napster failed to successfully negotiate 
the difficult task of preserving its projected authenticity and integrity 
when the company became an “overnight sensation.” But this is not 
the sort of narrative that ought to lie at the heart of an important dis-
cussion about public policy. Napster was allowed to function as a rep-
resentative for all peer-to-peer applications and networks, and its even-
tual defeat created a circumstance in which even clearly legal uses of 
peer-to-peer technologies are now greeted with wariness (especially by 
university attorneys who are compelled to err on the side of caution).
Ironically, Fanning was a big fan of both of the most prominent 
music acts to pursue litigation against Napster. In the wake of the com-
mencement of Metallica’s litigation against Napster, Fanning made a 
particular point of stressing his enjoyment of Metallica’s music, even 
appearing on an MTV award program wearing a Metallica t-shirt. 
Napster depended on Fanning’s public persona to forge a link to the 
communities of music fans he superficially represented, but this de-
pendence carried with it a lingering association with the now margin-
alized and suspect practice of hacking.
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 In its review of Joseph Menn’s history of the brief life and death of 
Napster 1.0, the New York Times refers to “Mr. Fanning, the wunder-
kind hacker who invented Napster when he was just a college student.” 
In so doing, the Times contributes to the increasingly fixed portrait 
of Fanning as a member of what Ross described as the “deviant social 
class” of “teenage hackers.” Because Napster persists as the emblem-
atic example of a peer-to-peer network among members of the general 
public, this inaccurate presentation of Fanning as more cracker than 
hacker is also perpetuated. The ultimate consequence is that it is now 
common for legislators and members of the lay public to misconstrue 
the whole of peer-to-peer file transfers—a staple phenomenon within 
the Internet—as an expression of hackers’ characteristic transgressions 
against traditional property lines.
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3 The Positioning of Peer-
to-Peer Transfers as Theft
In the mid 1960s, Lyman Ray Patterson undertook the challenging 
project of revisiting the often-arcane machinations surrounding early 
British laws addressing copyrights and “literary property.” Patterson 
hoped to use historical analysis to reveal “aspects of law which logical 
analysis does not bring into focus” (v). Patterson pursued path-break-
ing work on the early history of copyright, but he did so always with 
an eye toward understanding and explaining the particularities of his 
own historical circumstance. Fortuitously, Patterson’s book arrived one 
year prior to the first stirrings of the Internet, so it offers a snapshot of 
arguments embedded in a culture rich in media opportunities but free 
from the particular challenges that would later be presented by digital 
media. Patterson closes his book by articulating three principles that 
he deems “necessary for an integrated concept of copyright” (228). 
Taken together, Patterson’s principles constitute a sharp and prescient 
critique of the general arc of copyright policy in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Patterson writes:
1. [A] copyright owner has a right against an economic competitor 
to the exclusive reproduction in its original or derivative form.
2. [A]n author retains an inalienable right to protect the integrity 
of his work, and his reputation in connection therewith.
3. [T]he right of individuals to the use of copyrighted work for per-
sonal, private, or reasonable uses shall not be impaired. (228)
Patterson’s first principle is directed at limiting the scope of copyright 
infringement to those instances where the economic interests of the 
copyright owner are clearly affected. Patterson refers to this as “pro-
tecting the entrepreneur, not the work itself,” and argues that: “the 
basic function of copyright is to protect the publisher—not against 
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the author or individual user, but against other publishers” (228). 
Patterson’s second principle accords rights to the author that had been 
subsumed, under U.S. copyright law, by publishers. This principle 
would, in practice, allow an author to pursue damages against a pub-
lisher who failed to accurately reproduce the author’s work. It contrasts 
with contemporary practice in which an author would have little re-
course after the point at which her copyright had been transferred to 
a publisher. Patterson’s third principle, however, represents the most 
radical challenge to copyright “business as usual.” Structurally, the 
third principle corresponds closely with the U.S. Constitution’s sec-
ond Amendment. If Patterson meant to invite this comparison, the 
suggestion is that because the U.S. acknowledges a right to “private,” 
“personal,” and “reasonable” uses of weaponry, the comparatively mild 
questions of whether individuals may go about their business with 
loaded or concealed copyrights should also be easily and definitively 
settled. While Patterson’s persistent focus is on the relationship be-
tween copyright policy and freedom of expression, here his emphasis 
falls on citizens’ expectations of privacy. While Patterson wholeheart-
edly endorses copyright’s role in protecting publishers from piracy, he 
would allow no intrusions into private and personal consumption of 
copyrighted materials.
Patterson’s principles predate the popular adoption of digital media, 
but his arguments are nevertheless informed by his attentiveness to the 
copying technologies available at the time he wrote. In a critical para-
graph, Patterson suggests that the advent of a particular copying tech-
nology has prompted an over-reaching response by copyright holders:
The limited ability of the individual a few years ago 
to reproduce a book has been changed by the avail-
ability of high-speed copying machines. The change 
has made copyright owners—that is, publishers—
look to the long-continued concept of monopoly in 
the guise of property rights to protect their interest. 
A more subtle and significant point is overlooked. 
However slight the danger, the failure to recognize 
the individual user’s right results in a limitation upon 
the freedom of expression. The copyright owner’s 
complete control of the work, based on the notion of 
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the expression of ideas for profit, allows him to con-
trol that work completely. (227–28)
Though the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was 
founded in 1967, at the time Patterson wrote, it was not yet common 
practice to refer to patents, trademarks, and copyrights as “intellectual 
property.” Patterson here rejects the implicit analogy, suggested by in-
vocations of property, arguing that the “guise of property rights” is 
a euphemistic substitution for the less-palatable “monopoly.” Because 
the copyright monopoly mandated by the Constitution is, in prac-
tice, transferred efficiently and wholly from creators to publishers, the 
scope and reach of copyright have expanded exponentially. Patterson’s 
principles foreshadow the degree to which the expansion of copyright 
law would impinge on the personal and private uses of copyrighted 
material that U.S. citizens once took for granted.
One of the first books to wrestle with the ramifications of digital 
media for copyright law was Paul Goldstein’s Copyright’s Highway: The 
Law and Lore of Copyright from Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox. Pub-
lished in 1994, Copyright’s Highway features an attempt to toe Patter-
son’s lines that is marked (and marred) by hedged language:
Every American copyright act since 1790 has clung 
to the idea that copyright is a law of public places 
and commercial interests—retail sales of books, pub-
lic performances if plays or movies, radio or television 
broadcasts of every kind of performance. This idea 
has dominated some of copyright law’s central doc-
trines: only public, not private performances infringe 
copyright; noncommercial uses are more likely to be 
held fair use than commercial ones; to prevail against 
a fair use defense, a copyright holder must often show 
that it has suffered economic harm. (131)
The first sentence in this excerpt is satisfyingly absolutist, and the cast-
ing of copyright as directed at the public and the commercial matches 
up very well with Patterson’s first and third principles. The second 
sentence, by contrast, is littered with exceptions and limitations. 
Goldstein’s enumeration of “central doctrines” starts with a promis-
ing emphasis on public performance as a requirement for infringe-
ment. But in stating that noncommercial uses are “more likely” to be 
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considered fair use than commercial uses, Goldstein isteps back from 
Patterson’s principles and leaving open the possibility that noncom-
mercial uses might not be considered fair use, and thus infringe. And 
in the final clause, Goldstein suggests that demonstration of economic 
harm is not an absolute requirement for a copyright holder alleging 
infringement.
The gap between Patterson’s principles and Goldstein’s account of 
contemporary copyright in operation is significant. While Patterson 
called for sharp limits on publishers’ ability to pursue cases of infringe-
ment in the absence of public performance/sale and demonstrable 
economic harm, Goldstein, surveying 1994’s newly networked envi-
ronment, must acknowledge that Patterson’s calls are being drowned 
out by increasingly aggressive copyright enforcement. Goldstein’s lan-
guage—however grudgingly—acknowledges that copyright holders 
were successfully pursuing cases where no public performance or sale 
had occurred, and where no demonstrable economic harm could be 
established.
In the years since Goldstein’s assessment, there has been a dramatic 
expansion in the amount of control ceded to U.S. copyright holders. 
And when I say “ceded,” I mean to stress that in a U.S. context, copy-
rights are granted by the public, via Congress, to copyright holders. 
The Constitution specifies that “Congress shall have the power [. . .] to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.” Thus, in the United States, the foundational 
intellectual property protections (copyrights and patents) are offered 
by the people, via Congress, as an incentive for further production 
from authors and inventors. This represents a subtle but significant 
break from a broader European tradition in which the so-called “natu-
ral rights” of the author or inventor function as the basis for intellec-
tual property protections. This distinction is, in part, why for many 
years the U.S. maintained a sharp gap between penalties for infringe-
ment (monetary damages adjudicated in civil court) and theft (im-
prisonment adjudicated by criminal courts). In this now lost context, 
economic penalties for infringement were appropriate because infring-
ers introduced inefficiencies into or disrupted markets for copyrighted 
materials. Infringers harmed publishers and ultimately the public be-
cause they diminished incentives for progress in science and useful arts. 
By contrast, criminal penalties were inappropriate because copyright 
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law was focused on the public’s access to the maximum output from 
creators, and not on addressing injuries to individual creators (whereas 
under a moral rights regime the injury to the creator’s reputation and 
interests would be critical). And this understanding arguably persisted 
from 1790 until the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997.
Prior to 1997, there were a few statutes on the books specifying 
criminal penalties for copyright infringement, but these statutes were 
all directed at activities that could fairly be described as public sale or 
performance, obviously causing direct economic harm, like the 1897 
statute forbidding unauthorized public performances of plays and mu-
sical compositions. The NET Act, by contrast, represents the point 
at which infringements that might never travel beyond private and 
personal use—the uses Patterson wished to place beyond copyright’s 
reach—became felonies and misdemeanors. The NET Act begins 
by altering a passage in the U.S. Code which read: “(a) Criminal In-
fringement.—Any person who infringes a copyright willfully and for 
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be 
punished [. . .].” This statutory language embedded a Pattersonian em-
phasis on measurable economic harm into copyright policy, which the 
NET Act no longer requires. The NET Act, through a subtle reloca-
tion of a crucial clause, dramatically expands the scope of criminal 
infringement.
§ 506. Criminal offenses
(a) Criminal Infringement—Any person who infringes a copyright 
willfully
1 for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, 
or
2. by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic 
means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or pho-
norecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total 
retail value of more than $1,000, shall be punished as provided 
under section 2319 of title 18.
The revised statute thus repositions “for-profit” infringement as 
one of two roughly equivalent types of criminally infringing activity. 
The second class of infringements includes not only distribution but 
mere “reproduction” of copyrighted materials. To date, the bulk of the 
convictions under the NET Act have involved substantial distributions 
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of computer software, but, in one case, a man was prosecuted for mak-
ing a single film (Star Wars Episode 1: The Phantom Menace) available 
to others on his website. While this individual used exceedingly poor 
judgment in choosing to redistribute the whole of a high profile film, 
then still in theatrical release, via his own personal webspace, the fact 
that he was successfully prosecuted under the NET Act for a single in-
fringement illustrates the degree to which the NET Act has lowered the 
bar. Under the NET Act, it is now theoretically possible for a person 
who possesses (but does not distribute or circulate) a single infringing 
theatrical release to face imprisonment for up to one year, and a fine 
of up to $100,000. And this does not preclude the possibility of addi-
tional civil action against the infringer. More troublingly, the NET Act 
implies that even without distribution, the reproduction of copyrighted 
materials is the equivalent of “theft.” Even though it isn’t.
At this point, I am obliged to stress that I am not a lawyer, and 
that this text ought not be understood as a substitute for legal advice 
from a trained and certified professional, but there are many instances 
when the reproduction of even a heavily commercialized piece of copy-
righted material would be found—if not legal—at least well below the 
threshold at which a court would or should consent to hear the matter. 
This is not to say that the majority of the uses of Napster were clearly 
legal, or that the majority of uses of contemporary peer-to-peer net-
works are clearly legal, but it is to say that the mere act of reproducing 
copyrighted material or of securing copies of copyrighted material via 
peer-to-peer networks ought not, in and of itself, be regarded as the 
equivalent of theft.
If, for example, a classroom instructor downloaded a copy of rap-
per Eminem’s virulently sexist “My Dad’s Gone Crazy” in order to 
critique the rapper’s decision to involve his daughter in the recording, 
or to interrogate Eminem’s description of himself as “Clyde” to his 
daughter’s “Bonnie,” this use would almost certainly be found to be a 
fair use. Let’s assume that, as a point of principle, the instructor does 
not wish to support Eminem or his record company in any way, and so 
the instructor’s decision to download the file is grounded in a pointed 
refusal to compensate the copyright holders for art that he views as 
distasteful. Even though the instructor’s use is arguably a substitution 
for a purchase, the instructor’s download of the Eminem track almost 
certainly passes the four point “fair use test.”
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The purpose of the use is expressly non-commercial and education-
al. Courts have historically granted special consideration to uses in 
furtherance of education, and it is clear the instructor is not benefiting 
financially from the use. The nature of the copyrighted work is heav-
ily commercial, which argues against the instructor’s use being judged 
“fair.” The amount of the song used by the instructor is, in this hypo-
thetical, the entire song. While elements of the song make it a ques-
tionable choice for even a graduate seminar, let’s assume the instructor 
was bold and allowed students to confront the whole of the roughly 
five-minute recording. This, too, argues against a determination of 
fair use. The effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted work 
is, for all practical purposes, nil. Here, the instructor is on extremely 
solid footing. The in-class performance has no plausible impact on the 
market for Eminem’s music. While some might be persuaded by the 
terms of the instructor’s criticism to rethink purchases they were plan-
ning, others might conclude that the charge of sexism is outweighed 
by other considerations, or that the song simply sounded really cool. 
Thus, while the instructor’s download and performance involves the 
reproduction and circulation (albeit ephemerally) of the whole of a 
heavily commercialized product, the context, wherein the work was 
serving as an object of criticism within an educational institution, out-
weighs any concerns that the use might otherwise raise.
Because the first U.S. Copyright Act is entitled “An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning,” all parties to the peer-to-peer debates 
have a special obligation to acknowledge that people do and should 
download cultural artifacts for legitimate educational purposes. When 
these uses meet the standards established by the codification of fair 
use, they are legal. Or at least, probably legal. Ultimately, the legality or 
illegality of any particular use would hinge on the determination of a 
judge or panel of judges in a given geographic subsection of the Unit-
ed States. And the interpretation of copyright law has proven highly 
variable depending on the district in which potential litigants reside. 
But this variability is not, ultimately, the fault of the courts, as U.S. 
federal legislators have refused to offer “bright line” distinctions, pre-
ferring instead for judges to make the kinds of fine-grained decisions 
called for in copyright cases. In the absence of case law addressing a 
precisely parallel circumstance, copyright consumers are routinely left 
to guess whether their uses are legal. Of course, the absence of clear 
markers means, in practical terms, that those wishing to use material 
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that might be protected by copyright must err on the side of caution 
or assume some measure of risk of litigation. In the future, it may be-
come technically feasible to monitor, track, and evaluate many, if not 
all, uses of copyrighted material. But few consumers of copyrighted 
material would exchange our current and admittedly confusing cir-
cumstance for one in which the boundaries were both clear and readily 
enforceable.
This is especially true because virtually everything virtual is copy-
righted. Because the U.S. has eliminated requirements for notice and 
registration, the default status for any finished artifact of expression is 
that it is copyrighted. The sole requirement for a work to be considered 
copyrighted is fixity. All of the e-mails that have ever been sent are 
“fixed” enough for purposes of copyright. Every Web page is, simi-
larly “fixed.” Those of us whose workdays involve significant use of the 
Internet spend our days constantly reproducing copyrighted material. 
Given the low economic value of most e-mail messages and websites, 
the threat of litigation over these potential infringements is low, but 
it is not absent. If, as the NET Act suggests, “reproduction” of copy-
righted material constitutes “theft,” then we are all thieves.
Sadly, this government endorsement of an expansive characteriza-
tion of “theft” emboldened the content industries, who responded to 
Napster with a coordinated campaign directed at ensuring that digital 
downloads would not be understood in their challenging complexity. 
Representatives of the recording industry consistently characterized 
downloads as theft. A March, 2000, Time magazine story features an 
especially hyperbolic example of the kind of rhetoric emanating from 
the RIAA and its constituents, along with some surprisingly tart edi-
torializing from writer Karl Taro Greenfeld:
“Napster is the greatest example of aiding and abet-
ting a theft that I have ever seen,” says Ron Stone, 
manager of Bonnie Raitt and Tracy Chapman, among 
other artists. “Ninety-nine percent of their content is 
illegal.” What really bothers Stone and the rest of the 
biz is the fact that 100% of their content is free—no 
money for the labels, artists or managers. (“Free”)
The RIAA encouraged prominent musicians to perpetuate analogy 
between digital downloading and physical theft. By 2001, the RIAA’s 
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website was soon filled with brief statements like this one from Creed 
lead singer Scott Stapp:
The day I decided to share my music with the world, 
was the day I decided to walk the fine line between 
art and commerce. I have been blessed in that I do 
what I love and can support my family with what I 
create. When my music is given away, as taboo as it 
is for me to say, it is stealing. I need not defend my 
motives for making music, but the distribution of my 
music has made me business conscious. I have de-
cided to sell my music to anyone who wants it, that 
is how I feed my family, just like a doctor, lawyer, 
judge, or teacher. Not to insult anyone’s intelligence, 
but my music is like my home. Napster is sneaking in 
the back door and robbing me blind. (Stapp)
While there are obvious distinctions to be drawn between real/physi-
cal and intellectual/virtual properties, the RIAA took steps to ensure 
that peer-to-peer downloads were consistently judged according to the 
rules established to address property in physical spaces.
The apotheosis of the RIAA’s efforts to equate Napster-enabled 
digital downloading with physical theft occurred during Metallica 
drummer Lars Ulrich’s July 2000 Senate testimony:
If you’re not fortunate enough to own a computer, 
there’s only one way to assemble a music collection 
the equivalent of a Napster user’s: theft. Walk into a 
record store, grab what you want and walk out. The 
difference is that the familiar phrase a computer user 
hears, “File’s done,” is replaced by another familiar 
phrase, “You’re under arrest.” (Ulrich)
This argument hinges on the flat equation of physical artifacts (CDs) 
and readily reproducible digital files (MP3s). In Ulrich’s hypothetical, 
the record store owner is harmed by the loss of an existing invest-
ment in the compact discs, in anticipation of their eventual sale. In the 
absence of the physical copies, the retailer has no way to recoup that 
investment. The loss of tangible property (CDs) results in a tangible 
financial loss.
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By contrast, in the case of a downloaded file, the uploader and 
downloader each retain perfect copies. There is net gain in the amount 
of property available. While the harm to retailers is clear in cases of 
physical theft, the harm caused by digital downloads is difficult to 
quantify. Though the RIAA has argued vociferously that each down-
load is tantamount to a lost sale, the truth is much more complex. 
Some peer-to-peer users describe their downloading as “sampling” and 
claim to purchase retail copies of the music they enjoy. Others are 
clearly downloading files because once the fees for Internet service are 
paid, the downloads are “free.” Whether they would in fact be pur-
chasing the songs they download in the absence of this “free” option 
is impossible to know, but reason suggests that only a fraction of the 
downloaded songs would prompt purchases. Even the aggregate effect 
of unauthorized peer-to-peer downloads on music sales is uncertain. A 
2004 economic analysis by Felix Oberholzer of the Harvard Business 
School and Koleman Strumpf of the University of North Carolina ar-
rived at a surprising conclusion:
We find that file sharing has no statistically signifi-
cant effect on purchases of the average album in our 
sample. Moreover, the estimates are of rather mod-
est size when compared to the drastic reduction in 
sales in the music industry. At most, file sharing can 
explain a tiny fraction of this decline. This result 
is plausible given that movies, software, and video 
games are actively downloaded, and yet these indus-
tries have continued to grow since the advent of file 
sharing.
But even if the casting of peer-to-peer downloading as “theft” ulti-
mately does not map neatly in terms of demonstrable physical harm, 
the characterization still has rhetorical power, as the RIAA surely un-
derstood.
The charge of theft, especially when paired with an idealized pre-
sentation of copyright, constitutes a powerful pathos appeal, grounded 
in the notion that the author has worked hard and expended effort 
and deserves to be rewarded for this expenditure. Ulrich’s testimony 
underscores this point:
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Since what I do is make music, let’s talk about the re-
cording artist for a moment. When Metallica makes 
an album we spend many months and many hun-
dreds of thousands of our own dollars writing and re-
cording. We also contribute our inspiration and per-
spiration. It’s what we do for a living. Even though 
we’re passionate about it, it’s our job. (Ulrich)
But copyright makes no allowance for inspiration and perspira-
tion. Indeed, the law makes no distinction between the by-products 
of Metallica’s “job” and a recording like Jimi Hendrix’s “Band of 
Gypsies,” which documents a live performance on New Year’s Eve, 
1970. While Hendrix’s inspiration and perspiration were certainly in-
volved, they would have been present even if this performance had not 
been recorded.
U.S. courts have repeatedly rejected the notion that the creators of 
intellectual property are entitled to any special consideration based on 
their investment of labor. As recently as 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court 
expressly rejected the idea of “natural rights” arising from “sweat of 
the brow.” In Feist v. Rural Telephone Service, a phone book publish-
er sued for copyright infringement when the specific arrangement of 
names and numbers in its “white pages” was reproduced without per-
mission by a competitor. Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor was careful to emphasize that the public’s interest in access 
to information can trump the creators’ expectation for a return on ef-
fort expended, writing:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the com-
piler’s labor may be used by others without compen-
sation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, 
however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of 
a statutory scheme.” [. . .] It is, rather, “the essence 
of copyright,” and a constitutional requirement. The 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the 
labor of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.” To this end, copyright as-
sures authors the right to their original expression, 
but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas 
and information conveyed by a work. (Feist)
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Seven justices joined O’Connor in this opinion and Justice Harry 
Blackmun concurred, creating, in effect, a unanimous endorsement 
of the principles O’Connor articulates here. For its first two centu-
ries, U.S. copyright law was commonly understood as emphasizing the 
public benefit of progress even if this interpretation at times required 
failing to acknowledge considerable labor. It is difficult—perhaps even 
impossible—to reconcile the strong bias toward public access articu-
lated in Feist with many of the laws and legal decisions that material-
ized in its wake.
A decade after Feist, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California issued a ruling that ended Napster’s reign as the 
most popular “free” peer-to-peer application. Though the RIAA rou-
tinely characterized Napster’s activities as “theft,” it is important to 
recognize that Napster never housed MP3 files on its servers. Rath-
er, Napster’s servers housed a comprehensive index of the locations 
of MP3 files on Napster users’ computers. To return to Lars Ulrich’s 
record store analogy, it was never Napster itself that was “grabbing” 
copies of copyrighted material. Rather, Napster was alerting its users 
to the locations where they could set about grabbing. Except, as dis-
cussed, the “grabbing” was not from a “record store owner” but from 
other Napster users and the “grabbing” ultimately produced more cop-
ies of the works in question.
Nevertheless, as the Napster case wended through the courts, the 
company was directed to eliminate the indexing information for copy-
righted material from its servers. Judge Marilyn Hall Patel’s March 
2001 injunction had required Napster to purge music files within three 
days of being notified that the files were subject to an actively man-
aged copyright. If Napster maintained a copyrighted file beyond that 
point, the court’s holding was that Napster was guilty of contributory 
infringement. In July of 2001, Napster reported that it had blocked 
the indexing of 99.4% of the files identified by copyright holders. A 
Napster attorney stated that the music industry, in its own canvas of 
music indexed on Napster’s servers, located pointers to only 174 pro-
spectively infringing files out of 950,000 index entries (or .02 percent). 
Napster argued that these figures indicated that the company was in 
substantial compliance with the judge’s order. A contemporaneous ar-
ticle from C/NET’s news.com service reports that Judge Marilyn Hall 
Patel did not find this claim persuasive:
wwwww.parlorpress.comParlor Press
The Positioning of Peer-to-Peer Transfers as Theft 57
[M]usic industry attorney Russell Frackman told 
Patel that just one unauthorized song on the system 
could have deleterious effects on an artist because it 
could be distributed to millions of people. “The law 
does not tolerate any infringement,” he said.
 Patel agreed, saying she would have a zero toler-
ance policy for swapping. “There should be no copy-
right infringement, period,” Patel said.
 When Napster attorneys asked Patel for a stan-
dard that would allow them to go back online, Patel 
replied, “the standard is to get it down to zero, do you 
understand that?” (Hansen and Bowman)
In fact, the law does tolerate infringement, or it least it did for many 
years. Many Napster advocates cited the 1984 Supreme Court ruling 
in the so-called Betamax case as supporting their right to make and 
keep non-commercial copies of songs for their personal use. In this 
case, Universal Studios sued Sony for having marketed a home video-
tape recorder—a VCR—alleging that the primary use of the VCR as a 
technology was the enabling of piracy, and that Sony should be held li-
able for contributory infringement. While the court acknowledged the 
likelihood of VCR owners archiving copies of copyrighted films and 
programs, the Court also recognized that the VCR had a significant 
non-infringing use: the recording of programs for viewing at a later 
date, or time-shifting, and it ruled in favor of this non-infringing use 
without directly addressing the problem of archived videotapes harm-
ing the markets for commercial releases of copyrighted material.
The question of whether individual consumers can legally record 
and preserve copyrighted materials for personal use was also addressed 
by the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991. This Act protects manu-
facturers of recording devices from the charge that their devices were 
enabling contributory infringement when home users violated copy-
rights. (In this case, the technology driving the law was Digital Audio 
Tape or DAT.) But this protection came with a price. Manufacturers 
of DAT players and DAT tapes were also obliged to pay fees designed 
to address the likelihood that purchasers of DAT tape would be using 
this high quality recording medium as a substitute for commercially 
produced recordings. Unlike the VCR, the DAT was never meant to 
time-shift broadcasted material—its chief purpose was creating the 
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best possible reproductions of previously recorded material. Neverthe-
less, the legislative history found in the house reports leading to the 
Audio Home Recording Act makes it clear that, at least at that time, 
home recording for private, non-commercial use was not being tar-
geted. This is most apparent in a passage which reads: “In short, the 
reported legislation would clearly establish that consumers cannot be 
sued for making analog or digital audio copies for private noncommer-
cial use.” (qtd. in Carroll, 1993)
The general import of both the Audio Home Recording Act and 
the holding in the Betamax case is that technologies facilitating both 
infringing and non-infringing copying ought not be withheld from 
the public, even if the availability of the technologies leads to infring-
ing uses. And while Congress offered special compensation to copy-
right holders for anticipated infringements by DAT users, the Supreme 
Court offered no such compensation to copyright holders for the ex-
pected infringements by home videotapers. If we follow the logic of 
these policy decisions, it seems clear that the peer-to-peer file transfer 
system at the heart of Napster, if understood as a technology, ought 
to have remained available to the public because, like the VCR, the 
technology is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. The only real 
question should have been whether, like DAT, Napster and the ma-
chines associated with it ought to be subject to fees that would have 
been distributed to copyright holders as compensation for anticipated 
infringements. As with the VCR, Napster users employed this peer-to-
peer technology for a variety of purposes, many of which are certainly 
no more problematic than a Betamax tape housing a recording of one 
of HBO’s screenings of Risky Business. But Napster and its lawyers 
were unable to build a persuasive case for the range of uses common in 
peer-to-peer environments. This is in part because Napster limited its 
scope to music files. While this focus enhanced Napster’s functional-
ity, it also curtailed Napster’s ability to claim that the technology was 
suitable for general circulation of media files.
In addition to the general fair use defenses that would arguably in-
sulate certain downloaders of files from charges of infringement, there 
are also uses that, while technically infringing on a copyright, are nev-
ertheless unworthy of the expenditure of time and money associated 
with a court proceeding. Copyright jurisprudence has a long history of 
invoking the de minimis doctrine, drawn from the Latin expression de 
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minimis non curant lex, which is commonly translated as “the law does 
not concern itself with trifles.”
Many such “trifling” infringements were arguably at the heart of 
Napster’s popularity. In many cases, users valued Napster not because 
it offered access to copies of the Top-40 hits of the fortnight, but be-
cause it offered the only available avenue for distributing digital re-
cordings of music that had long ago exhausted their viability in the 
compact disc marketplace. For example, for reasons best left for read-
ers to speculate about, I enjoy the music of Davie Allan and the Ar-
rows, a band best known for their contributions to the soundtrack 
of “The Wild Angels,” a 1966 film starring Peter Fonda and Nancy 
Sinatra. I feel fortunate to own the two vinyl soundtrack LPs that 
were released at the time the film came out, which I located only after 
considerable time spent trolling the LP bins at flea markets and used 
record stores. These LPs are long out-of-print, hard to find, and col-
lectible. And I would like to have a digital version of the albums. But I 
missed my opportunity. There was a CD release in 1996, but the CD 
is now out of print. There are no copies for sale on Amazon.com, and 
at least six buyers are now hoping for a copy to purchase. So if I now 
determine to listen to the songs from “The Wild Angels” on my iPod, 
I’ll need to record the LPs to my hard drive, scrub the pops and clicks 
from the LP, label the tracks, and convert those recordings to MP3s. 
Commercial services charge in excess of $50 per record to perform this 
process, as it is fairly time-consuming and labor-intensive. It’s also a 
process that really only needs to be performed once, if widespread ac-
cess to peer-to-peer technologies is maintained.
When Napster was active, the first legitimate owner to rip digital 
files from an LP often posted them, and saved others the arduous step 
of recording and ripping those files. If I had been attentive to the op-
portunity, I might have downloaded the Wild Angels soundtrack music 
from Napster, and, given my legitimate ownership of the LPs, my pos-
session of the MP3 versions of the music for personal use would, in 
a reasonable court, be found to be just the sort of “trifle” that ought 
not trigger a court proceeding. The problem, of course, is that digital 
media are hard to contain. The exchange of the Wild Angels tracks 
seems clearly de minimis when both the uploader and the downloader 
are legitimate purchasers of the songs, whatever the medium. But no 
peer-to-peer network to date has pursued a model that would limit 
participation to purchasers (though the my.mp3.com case addressed 
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in the impending “Piracy” chapter offers a close approximation). The 
robustness of the networks is a direct function of the easy reproduc-
ibility of digital files. The networks depend on multiple copies radiat-
ing throughout the network. Thus, while my hypothetical download 
would arguably have been de minimis, there is also a strong chance that 
my ability to easily locate and download the Wild Angels files would 
depend on copies having been made and relayed among a fairly sub-
stantial pool of users, at least some of whom had never taken advan-
tage of an opportunity to purchase the Wild Angels soundtrack music 
in any form.
The Napster debate, by spotlighting Lars Ulrich’s specious argu-
ments, served to perpetuate a fundamental misconception with re-
spect to users of peer-to-peer technologies: that they are “thieves” of 
other people’s “property.” This perception remains dominant despite 
the absence of precise correspondences to physical theft and real prop-
erty, as Vaidhyanathan points out:
We make a grave mistake when we choose to engage 
in discussions of copyright in terms of “property.” 
Copyright is not about “property” as commonly un-
derstood. It is a specific state-granted monopoly is-
sued for particular policy reasons. While, technically, 
it describes real property as well, it also describes a 
more fundamental public good that precedes specific 
policy choices the state may make about the regula-
tion and dispensation of property. But we can’t win 
an argument as long as those who hold inordinate 
interest in copyright maximization can cry “theft” 
at any mention of fair use or users’ rights. You can’t 
argue for theft. (“Copyright as Cudgel”)
Napster’s failure to successfully articulate the degree to which it en-
abled non-infringing, de minimis, and fair uses of music files cemented 
the music industry’s inscription of users of peer-to-peer technologies 
as at best suspect, and, at worst, thieves. This characterization has di-
minished opportunities for the general public to develop a more reflec-
tive portrait of peer-to-peer users which would include, among others 
the classroom instructors who keep their courses current by briefly 
referencing current artworks; the Usenet users who build communi-
ties around shared interest in particular cultural artifacts; and archi-
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vists, who are struggling to maintain whatever seems most compelling 
amidst the torrents of data now available via the Internet. Instead, the 
Napster case now functions as a cautionary tale that drives not only 
public policy, but also the increasingly cautious policies of corporations 
trafficking in music and media. This point can be clearly illustrated by 
reviewing the activities of Apple Computer as it adapted its business to 
accommodate computer users’ voracious appetite for digital music.
Figure 4. Apple’s “Rip. Mix. Burn.” campaign. Copyright © 2001, Apple 
Computer, Inc. 
In February of 2001, Apple Computer introduced a revision of its 
popular iMac computer with a feature customers had long sought: an 
onboard CD-RW drive. This was the first Macintosh machine to fea-
ture the ability not merely to read CD-ROMs and compact discs, but 
also to write discs filled with data or music. Apple chose to introduce 
this new feature with an ad campaign structured around the phrase 
“Rip. Mix. Burn.” The slogan was understood by many as an invita-
tion to copy data without permission. At a Spring 2002 hearing of the 
Senate Commerce Committee Michael Eisner, then CEO of Disney, 
testified that by using this phrase, Apple was informing prospective 
customers “that they can create a theft if they buy this computer. (Bo-
liek)
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Figure 5. A first-generation iPod bearing the “Don’t Steal Music” sticker. Copy-
right © 2001, Mike Cohen. 
In late 2001, as the complaints about the “Rip. Mix. Burn.” cam-
paign were mounting, Apple launched the iPod digital audio player. 
Purchasers who paid the $399 price for the five gigabyte iPod received 
an elegantly designed MP3 player (examples are now common in the 
industrial design sections of art museums). But the elegance of the de-
sign was undercut by a sticker affixed to the iPod’s tiny LCD display. 
The sticker featured the phrase “Don’t steal music” in four languages. 
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The directive, commanding tone is unusual for Apple, and indeed for 
most companies seeking to preserve a positive relationship with its cus-
tomer base. In fairness, the German translation adds, bitte, (“please”) 
to the injunction, but even in this form, the iPod remains that rare 
sort of product that greets its purchasers with an implied accusation. 
We would do well to understand how Apple moved from a rhetorical 
stance that was widely understood as providing a winking acknowl-
edgment of consumers’ potentially illicit consumption of music files to 
the marginally insulting assumption that iPod purchasers would steal 
unless told not to. As it turns out, Apple’s contrasting rhetorical ap-
peals fall neatly within the few months before and after the July 2001 
shutdown of Napster.
Apple’s “Rip. Mix. Burn.” slogan was really more innocuous than 
it initially appeared. Computer terminology often sounds more vio-
lent and disruptive than it really is. For reasons that are, if not inscru-
table, then at least beyond the scope of this project, computer jargon 
is littered with “slashes,” “dumps,” “hacks,” and the like. The terms 
invoked by Apple all have fairly innocuous meanings within the con-
text of the computing subculture. “Ripping” is simply the relocation 
of data from one storage medium to another. “Mixing” is not really a 
technical term at all. Here, Apple was drawing on the common prac-
tice of creating custom sequences of music, either in the form of cas-
sette “mix tapes” or live mixes by disk jockeys on the radio or in the 
clubs. And “burning” is the practice of recording data in final form 
to (typically) a non-rewriteable disc. That said, the aggregate effect of 
these terms was clear. Apple was attempting to reach out to the popu-
lation of music fans who had embraced Napster, and Apple’s rhetorical 
positioning reflected the company’s desire to lure fans of the genres 
favored by Napster’s users, namely rock & roll and hip-hop.
There are practical reasons why both Napster and Apple targeted 
fans of these genres. Neither genre requires absolute musical fidelity, 
and thus both are especially amenable to circulation via MP3s. The 
MP3 compression format was initially developed to encode full-mo-
tion video in compact form for delivery on discs and over the Internet. 
For these purposes, MPEG-1 performs only acceptably. MPEG-1 is 
the basis for the Video CD format popular throughout Asia, but the 
image quality is comparable to VHS tapes, and obviously and visibly 
inferior to DVD images. The MPEG compression format delivered 
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only marginal results with video, but it delivers much better results 
when its focus is limited to music.
While an MP3 file coded at the common rate of 128 bits per sec-
ond would certainly not fool an audiophile, or even a trained ear, this 
rate delivers a listening experience very close to CD quality, especially 
when the genre involved is not predicated on the absence of distor-
tion. Both rock and hip-hop are especially suited to MP3 distribution 
because the emotional impact of the music is usually more important 
to fans than the care with which it was recorded. Vaidhyanathan has 
pointed to both punk rock and hip-hop as genres that depended, for 
a time, on loose networks of fans circulating the music they loved on 
cassette tapes, with sound quality degrading noticeably each time a 
favorite record was dubbed (Anarchist 46).
While Apple could never acknowledge this directly, the iPod de-
pended on peer-to-peer services like Napster to provide the “software” 
for its hardware. While it is technically a simple matter to rip files from 
CD to an iPod, it is also very time-consuming. In fact, in major cities, 
there are services like LoadPod, which charges $1.49 per CD to load 
music for iPod owners who do not wish to invest the considerable time 
needed to max out their iPods’ storage. The initial five gigabyte iPod, 
released in 2001, could hold roughly 1,000 songs, or roughly ninety 
CDs worth of music. The current top-of-the-line iPod, at 80 giga-
bytes, holds roughly 20,000 songs, or over 1,600 CDs worth of music. 
Even assuming an optimistic fifteen minutes per ripped CD, an owner 
of the 80 gigabyte iPod could spend the better part of seventeen days, 
nonstop, loading CDs first into the computer, and then transferring 
them to the iPod. Admittedly, many users are taking advantage of the 
current iPod’s video and photo storage abilities, and few choose to fill 
their iPods with music alone. But the ever-increasing storage capacity 
of the iPod (and its competitors) implicitly challenges the notion that 
most users are sitting around painstakingly loading music from their 
purchased CDs for days at a time. 
By contrast, users of peer-to-peer services are able to quickly and 
efficiently load music into their portable players. The biggest bottle-
neck in the “ripping” process is the time it takes to transform the file 
from the relatively robust file size found on the compact disc, to the 
compressed file formats appropriate for digital audio players. Once this 
process has been completed, the file sizes are small enough that they are 
easily downloaded, transferred, and organized. Indeed, though it may 
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seem counter-intuitive, many users of peer-to-peer networks download 
copies of songs they already own on vinyl LPs or CDs, simply because 
the speed with which they can achieve their goal of making a specific 
song portable greatly outstrips the time needed to accomplish the same 
task with their physical copies.
At the time the iPod was released, there were no stable and com-
prehensive commercial online music sources. Apple itself would not 
launch its own online music service, the iTunes Music Store, until 
April of 2003. Though Apple could not have fully anticipated Nap-
ster’s closing at the time the iPod was developed, Apple almost certain-
ly recognized that the success of the iPod hinged on the ready avail-
ability of music in the MP3 format (or a format very much like it) and 
thus must have implicitly understood that their product was thereby 
yoked to the continuing availability of peer-to-peer music downloads. 
A February 2001 ruling that complicated Napster’s efforts to remain 
viable prompted a C/NET reporter to speculate that the increasing 
popularity of pre-iPod MP3 players was closely tethered to Napster’s 
availability: “Despite shifts in consumers’ perception of music and the 
popularity of MP3 players, there’s no question that the closure of Nap-
ster would represent a big drain on MP3 player demand, even if only 
in the near term” (Konrad, “Makers”). The market for digital audio 
players like the iPod arose precisely because people had amassed large 
collections of music on their desktop computers and welcomed the 
opportunity to transfer those collections to more portable hardware. 
Without a steady supply of digital music files, the market for digital 
audio players would be sharply circumscribed. Even if robust com-
mercial online music services had existed when the iPod launched, no 
reasonable person would imagine that the typical iPod user would be 
filling the device with music at prices like the $.99 per song or $9.99 
per album eventually charged by Apple’s iTunes music store. At these 
prices, the music within a fully loaded 60GB iPod would represent 
an expenditure of $8,000 to $10,000. Clearly, the iPod and the high-
capacity MP3 players that compete with it are products whose utility 
depends upon low or no-cost downloads of music files.
But when Apple CEO Steve Jobs announced the launch of the 
iTunes Music Store in April 2003, he implicitly criticized many of the 
consumers who had purchased the iPod, and filled it with MP3s, from 
peer-to-peer services, especially Napster. Jobs touted the iTunes Music 
Store by saying, “It’s not stealing, which is good karma” (Mainelli). 
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Thus, in the space of less than three years, Apple had moved from an 
advertising campaign that was widely understood as tacitly endorsing 
unauthorized copying of music, to suggesting that the majority of on-
line music consumers were guilty of theft (and bad karma, to boot).
Whether or not Jobs ultimately believed in his characterization of 
peer-to-peer networks as facilitating “stealing” is less important than 
the context in which he spoke. By 2003, he could assert, without fear 
of significant reprisal, that Apple’s commercial online music service of-
fered an alternative to theft. And Jobs was able to make this claim be-
cause the Napster case, and the RIAA’s associated campaigns against 
peer-to-peer technologies, had persuaded most Americans that the act 
of downloading copyrighted material from the Internet—whatever 
the context and purpose—was illegal. This victory was achieved in 
large part because of the successful rhetorical strategies of the content 
industries. And once these industries had persuaded Americans that 
downloading was criminal, the logical next step was to ensure that it 
was perceived as violent crime. 
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4 Peer-to-Peer Technologies as Piracy
In a lengthy July 26, 2000, hearing to determine whether the Napster 
peer-to-peer service ought to be shut down by an injunction while 
the merits of its case wended through the legal system, Ninth District 
Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel was witheringly dismissive of Napster’s 
attempts to present itself as an increasingly responsible corporation. 
Patel sketched a portrait of Shawn Fanning and Napster’s develop-
ers that left little doubt as to how she would ultimately rule. Patel 
said, “This program was created to facilitate downloading, and pi-
rating be damned.” Later, Patel sharpened her critique, asserting that 
“Piracy was utmost in their minds; their thought was free music for 
the people” (Fitzpatrick). Napster was able to withstand the injunc-
tion Patel issued at the end of the 2000 hearing, but a year later, the 
company succumbed to a second injunction, and shut down its servers. 
And Napster’s ultimate surrender had the unfortunate effect of per-
petuating Patel’s demonstrably false characterizations. The Recording 
Industry Association of America had, through its proxies, scored a tre-
mendous victory.
This victory was not so much the legal jeopardy that had been vis-
ited upon a single peer-to-peer company as it was the Court’s uncritical 
acceptance of “piracy” as an accurate description of Napster’s activi-
ties. This usage radiated throughout media reports of the Napster law-
suits and embedded itself in the public’s consciousness until it became 
difficult to recall that “piracy” had for many years had a specific and 
recognizable meaning well removed from the peer-to-peer downloads 
at the heart of the Napster case.
In Digital Copyright, law professor Jessica Litman offers a chapter 
entitled “Choosing Metaphors” in which she observes, “If you’re dis-
satisfied with the way the spoils are getting divided, one approach is 
to change the rhetoric” (79). Litman goes on to present the content 
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industries’ repurposing of “piracy” as a signature example of a success-
ful rhetorical shift:
Piracy used to be about folks who made and sold 
large numbers of counterfeit copies. Today, the term 
“piracy” seems to describe any unlicensed activity—
especially if the person engaging in it is a teenager. 
The content industry calls some behavior piracy de-
spite the fact that it is unquestionably legal. When 
a consumer makes a noncommercial recording of 
music by, for example, taping a CD she has pur-
chased or borrowed from a friend, her copying comes 
squarely within the privilege established by the Audio 
Home Recording Act. The record companies persist 
in calling that copying piracy even though the statute 
deems it lawful. (85)
Litman wrote this critique in 2001, and, since that time, the content 
industries have demonstrably embraced the positioning of Internet-
driven peer-to-peer file transfers as piracy, as evidenced by a 2005 Web 
broadside by the RIAA entitled “Anti-Piracy”:
Online piracy is the unauthorized uploading of a 
copyrighted sound recording and making it avail-
able to the public, or downloading a sound recording 
from an Internet site, even if the recording isn’t re-
sold. Online piracy may now also include certain uses 
of “streaming” technologies from the Internet.
This presentation is dubious from a legal standpoint, but it clearly il-
lustrates the degree to which the RIAA has embraced “piracy” as an all-
encompassing term describing almost any unauthorized file transfer.
To properly recover a pre-Internet understanding of piracy I will 
resort to the hoary rhetorical strategy of offering and interpreting dic-
tionary definitions. Though this may seem blisteringly obvious, it is 
important to note that the figurative uses of piracy are grounded in 
an analogic comparison to the activities of physical, nautical pirates. 
The term pirate is derived from an ancient Greek word meaning “to 
attempt, attack, or assault,” and thus, the notion of theft by force or at 
least the threat of force is embedded into the term. This is reflected 
in the Oxford English Dictionary’s primary definition of piracy as “The 
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practice or crime of robbery and depredation on the sea or navigable 
rivers [. . .] by persons not holding a commission from an established 
civilized state.” Thus, maritime pirates are best understood as stateless 
predators who practice theft by force, or the threat of force. With this 
model in mind, I turn to the figurative uses of piracy.
The OED’s second definition of piracy reads as follows: “The ap-
propriation and reproduction of an invention or work of another for 
one’s own profit, without authority; infringement of the rights con-
ferred by a patent or copyright.” Even at first blush a sharp contrast 
with the primary definition is evident. The analogic comparison re-
tains only a very limited sense of the original term, as is common in 
most analogies. But we may still gain a stronger sense of the analogy’s 
operation by devoting attention to what elements of the definition 
serve as the core of the comparison. In this usage of piracy, the notion 
of statelessness has been lost, as has the strong implication of force or 
violence. What remains is the idea of taking without permission. But 
this definition also makes explicit a concept that was only implicit 
in the primary definition—the idea that the taking is “for one’s own 
profit.”
The mechanism by which these figurative pirates profit is made 
clear by the historical examples of this usage offered by the OED. The 
first example, and thus one of the very earliest if not the earliest uses 
of the term in print in English, is drawn from Philip Luckombe’s 1771 
edition of The History and Art of Printing and reads, “They . . . would 
suffer by this act of piracy, since it was likely to prove a very bad edi-
tion.” Luckombe is describing the then common practice of “literary 
piracy,” in which unscrupulous printers took advantage of the func-
tional limits of copyright enforcement and produced unauthorized 
editions of popular books for sale at a considerable discount, relative to 
the authorized edition. A later example, drawn from Sir David Brew-
ster’s 1855 biography, Memoirs of Newton, refers to Isaac Newton’s ef-
forts to protect his invention of the reflecting telescope from “foreign 
piracy.” In each of these examples, the mechanism by which the “pi-
rates” profit is the production and distribution of substitute goods, 
whether goods subject to copyright, like books, or goods subject to 
patent, like telescopes and other mechanical inventions.
The use of piracy to describe these activities transpired despite the 
ready availability of the near synonym that Litman points toward in 
the above-cited passage: counterfeiting. While in a contemporary con-
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text, the term counterfeiting is almost exclusively associated with the 
illicit reproduction of currency, the term was for many years used to 
describe what the OED terms “fraudulent imitation” or “imitat[ion] [. 
. .] with intent to deceive.” One of the earliest references in English to 
counterfeiting is drawn from Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and refers to 
personal letters being stolen and counterfeited. Thus, the term “coun-
terfeit” has a long history of association with the literary arts, and its 
common usage for actions that might now be described as piracy is re-
flected in Richard Hakluyt’s 1590 introduction to “The True Pictures 
and Fashions of the People in that Part of America Now Called Vir-
ginia, Discovured By Englishmen.” Hakluyt closes with the following 
entreaty/warning:
I heartily Request thee, that if any seek to Counter-
feit this my book (for in this day many are so ma-
licious that they seek to gain by other mens’ labors 
) thou would give no credit unto such counterfeited 
Drawghte. For diverse secret marks lie hidden in my 
pictures, which will breed Confusion unless they be 
well observed. (“True Picture”) 
Hakluyt’s stated approach to combatting “counterfeit editions” of his 
book is steganography—the embedding of hidden data within a prod-
uct to facilitate verification or tracking—is currently being revisited in 
a digital context as a so-called “anti-piracy” measure. But it is worth 
noting that, for Hakluyt, there was a clear distinction between piracy 
and the kind of counterfeiting described here. Hakluyt’s accounts of 
his attempts to discover the Northwest Passage are replete with ac-
counts of the depredations of pirates. In a 1577 account, he notes the 
degree to which local populations in the New World had been terror-
ized by buccaneers:
At our landing the people fled from their poor cot-
tages with shrieks and alarms, to warn their neigh-
bours of enemies, but by gentle persuasions we re-
claimed them to their houses. It seemeth they are 
often frighted with pirates, or some other enemies, 
that move them to such sudden fear. (“Voyages”)
The concept of literary piracy was not yet in vogue when Hakluyt 
crafted his introductory warning, but given his experience with the 
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consequences of physical piracy, it is easy to sense how the term coun-
terfeiting would have seemed more apt to him.
Given the consistency with which transgressions against what would 
come to be called “intellectual property” were described as counter-
feiting for nearly four centuries, extending from Middle English to 
Modern English, we do well to ask how it was that the term came to 
be supplanted by piracy. One clue lies in the different resonances of 
the terms pirate and counterfeiter. While both are understood to be 
criminals, the pirate is active and violent, whereas the counterfeiter is 
stealthy and non-threatening. While both participate in activities that 
can have profoundly damaging consequences for their victims, the pi-
rate threatens life and limb (there is good reason why the peg-leg and 
the hook are part of the stereotypical image of the pirate), while the 
counterfeiter threatens only economic harm. Both figures have been 
heavily romanticized. The pirate is romanticized for a putative rogu-
ish charm. This trope has played out in popular culture from at least 
Gilbert and Sullivan (“It is, it is a glorious thing to be a Pirate King!”) 
through Errol Flynn, and continues into the present with Johnny 
Depp’s portrayal of the charming reprobate Captain Jack Sparrow in 
the Pirates of the Caribbean movie series. The figure of the counter-
feiter, by no means as commonplace in popular culture, is nevertheless 
romanticized for skill as an artisan (of a sort) and for stealth. But when 
push comes to shove, the pirate is by far the more threatening of the 
two figures (especially if a plank is involved) and for this reason it is, 
and has been, in publishers’ interests to characterize infringers not as 
nonviolent, stealthy counterfeiters, but as violent, rapacious pirates.
The act of selling pirated editions of copyrighted works is widely 
understood as illegal and usually considered unethical. The most com-
mon argument in favor of piracy is that the copyright holders have 
not taken into account the realities of local economies and that their 
products would be wholly unavailable were it not for piracy. This jus-
tification is commonly applied to the pirating of computer software 
in developing countries. The U.S., by contrast, is thought to be so 
wealthy and so laden with purchasing opportunities that piracy of cul-
tural property seems reflective of a particularly dogged criminality.
In a U.S. context, piracy serves two functions. The first is under-
cutting the prices for legitimate copies, and the second is delivering 
copies in a preferred media format before the availability of legitimate 
copies. The decision to purchase a pirated product is thus grounded 
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in some combination of financial and chronological expediency. But 
opportunities for piracy in the U.S. are somewhat limited because if 
time is taken into account, virtually any cultural artifact can be had 
at an affordable price. 
Consider the life cycle of a typical hardcover book. The first edi-
tion hardback is available at a premium (the printed list price) for those 
who wish to purchase it in the first week. Assuming the book is popu-
lar, it then reaches best-seller lists and is subject to discounts typically 
in the neighborhood of 20–30% at major booksellers. Over the course 
of a few months, used copies begin filtering into used bookstores and 
online sellers, including Amazon.com, which helpfully lists the avail-
ability of used books alongside the prices of new books. If a book’s 
popularity warrants, it might also be available at an even more sub-
stantial discount through book clubs. For example, the Book-of-the 
Month Club offshoot Zooba is currently selling a selection of best-sell-
ers for $9.95, shipping included. And many hardcovers are ultimately 
remaindered and moved to bargain bins in a last stab at generating a 
few dollars. Following on the heels of the hardcover there might be 
both a trade paperback (printed on fairly high quality paper) and a so-
called “mass market” paperback (printed on newsprint-grade paper).
For Laura Hillebrand’s immensely popular 2001 book, Seabis-
cuit: An American Legend initial list prices ranged from $25.95 for the 
brand-new hardcover to $7.99 for the mass-market paperback released 
two years later. Many used copies of the various editions are now avail-
able via Amazon, with prices typically starting at under a dollar. In 
the five years since Hillebrand’s book was released, editions of varying 
quality have become available at virtually any price point. Because the 
U.S. book publishing market offers such a broad array of purchasing 
opportunities (and the reasonable certainty that its products can be 
purchased at very low cost within a few years) there is almost no piracy 
of books within the United States.
But in the case of compact discs and DVDs, there are not as many 
editions and not as many gradations in the ultimate prices. The 2003 
film version of Seabiscuit is available in two DVD editions, fullscreen 
and widescreen. Both initially listed for $14.98, but used copies are 
now available for under $3 at Amazon.com. The compact disc of the 
soundtrack was initially listed for $18.98 (note that this price, for an 
ancillary product derived from the film, was initially $4 more than the 
film itself) and used copies are now for sale for roughly $5.
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The book now commands only a tiny fraction of its original price 
(excluding first editions that might command a premium on the col-
lector’s market). The DVD of the film can be had for roughly a fifth of 
its original price. And the compact disc still commands over a quarter 
of its original list price. But all are ultimately affordable. It is some-
what surprising, given the steep decline in prices over the course of 
only two years, that many consumers still prefer to purchase pirated 
discs. Nevertheless, piracy persists in most major American cities, as 
an August, 2003 column by the late Variety columnist Army Archerd 
ably demonstrates:
On a busy and blistering Sunday (the thermometer 
was topping 97) the famous “Alley” between Santee 
Street and Maple Avenue, in the heart of L.A.’s fash-
ion district, was body-to-body with shoppers. Bar-
gains are the byword here and $5 is the going rate for 
a DVD. I’d been tipped by a civilian friend, Sylvia 
Gordon, who’d told me she and Helen Kuhn bought 
“Seabiscuit” there last week. I thought it was impos-
sible, but decided to see for myself. I located a young 
entrepreneur standing outside one of the hundreds 
of multi-merchandise stores. Yes, he had a DVD of 
“Seabiscuit.” [NOTE: the film had opened July 25, 
roughly two weeks before Archerd visited the “Alley.”] 
“Anything else?” I asked. He pulled out a black bag 
containing a fistful of DVDs, including “Pirates of 
the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl.”
In the case of the pirated Seabiscuit DVD (and also the pirated Pirates) 
the counterfeit DVDs were taking advantage of the now-enforced 
pause between theatrical release and DVD release. These DVDs also 
preyed upon the disparity between movie theater ticket prices, which 
had crested at $10 in Los Angeles, and the possibility of several people 
watching the film in a home theater for $5.
Buyers knowingly assume a certain measure of risk when purchas-
ing pirated copies. Many of the copies sold illegally on the street are 
poor quality transfers from videotape or, worse, videorecordings of 
film screenings shot from within a movie theater. Archerd exhibited 
an appropriate measure of skepticism as he trolled the “Alley”:
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When I asked the Santee Street salesman about the 
quality of the DVDs, he assured me they were top 
quality—and produced a portable DVD player on 
the spot to allay any fears. My civilian friends who 
had told me of this illegal “treasure trove” were more 
trusting when they purchased “Seabiscuit”: When 
they arrived home to play their bright and shiny new 
discs, they found them to be blanks. (Archerd)
But a substantial enough pool of buyers, unwilling to wait for legiti-
mate copies to drop into their price range, or seduced by the relative 
inexpensiveness of the pirated DVDs, continues to drive this market.
A May, 2005 New York Times article states that the number of street 
vendors illegally selling goods of all kinds, from counterfeit handbags 
to pirated CDs and DVDs had “grown exponentially” in recent years. 
The Times article offers a reasonably clear picture of the shoppers who 
frequent street vendors. For some, there is an inherent appeal in par-
ticipating in activities that defy the law. The article reports: “Some 
customers revel in the idea that some of the stuff is stolen, that it ‘fell 
off the back of the truck.’ That almost never happens. Virtually none 
of the items sold are authentic, but many tourists, young and old, don’t 
seem to care” (Rozhon and Thorner).
In the U.S. “outlaw” activities have a demonstrable appeal. A varia-
tion of the same anti-authoritarian impulse that drives hackers, rock-
ers, and rappers manifests itself in the grey markets of the American 
metropolis. The dynamic is redoubled by the fact that in an inter-
national context the U.S.’s adherence can fairly be described as both 
tardy and fitful. In the nineteenth century, the U.S had a well-earned 
reputation as a nation that embraced piracy. Charles Dickens famously 
toured the States decrying the pirated editions of his novels that effec-
tively wiped out the market for legitimate editions. As a British author, 
Dickens was directly harmed by the U.S.’s refusal to honor interna-
tional copyright laws. Dickens’s campaigns for international copyright 
standards helped pave the way for the 1886 Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, initially signed by ten na-
tions—Belgium, France, Germany, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, Swit-
zerland, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom.
A century later, the U.S. was steadfastly refusing to sign the Berne 
Convention. One of the U.S.’s principal objections was that U.S. Copy-
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right law provided for fixed copyright terms, whereas the Berne signa-
tories had adopted a floating term based on the life of the author plus 
a number of additional years. Even after adopting its own “life plus” 
standard in the 1976 revision, the U.S. delayed signing Berne until 
1989. Arguably, the U.S. should never have signed. In addition to the 
excessive duration of “life plus” standards (exemplified by the U.S.’s 
current “life of the author plus seventy years” base term for copyrights) 
the Berne Convention reflects its grounding in the moral rights tradi-
tion that the U.S. arguably rejected when, in the Constitution, copy-
rights and patents were cast as grants from the public to authors and 
inventors. The continuing popularity of street markets selling pirated 
goods suggests that U.S. citizens sometimes reflect their nation’s his-
torical status as reluctant latecomers to copyright as commonly prac-
ticed in an international context.
The Times article’s reporters also asked the customers at the street 
markets whether they were at all concerned about the laws that might 
have been violated by the vendors, and by their own purchases. The 
responses suggest a calculated disregard for the potential consequences 
of piracy:
Kaila’s mother, Jacqueline Thompson, said she was 
somewhat bothered that the artists and musicians 
who made the CDs and DVDs were not getting their 
fair percentage, and the young tourists from Toronto 
said if they knew the vendors were selling illegally 
they would not be buying.
But Ms. Wilson, the shopper from Chicago, said 
she didn’t particularly care. “Whatever,” she said, 
keeping her eye on the vendor, who was making 
change. “I’m not the one who’s going to get into trou-
ble.” (Rozhon and Thorner)
Ms. Wilson is offering a realistic assessment of the law as it regards 
physical piracy. The purchasers of obviously counterfeit and pirated 
merchandise are never targeted in the occasional raids and sting opera-
tions directed at stemming the tide of unauthorized and illegal goods. 
To a certain extent, the poor quality of most of these goods functions 
as its own enforcement mechanism. The purchaser of the fake Louis 
Vuitton handbag with the handle that breaks after three days of use is 
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out of luck, unless she can locate the vendor, and the vendor is usually 
a moving target.
Digital media have transformed the economics of street piracy. The 
purchaser of the blank DVD supposed to have housed Seabiscuit is just 
as out of luck as the purchaser of the fake handbag, but the costs of 
producing a high quality copy of the film have dropped so low that an 
increasing number of vendors are opting to sell DVDs that rival the 
quality of commercial releases. That said, most consumers could easily 
distinguish between the packaging of a legitimately released commer-
cial DVD, and the packaging of a pirated DVD. By and large, con-
sumers of pirated DVDs are knowingly purchasing an illicit product 
as a substitute for a legitimate purchase.
Few would argue that the content industries do not have a legiti-
mate interest in stemming the traffic in pirated physical editions of 
their copyrighted works. While some of the more heavy-handed en-
forcement techniques trigger occasional outcries from participants in 
the peer-to-peer debates, there is general acknowledgment that the 
presence of a $5 DVD copy of Pirates of the Caribbean competes un-
fairly with the $10.50 tickets at the local cineplex. Nevertheless, the 
evident comfort many consumers demonstrate when shopping for ob-
viously pirated goods stems from a baseline sense that piracy of copy-
righted materials is, at least with respect to their particular purchases, 
a victimless crime. Any of a number of rationalizations will serve to 
explain away the purchase of a pirated DVD. Parents point to the 
high costs of babysitting. Experienced filmgoers point out, with some 
merit, that not every film is “worth” the cost of a full-price admission 
(thereby according to themselves the “right” to pay a lower price when-
ever possible). Smokers, and those who enjoy alcohol during films, 
point out that these products are forbidden in movie theaters. (My 
thanks to a student who will remain nameless who offered this last ex-
planation for her dorm-based consumption of unauthorized copies of 
Hollywood films—as a non-smoker, this never would have occurred 
to me—and I suspect smoking bans do play a significant role in de-
clining attendance at movie theaters). Whatever the rationalization, 
on a purchase-by-purchase basis, the harm caused by physical piracy 
seems minor, hardly even worthy of the piracy analogy. No cutlasses 
are swung. No one is sent plunging toward Davy Jones’s locker. In the 
purchaser’s mind, a movie studio that already has too much money has 
lost, at most, a few dollars.
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Given the evident failure of the piracy analogy to prompt a qualita-
tive shift in consumers’ purchases of physical goods, one might have 
expected the content industries to develop a term with more precision 
or more rhetorical power to address the unauthorized downloading of 
copyrighted materials. But from the content industries’ perspective, any 
time a potential consumer takes unauthorized possession of a physical 
or digital copy of a protected work, a crime has been committed. The 
association of these crimes with physical violence and rapaciousness is, 
from the content industries’ perspective, entirely appropriate, whether 
the copyrighted work in question is physical or digital.
The content industry’s strategy of extending the piracy analogy 
throughout virtual spaces has a long history. Napster was routinely de-
scribed by the RIAA as a facilitator of piracy, and this usage was gener-
ally adopted by the mainstream media. With this baseline established, 
the RIAA settled on a second target: my.mp3.com.
In early 2000 one of the RIAA’s member corporations (UMG Re-
cordings) sued the Internet start-up mp3.com for having inaugurated a 
service called my.mp3.com. The service was an offshoot of the popular 
mp3.com, which in its heyday housed sixteen listening years’ worth of 
audio content from performers ranging from rank amateurs to recog-
nized acts like David Bowie and Linkin Park. The my.mp3 service was 
grounded in recognition that many users of peer-to-peer services sim-
ply wished to have access, in digital form, to music they had already 
purchased. My.mp3 asked users to verify their purchase of a compact 
disc by inserting the disc into their computer. Once my.mp3 verified 
physical possession of the disc, it allowed that user, employing a pro-
prietary software protocol called “Beam-It” to access the contents of 
that disc via the Internet from any computer. The My.mp3 service was 
especially popular with Internet users who did not wish to transport 
their compact discs to and from their workplaces. With the “Beam-It” 
software, users could quickly verify their ownership (or, at the very 
least, possession) of a number of compact discs, and then quickly access 
their favorite music from office computers, or any computer connected 
to the Internet.
mp3.com purchased physical copies (at retail prices) of all of the 
music it made available to its users. And my.mp3 required users of the 
Beam-It software to stipulate that they were, in fact, loading copies of 
legally acquired discs into their computers. mp3.com CEO Michael 
Robertson clearly believed his company was on the right side of copy-
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right law, as the following excerpt from a March, 2000 Wired article 
indicates. Robertson argues,
The whole purpose of copyright law is to guarantee 
access to copyrighted materials for consumers. The 
copyright law is not to protect copyright holders, it 
is to guarantee access for consumers to create a viable 
marketplace, and that’s exactly what we are doing. 
(qtd. in King)
Robertson’s statement is, no doubt, grounded in a reasonably standard 
interpretation of the “Progress” clause in the U.S. Constitution that 
served as basis for the first U.S. copyright law. In this understanding, 
the central forms of intellectual property protection (i.e., copyrights 
and patents) are offered by the people, via Congress, and for the people, 
as an incentive for further production from authors and inventors. This 
represents a subtle but significant break from a broader European tra-
dition in which the so-called “natural rights” of the author or inventor 
function as the bases for intellectual property protections. The 1991 
Supreme Court’s ringing endorsement of copyright’s inherent public 
bias in the Feist case (once again: “The primary objective of copyright 
is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’”) almost certainly emboldened Robertson as 
he set about developing the my.mp3.com service.
Robertson even agreed with the RIAA that Napster was enabling 
piracy. As the Napster case was still wending its way through the 
courts, Robertson was sharply critical of his fellow RIAA defendant.
There have been a lot of comparisons of my.mp3.com 
and Napster, and nothing could be further from the 
truth. Napster is built entirely on pirated music. We 
are helping grow the music industry by encouraging 
people to buy more products.
[. . .]
When you talk about piracy you are talking about 
taking music without paying for it. The focus for the 
industry has been on how to stop people from taking 
that music. That’s the wrong focus. The right focus is 
how do you make it easier for them to pay. You give 
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them all those different price points, like the movie 
industry does. If you are properly filling all the chan-
nels with price points, you de-emphasize the need for 
piracy. (qtd. in King)
Robertson distinguished my.mp3.com from Napster because, unlike 
Napster, my.mp3.com did not allow users to download music files. 
The “Beam-It” software streamed music, essentially functioning as a 
personal jukebox for each user. Robertson grounds his definition of 
piracy in the phenomenon at the heart of physical piracy of cultural 
artifacts: unauthorized duplication. By contrast, the “Beam-It” soft-
ware was designed to prevent users from accessing music that they had 
not purchased or possessed. my.mp3.com could reasonably describe 
its the vast majority of its interactions with its users as a coordinated, 
cooperative exchange between two legitimate owners of the music in 
question.
When, in January 2001, a group of RIAA affiliates led by UMG 
Recordings filed suit against mp3.com, they asked the court to award 
statutory damages of $150,000 per work infringed. Because mp3.com 
had invested a significant chunk of its successful initial public offering 
of stock into purchasing physical copies of compact discs, its library of 
works available for transmission to “Beam-It” users was 45,000 discs 
deep. A full judgment against my.mp3.com would have prompted 
damages of over sixty billion dollars.
mp3.com countersued, and in the countersuit, Robertson contin-
ued to insist that my.mp3.com’s service was well removed from both 
“theft” and “piracy.” The complaint reads, in part:
RIAA and Rosen, on behalf of and in concert with 
the RIAA’s recording industry members, have waged 
a campaign to impugn and disparage mp3.com as 
supporting music ‘theft,’ ‘piracy’ and other disrepu-
table practices, and to use these false allegations to 
disrupt and interfere with mp3.com’s financial and 
business relationships. (Boehlert) 
At the time of the countersuit, Robertson was also embroiled in a feisty 
exchange of open letters with RIAA President Hilary Rosen. While 
the exchanges grew increasingly testy, Robertson seemed to maintain 
a sense of humor about the unfolding events: “Hilary still has my cell 
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phone number[. . .] . It’s not personal. It’s business. But when some-
body sues you for $60 billion, it’s tough to stay friends.” (Boehlert)
It is likely that Rosen’s February 8 open letter eradicated any traces 
of friendship between Robertson and Rosen. While the RIAA had, 
to that point, exercised some care and restraint in its descriptions of 
my.mp3.com and its services, the gloves came off, and Robertson was 
saddled with the charge he had so scrupulously worked to avoid. Rosen 
wrote:
The claims in the lawsuit are ridiculous. This is a 
transparent attempt on the part of mp3.com to si-
lence criticism of its infringing tactics. It won’t work. 
Our record is clear in distinguishing legitimate uses 
of MP3 technology from piracy. The lawsuit against 
mp3.com has nothing to do with MP3 technology. It 
has to do with mp3.com, the company, taking music 
they don’t own and haven’t licensed to offer new ser-
vices to make money for themselves. And there is 
nothing illegal in my saying so. (Rosen)
While Rosen’s statements may not have been illegal, they were unethi-
cal. The term piracy does not appear in the complaint filed with the 
court in the mp3.com case, and with good reason. The only references 
to piracy in Title 17 of the U.S. Code, which houses copyright law, are 
to the “Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982.” As the 
date suggests, this act was directed at the piracy of physical copies of 
various media, especially sound recordings and motion pictures. Even 
so, the RIAA was not shy about bandying the charge of piracy when 
it believed the facts—however marginally—supported the charge. 
The RIAA-affiliated corporations who sued Napster made piracy the 
centerpiece of their arguments, with variants of the term appearing 
dozens of times in the Napster complaint. A single exemplary sentence 
adequately conveys the tone: “Napster has [. . .] misused and is misus-
ing the remarkable potential of the Internet, essentially running an 
online bazaar devoted to the pirating of music.” With the Napster case 
serving as a baseline, it becomes clear that the absence of references 
to piracy in the my.mp3.com case was not accidental. The RIAA did 
not invoke the term because it understood that my.mp3.com did not 
facilitate piracy.
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The worst that could fairly be said of my.mp3.com was what U.S. 
District Judge Jed Rakoff wrote in his grant of partial summary judg-
ment: “defendant is re-playing for the subscribers converted versions of 
the recordings it copied, without authorization, from plaintiffs’ copy-
righted CDs” (UMG Recordings). While this judge went on to describe 
this re-playing as “a presumptive case of infringement under the Copy-
right Act” he did not equate my.mp3.com with piracy. Rakoff ’s final 
ruling, in which he awards the RIAA affiliates damages in the amount 
of $118,000,000, contains a passage in which he acknowledges that 
Robertson’s actions to avoid facilitating piracy were a mitigating factor 
that limited the amount of damages (though the damages were none-
theless substantial enough to shutter mp3.com). Rakoff writes:
I also credit that portion of Mr. Robertson’s testimo-
ny in which he indicated that, even from the out-
set, he shunned the kind of lawless piracy seemingly 
characteristic of some others operating in this area. 
While the defendant’s willful copyright infringement 
was a very serious transgression, defendant’s other-
wise responsible conduct is an appropriate mitigating 
factor for the Court to take into account. (Ruling in 
mp3.com)
Had Robertson been able to afford an appeal, my.mp3.com might well 
have won, as Judge Rakoff ’s decision was grounded in an interpre-
tation of copyright law that deserved to be challenged. In a critical 
passage, Rakoff argues: “Copyright [. . .] is not designed to afford con-
sumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect the copyright 
holders’ property interests.” On its face, it is difficult to reconcile this 
interpretation of copyright with Justice O’Connor’s clear emphasis on 
the public interest in the Feist decision.
By placing the copyright holders’ property interest ahead of the 
public’s reasonable desire to access information it had already pur-
chased, Rakoff not only wrongly decided the my.mp3.com case, he 
turned away from two centuries of precedents and legal interpretations 
that had reinforced the public’s access to and reasonable use of infor-
mation. At the time of the my.mp3.com case, Jessica Litman recalls 
participating in an electronic mailing list with other law professors, 
and she reports that “the majority of professors on that list insisted that 
the fair use privilege shielded the copying that Robertson got sued for” 
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(“War and Peace”). But Judge Rakoff conducted his own fair use anal-
ysis, and arrived at the opposite result. That’s where the case ends.
Litman argues further that despite the RIAA’s eventual victory, the 
lawsuit against my.mp3.com was strategically unwise:
Now, again, I can see why people were angry, but 
they could have reached a settlement calling for mod-
est royalties that would have exceeded anything that’s 
being collected today under section 112 for ephem-
eral copies. Choosing to litigate the entire site out of 
business sent precisely the wrong message to other in-
novators. If you’re going to get buried with a stake 
through your heart even if you purchase a license for 
what you are doing, and try to obey what your law-
yers reasonably conclude the law says, why even try? 
(“War and Peace”)
This stifling of innovation, the very opposite of the promotion of sci-
ence and useful arts, is the inevitable consequence of a debate that has 
been notable for its rhetorical excesses and inaccuracies.  
When Hilary Rosen publicly charged Michael Robertson’s com-
pany with piracy, she knew that my.mp3.com was not adding to the 
number of unauthorized MP3 files circulating on the Internet. But she 
and her colleagues in the RIAA publicly pretended to observe no sig-
nificant distinctions between my.mp3.com and Napster. In a contem-
poraneous article, an unnamed music industry executive succinctly 
summarized the music industry’s stance, claiming: “mp3.com is Nap-
ster in sheep’s clothing.” (qtd. in Macavinta)
Lawrence Lessig has properly described the content industries’ at-
tempted redefinition of piracy as having “at its core an extraordinary 
idea that is almost certainly wrong.” In Free Culture Lessig outlines 
the arguments put forward by the RIAA, MPAA, and their cohorts 
as follows:
Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or 
build upon the creative work of others, I am tak-
ing from them something of value. Whenever I take 
something of value from someone else, I should have 
their permission. The taking of something of value 
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from someone else without permission is wrong. It is 
a form of piracy. (18)
Indeed, each incremental step of this distilled argument is almost 
certainly wrong. It is possible to use, take, or build on others’ cre-
ative work without in any way diminishing the value of their work. 
Indeed, as Rebecca Moore Howard has argued, contemporary schol-
arship absolutely depends on building upon others’ work. There are 
many circumstances when a requirement to secure permission would 
be recognized as unnecessary, or would result in de facto censorship. 
Appropriation without permission is central to the practices of jour-
nalism, scholarship, and criticism, to say nothing of the myriad artistic 
statements that draw upon and repurpose earlier works. Characterizing 
this range of cultural practices as not merely theft, but as piracy, radi-
cally overstates the content industries’ case. Lessig encapsulates this 
argument as “if there is a value, then someone must have a right to 
that value” and suggests that this approach is, in addition to the above-
cited flaws, singularly un-American. Lessig writes: “in our tradition, 
intellectual property is an instrument. It sets the groundwork for a 
richly creative society but remains subservient to the value of creativ-
ity” (Free Culture 33) Or rather, it should. Or perhaps it once did re-
main subservient to creativity, but it doesn’t anymore. The successful 
public branding of Michael Robertson as a “pirate,” raises a serious 
question as to just how much creativity and innovation will be lost 
because the U.S. is, apparently, incapable of conducting the debate 
over peer-to-peer technologies with simultaneous attention to nuance, 
civility, and basic fairness.
True to his prescient form, Richard Stallman was among the first 
to identify and decry the content industries’ campaign to broaden the 
meaning of piracy. In his 1996 catalog of “21 Words to Avoid” (since 
expanded and more accurately retitled “Some Confusing or Loaded 
Words and Phrases That Are Worth Avoiding”) Stallman offers this 
clear, direct, and concise critique of a rhetorical shift that he lays at the 
doorstep of the content industries:
Publishers often refer to prohibited copying as “pira-
cy.” In this way, they imply that illegal copying is eth-
ically equivalent to attacking ships on the high seas, 
kidnapping and murdering the people on them.
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If you don’t believe that illegal copying is just like 
kidnapping and murder, you might prefer not to use 
the word “piracy” to describe it. Neutral terms such 
as “prohibited copying” or “unauthorized copying” 
are available for use instead. Some of us might even 
prefer to use a positive term such as “sharing informa-
tion with your neighbor.” (191)
Unfortunately, as the next chapter details, Stallman’s proposed posi-
tive term, “sharing.” is now yet another contested site in the increas-
ingly corrosive debate over the future of ideas in digital contexts.
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5 The Problem of “Sharing” 
in Digital Environments
The rhetorical positioning of peer-to-peer exchanges as “sharing” fails 
to acknowledge the special nature of digital media. Prior to the advent 
of digital technologies, sharing a particular resource necessarily im-
plied at least momentary depletion of that resource. The person offer-
ing the resource would lose at least the use of the resource for the time 
that the resource was being shared. In The Future of Ideas, Lawrence 
Lessig helpfully casts this distinction as one between “rivalrous” and 
“non-rivalrous” resources, and observes:
The system of control that we erect for rivalrous re-
sources (land, cars, computers) is not necessarily ap-
propriate for nonrivalrous resources (ideas, music, 
expression). Indeed, the same system for both kinds of 
resources may do real harm. Thus, a legal system, or a 
society generally, must be careful to tailor the kind 
of control to the kind of resource. One size won’t fit 
all. (96)
The colloquial understand of “sharing” is wholly rooted in the divi-
sion or apportioning of rivalrous resources. Lessig’s examples effec-
tively spotlight the dramatic difference between sharing rivalrous and 
nonrivalrous resources. If I agree to share my car or my laptop with 
someone, I understand that there will be times that I will not have ac-
cess to those resources. But if I share an idea, we both have the idea. 
And if I “share” an MP3 file by serving it to others via a peer-to-peer 
network, my resource is never depleted. Indeed, very nearly the op-
posite is true, as its presence on the network facilitates the creation of 
additional copies of that file.
wwwww.parlorpress.comParlor Press
Peers, Pirates, and Persuasion86
The old proverb states, you can not eat your cake and have it too. 
But the ready reproducibility of digital media means that, as a practi-
cal matter, one can offer the use of a resource without any loss of access 
or availability. In a peer-to-peer context you can eat your cake, allow 
others to eat it, and still have just as much cake as you started out with 
(and perhaps more).
The band Cake formed in Sacramento in 1991, and, as is the case 
with most popular bands, many of its songs are readily available for 
unauthorized downloads via peer-to-peer networks. Cake is not an 
especially prolific band. Since 1994, the band has released a total of 
five full-length CDs. In August of 2005, the Limewire peer-to-peer 
program, using the GNUtella protocol, offered pointers to over 200 
Cake songs, more than double the number of songs officially released 
by the band. By contrast, the fully licensed iTunes Music Store housed 
95 songs by the band—the whole of the bands’ officially released out-
put. Limewire is thus a space where fans of Cake can find not only the 
bulk of the band’s officially released recordings, but also recordings of 
live performances, demos, and rarities that, for whatever reason, did 
not receive an official release. On Limewire, fans of the band not only 
have their Cake, they “share” it, too.
Purchasing Cake’s official oeuvre from iTunes would cost roughly 
$95, exclusive of the costs associated with broadband connectivity to 
the Internet. The cost of all of that Cake plus all of the ephemera avail-
able on Limewire is, at first blush, nil. But there are costs that must be 
borne by those who distribute copyrighted material via networks like 
the GNUtella network at the heart of Limewire. The most dramatic 
costs are those associated with the lawsuits that have been filed by the 
RIAA with some regularity since September 2003. Because hardcore 
fans of musicians can reasonably be expected to comb the Internet for 
any scrap of music by their favorite performers, many musicians were 
open in expressing their discomfort with the RIAA’s lawsuits. A Sep-
tember 2003 article in the New York Times featured this particularly 
sharp comment: “‘On one hand, the whole thing [the RIAA lawsuit 
campaign] is pretty sick,’ said John McCrea, a singer and songwriter in 
the rock band Cake. ‘On the other hand, I think it’ll probably work.’” 
(qtd. in Strauss)
McCrea’s implicit concern for fans caught up in the lawsuit cam-
paign was counterbalanced by other musicians like Loudon Wain-
wright III, who is quoted in the same Times article as supporting the 
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lawsuits: “If you’re going to break the law, the hammer is going to 
come down.” Wainwright had also written a song entitled “Something 
for Nothing” that acidly surveys the peer-to-peer phenomenon. On 
one recorded version of this song, Wainwright spits out the final cho-
rus:
You can pull one of my songs right out of thin air. 
Bootleg and download me, see if I care. In love, war 
and cyberspace, everything’s fair. And it’s okay to 
steal ’cause it’s so nice to share.
Ironically, “Something for Nothing” is known to many listeners in 
a version broadcast on British disk jockey John Peel’s radio program 
long before it was ever officially released. For over a year, the song was 
the subject of some discussion but commercially unavailable. Then, 
Figure 6. Cake songs available via the Limewire peer-to-peer client.
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roughly six months before the song’s initial official release (albeit in 
a different and arguably inferior version) on Wainwright’s 2003 live 
album, “So Damn Happy,” one website took Wainwright at his word 
and posted a bootleg MP3 of Wainwright’s performance, where it re-
mained available in 2006.
The RIAA’s own press release on the day it inaugurated its law-
suit campaign acknowledges that one of the purposes was a kind of 
“education” for the general public. Alligator Records President Bruce 
Iglauer is quoted as follows:
If this proliferation of the theft of the creations of 
artists continues, less and less music will be recorded. 
The public must be educated about the real results 
stealing [sic] music from its creators.
It is unfortunate that the problem of illegal ‘shar-
ing’ of copyrighted music has grown to the point 
where legal action is necessary, but that is the case. 
Until such time as the public is jarred into awareness, 
it is the sad necessity that the people who create and 
own the music must aggressively defend themselves 
from having their creations stolen. (RIAA, “Record-
ing Industry to Begin Collecting Evidence”)
The “lack of awareness” Iglauer points up here was by no means lim-
ited to an apparent failure to understand the potential economic harm 
peer-to-peer transfers might inflict on recording artists. Many users 
of peer-to-peer technologies simply did not believe that their activities 
would or could ever prompt any sort of legal entanglement. Litman 
has argued that because copyright law is “complicated, arcane, and 
counterintuitive [. . .] people don’t believe the copyright law says what 
it does say.” Litman further observes: “People do seem to buy into 
copyright norms, but they don’t translate those norms into the rules 
that the copyright statute does; they find it very hard to believe that 
there’s really a law out there that says the stuff that the copyright law 
says” (Digital 112). And even when users of peer-to-peer software did 
have a reasonable understanding of copyright law, many did not un-
derstand the basic operation of the software they were using, and were 
surprised to learn that they were distributing as well as downloading 
files.
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The RIAA’s lawsuits are often described as a campaign against “il-
legal downloading.” This description is inaccurate. Even if we leave 
aside the sometimes complex question of whether a particular down-
load is illegal, de minimis, fair use, or legal, the overarching fact is that 
to this point the RIAA has never sued an individual for downloading 
music off of the Internet. Rather, the RIAA has filed lawsuits against 
uploaders of music, and further, the lawsuits have typically targeted 
only those who are distributing in excess of 1,000 music files via the 
Internet.
There are a number of plausible strategic reasons for the RIAA’s 
choice of targets in its lawsuit campaign, but one possible reason 
stands out. Were the RIAA to sue individuals who downloaded files 
without ever uploading them, the RIAA might well lose. The House 
reports leading to the 1991 Audio Home Recording Act make it clear 
that, at least at that time, home recording for private, non-commercial 
use was regarded as, if not wholly legal, certainly a de minimis viola-
tion of copyright. The legislative history for the AHRA is definitive 
on this point: “In short, the reported legislation would clearly establish 
that consumers cannot be sued for making analog or digital audio cop-
ies for private noncommercial use.” We can infer that because of the 
Audio Home Recording Act’s strong bias against prosecution of home 
users for making copies of media, the RIAA has wisely refrained from 
directly raising the legal question of whether personal and private cop-
ies merit the stiff penalties associated with copyright infringements. 
The act of uploading, by contrast, presents a more clear-cut case of 
copyright violation, as the uploader has, arguably, impinged on the 
distribution rights that are fundamental to copyright law.
The RIAA has consistently blurred the distinction in its own de-
scription of the campaign, tending to balance accurate references to 
the nature of its lawsuits with questionable references to “illegal down-
loading.” The September 2003 press release announcing the inaugura-
tion of the lawsuit campaign provides a fine example of this strategy 
in operation:
The Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) announced today that its member compa-
nies have filed the first wave of what could ultimately 
be thousands of civil lawsuits against major offend-
ers who have been illegally distributing substantial 
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amounts (averaging more than 1,000 copyrighted 
music files each) of copyrighted music on peer- to-
peer networks. The RIAA emphasized that these 
lawsuits have come only after a multi-year effort to 
educate the public about the illegality of unauthor-
ized downloading. (RIAA, “Recording Industry to 
Begin Collecting Evidence”)
This presentation features a subtle shift from an accurate statement 
(that the RIAA is targeting “offenders who have been illegally dis-
tributing substantial amounts” of copyrighted material) to an implied 
suggestion that downloading itself is illegal. The blending of terms 
has since become habitual for the RIAA. An April 2005 press release 
references “illegal downloading” and “illegal file sharers” before arriv-
ing at the more accurate characterization of the lawsuits as directed at 
individuals who allegedly “illegally distributed copyrighted music on 
the Internet”:
As part of its ongoing effort to protect the work of 
record labels, musicians, writers, producers and oth-
ers from theft through illegal downloading, the Re-
cording Industry Association of America (RIAA), 
on behalf of the major record companies, today an-
nounced a new wave of copyright infringement law-
suits against 725 illegal file sharers.
The “John Doe” suits filed today cite the individ-
uals for illegally distributing copyrighted music on 
the Internet via unauthorized peer-to-peer services 
such as Kazaa, eDonkey and Grokster. (RIAA “725 
Additional”)
The RIAA’s consistent conflation of lawsuits against uploaders with 
the necessarily inaccurate blanket characterization of downloads as “il-
legal” has persuaded not only members of the general public but also 
journalists to present the peer-to-peer debates as, in effect, a pointless 
discussion about a settled question. If, as the RIAA suggests, down-
loads of music files are illegal, the only legitimate questions would be 
how and whether the law should be enforced.
But it is quite possible that certain Federal courts would rule that 
private and personal use of downloaded material is either legal, or a de 
wwwww.parlorpress.comParlor Press
The Problem of “Sharing” in Digital Environments 91
minimis violation of copyright. Indeed, one of the U.S.’s closest neigh-
bors has pursued just such an approach. Canadian copyright law is 
strikingly clear on the status of P2P downloads for personal use. They 
are legal. This relatively flat statement of the law is possible, in part, 
because Canadian copyright policies have focused on minimizing op-
portunities for conflict between consumers and owners of copyrighted 
material. Canada has adopted levies on most recordable media (exam-
ples include cassette tapes, CD-ROMs, and, for a time, MP3 players 
like the iPod) designed to compensate copyright holders for the mul-
tiple copies music fans could be expected to make. Canada’s clarity on 
this point does not, however, extend to the status of uploading. And, 
as in the United States, the Canadian Recording Industry Association 
(CRIA) pursued a lawsuit campaign demanding that five major ISPs 
turn over the names of 29 uploaders of music files. But CRIA’s cam-
paign stalled in May 2005 when a Canadian appeals court ruled that 
CRIA had not provided enough solid evidence of infringement to war-
rant the invasion of privacy attendant in the release of users’ names.
It is important to note that whether uploading constitutes infringe-
ment has yet to be fully tested in U.S. courts. To date, the vast major-
ity of the lawsuits filed by the RIAA against uploaders of copyrighted 
materials have prompted settlements rather than court cases, and this 
means there are few precedents to draw upon. One notable exception 
is the case of BMG Music et al. v. Gonzalez, decided in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois in early 2005. Both 
sides acknowledge that Gonzalez used Kazaa to download a substan-
tial number of music files. Gonzalez’s defense hinged, in part, on her 
claim that she did what she could to avoid redistributing these files. 
Gonzalez testified that when she became aware of the option to ad-
just Kazaa’s settings, shortly after she began using the software, she 
changed the settings to foreclose further “sharing.” While the initial 
complaint specified that Gonzalez had roughly 2,500 downloaded 
(and thus, potentially infringing) songs on her computer, the com-
plaint was ultimately limited to 30 songs. Part of the trial process in-
volved a lengthy review of Gonzalez’ purchases, and it was established 
that many of the songs Gonzalez downloaded were in fact songs she 
had already purchased on compact discs.
According to the Chicago Reader:
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She wanted to be able to listen to them in any order, 
but didn’t want to manually copy her whole CD col-
lection onto her hard drive—she and her husband 
own about 250. She also used Kazaa to download a 
few songs she didn’t own, but only to “listen to them 
and determine if they were something she would be 
interested in purchasing.” (Mehr)
The thirty songs at the heart of the Gonzalez case were thus songs for 
which Gonzalez could offer no corresponding purchased CDs. The 
Court was dismissive of Gonzalez’s claims to have been an “innocent 
infringer” and ruled against her, levying the statutory minimum pen-
alty for willful infringement: $750 per song, or $22,500.
The Gonzalez case, the first of the RIAA lawsuits to go to trial, 
suggests that record companies are exercising some care to avoid di-
rectly raising the question of whether private home use of files is legal 
or not. While all of Gonzalez’s music files would be described by the 
RIAA as “illegal downloads,” the revision of the original complaint 
constitutes a tacit acknowledgment that the RIAA prefers for these 
cases to turn on distribution. In short, the RIAA took steps to en-
sure that the Gonzalez case focused on the allegedly brief period when 
Gonzalez’s Kazaa settings allowed “sharing.” The RIAA’s consistent 
assertion has been that any time period, however brief, in which the 
software permits sharing opens the door to massive distribution and 
likely infringement.
The RIAA’s senior vice president for legal affairs, 
Stanley Pierre-Louis, acknowledges that Gonzalez 
may have been sharing her files only briefly and per-
haps unwittingly, but he maintains that it doesn’t 
matter. “The answer we have is if you’d turned the 
[share] default off we wouldn’t have found you,” he 
says. “That’s the bottom line.” (Mehr)
The problem is, as Pierre-Louis here acknowledges, “sharing” is the 
default setting for most peer-to-peer programs. Indeed, the richness 
of any peer-to-peer network depends upon many (if not most) users 
distributing at least some files. And Napster’s most popular successor, 
Kazaa, has deployed questionable technical and rhetorical strategies in 
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order to assure that users, knowingly or unknowingly, feed files to the 
Kazaa network.
The linchpin of the Kazaa peer-to-peer system is the so-called 
“shared folder.” If a Kazaa user does not adjust the default settings for 
the program, this folder houses all of the songs that user has down-
loaded, and serves copies of all of those songs back out to the large net-
work of individuals also using Kazaa. While the RIAA has responded 
with increasing derision to pleas of ignorance from peer-to-peer users 
ensnared in the RIAA lawsuit dragnet, it is clear that at least some 
generally ethical people were lulled into a false sense of security by the 
language on Kazaa’s website.
Another Kazaa user caught up in the first wave of RIAA lawsuits 
was Lorraine Sullivan, who in September 2003 offered a statement to 
Congress that illustrates a degree of technical ignorance that was com-
mon among early users of Kazaa. Sullivan states:
I mistakenly imagined that since Kazaa was still up 
and running while Napster had been forced to close 
down that the downloading I was personally respon-
sible for was okay. I certainly never saw any sort of 
disclaimer on the original Kazaa website. I com-
pared it to recording songs from the radio. I never 
willingly shared files with other users. I was not even 
fully aware of all the songs in “my” Kazaa file until 
I looked at it after receiving the Time Warner sub-
poena letter. As far as I was concerned the music I 
downloaded was for home, personal use. I made a 
play list of favorites and listened to it when I cleaned 
house or did homework. Part of the reason I down-
loaded songs I already owned on CD was because I 
didn’t want to mix them manually and found it more 
convenient to have on my computer. I don’t know 
how to “upload” songs on the computer either. I in 
no way financially benefited from nor intended to 
make a profit from the music I listened to. As far as I 
was concerned copyright infringement was what the 
people in Chinatown hawking bootlegged and fake 
CDs on the street corner were doing.
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Sullivan’s statement, while presented with a veneer of naiveté, actu-
ally presents a series of arguable defenses to the charge of copyright 
infringement. The first is that Kazaa had an obligation to warn her of 
the possible illegality of downloading copyrighted materials. Sullivan 
could not accurately state that no such warning exists on the Kazaa 
site, as Kazaa has included such warnings on its site since its inception. 
But the nature of the warnings is such that Sullivan could reasonably 
plead confusion. Consider this language from the first iteration of the 
Kazaa website, posted in October 2000:
Something you have to keep in mind . . . 
Please do not infringe on the copyright of other peo-
ple! Later this year we will introduce a payment sys-
tem, with which you will be able to download copy-
righted files at a very low cost. You will be able to 
enjoy the works of mainstream artists with a clean 
conscience and your favourite artist receives their 
well-earned royalties.
Napster and Scour, two first-generation file-shar-
ing services have both been sued and may be forced 
to shut down.
Our mission is to create a community with a 
much broader scope than these services, a commu-
nity where you can still enjoy the works of established 
artists, but with a clear conscience and at a very fair 
price! So—please be sensitive to the legal issues—do 
not share material that is copyrighted, such as MP3 
files copied from your CDs. Support Kazaa for the 
next couple of months if you want to be able to enjoy 
the works of commercial artists on Kazaa with a clear 
conscience.
Amid a wealth of language suggesting that Kazaa was actively pursu-
ing a resolution to its dicey status with respect to U.S. Copyright law, 
the company provides a wholly inadequate account of how infringe-
ment might occur, offering as its sole illustrative example of question-
able usage, “MP3 files copied from your CDs.” It is quite possible 
that Lorraine Sullivan could honestly state that she never copied music 
from her CDs into her computer. Indeed, her testimony suggests that 
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she valued Kazaa precisely because it spared her the chore of loading 
CDs into her computer. It is likely that Sullivan’s computer housed no 
MP3 files burned from her personal CD collection. Nevertheless, the 
Kazaa software’s default settings ensured that she was amassing and 
effectively uploading a large compilation of MP3 files, and every time 
she booted up her computer, everything she had ever downloaded was 
served back up to Kazaa’s network.
Sullivan also suggested that she had been wrongfully targeted in 
part because her fiancé had downloaded the software and in part be-
cause she allowed others to use her computer. These claims surely do 
not absolve her of her responsibility to develop a measure of awareness 
about the software on her personal computer. But because Sullivan 
claimed that her fiancé downloaded the software in August of 2001, 
Sullivan can point to the misleading language that was featured on the 
Kazaa website at the time:
Kazaa in a Nutshell
Kazaa is a media community, where millions com-
munity members can share their media files—audio, 
video, images and documents—with each other.
Without directly asserting that the service is legal, this language tacitly 
implies that this is the case by asserting that in the Kazaa “community 
[. . .] users can share.” The site also featured “Terms of Service” that 
featured specific language warning against copyright infringement, 
but this language was positioned deep within the website so as to make 
it easily avoidable, leaving Kazaa’s users with at least plausible deni-
ability, and in many cases real ignorance of the site’s warnings against 
potentially infringing uses of the software. It was indeed possible, as 
Sullivan testifies, “to never see any sort of disclaimer.” But, as the old 
saw states, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Yet in her subsequent ar-
guments, Sullivan presents a much stronger case for her use of Kazaa.
Sullivan next states that she compared her downloading of songs 
to the arguably legal action of recording songs off of the radio. Know-
ingly or not, Sullivan is articulating the principle at the heart of the 
Audio Home Recording Act “ that consumers cannot be sued for mak-
ing analog or digital audio copies for private noncommercial use.” If 
one accepts Sullivan’s analogy, that her use of Kazaa was comparable 
to making recordings off the radio, then the language in the House 
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reports strongly supports her claim that her use was reasonable and 
ought not have triggered a lawsuit.
Sullivan then claims that she was unaware that her downloading of 
songs for personal use also positioned her as an uploader of these same 
music files. It can be argued that the term “peer-to-peer” itself consti-
tutes a tacit acknowledgment that downloaders must also be uploaders 
if the network is to remain robust (though it should be remembered 
that the “peers” referenced are computers, not individuals). Many users, 
like Sullivan, were startled to learn that all of the files they had down-
loaded were routinely maintained and recirculated via their so-called 
“shared folders.” This surprise is in part attributable to the disingenu-
ous presentation of Kazaa’s mechanics on the company’s website.
Kazaa’s description of how the “shared folder” functions is a mas-
terpiece of misdirection. Kazaa inaugurates a section of its user guide-
book entitled “Sharing and the P2P Philosophy” with this questionable 
definition: “Sharing is making your content available to other peer-to-
peer users.” The key point of slippage in this definition is Kazaa’s use 
of “your content,” which in practice meant not only content created 
by Kazaa users, but also content purchased or even momentarily pos-
sessed by Kazaa users. It should also be noted that “making content 
available” is a description that repositions “sharing” from its common 
meaning as a negotiated activity between individuals in a specific lo-
cation or context, and extends the concept to the largely anonymous 
and ephemeral machine-based connections facilitated by peer-to-peer 
networks. Napster could plausibly claim to be fostering “community” 
to the extent that the software’s chat functionality allowed users to 
communicate with one another, and survey one another’s collections 
of music. These aspects of Napster’s software encouraged many users 
to bond over a shared love of an obscure band or genre. While similar 
features are available within Kazaa, the default settings for the soft-
ware allow for no instant messaging and no browsing of a given user’s 
files. Typically, Kazaa users’ interactions are limited to the anonymous 
transfer of files. Here we see the real consequence of the sharp differ-
ence between rivalrous and nonrivalrous resources. Sharing of rival-
rous resources is typically achieved through negotiation and commu-
nication. As Kazaa demonstrates, a nonrivalrous, readily reproducible 
resource like MP3 files can be distributed without anything more than 
the most rudimentary negotiation. Indeed in Kazaa the “negotiation” 
typically transpires between a file seeker and a machine surreptitiously 
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distributing the desired file. By contrast, Napster at least preserved 
opportunities for negotiation and communication, and this was argu-
ably the outgrowth of a sincere commitment to community building 
among the developers of Napster’s software.
Despite the suppression of community sustaining features in the 
Kazaa software, Kazaa’s website repeatedly presented the software as 
facilitating collaborative relationships among the software’s users. One 
egregious example of this rhetorical stratagem does considerable vio-
lence to Descartes:
At Sharman Networks we have a saying:
“I share, therefore we are.”
Responsible sharing is the cornerstone of a use-
ful peer-to-peer experience. In order for everyone to 
benefit from the collaboration, users need to share 
appropriate files. Successful peer-to-peer is a two way 
street.
And, in order for Kazaa to benefit significantly from this “collabora-
tion,” users need to share appropriated files. Kazaa’s business model de-
pends on selling advertisements, most of which are delivered to users’ 
computers as part of their initial download of the Kazaa software in 
the form of additional adware. (The pop-up ads within Kazaa Media 
Desktop are so frequent and bothersome that they have prompted a 
small cottage industry of shareware programs designed to eliminate 
or suppress the ads.) Kazaa depends on its software being downloaded 
frequently in order to drive advertising revenue. Its popularity is tied 
directly to the availability of copyrighted popular music via its soft-
ware. Kazaa, is, in effect, selling billboards on every inch of the “two-
way street,” and failing to adequately warn its users about the “one-way 
sign” that the RIAA has posted at the other end of the street.
Users who relied on the language of the Kazaa “Guide” that was 
in place prior to the RIAA lawsuits can legitimately claim that they 
were relying on information that failed to fully and fairly explain both 
the operation of the Kazaa software and the risks attendant to using 
it. In a critical paragraph, Kazaa manages to suggest that the default 
software setting that opened Cecilia Gonzalez to litigation is actually 
the “safest” option. I will quote the “Guide” at some length, and then 
illustrate how this section is structured to misdirect readers away from 
an informed understanding of the technology they are employing:
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The Kazaa Media Desktop peer-to-peer application 
is set up to allow the user to control what, and how 
much they share. You can:
• Specify which files you share.
• Decide how many files you allow to be down-
loaded by other KMD users at any one time (to 
minimize the impact on your computer and 
bandwidth capacity).
• Decide whether to reply to instant messages 
from other users.
When you select a folder to share, all files and sub-
folders inside that folder will be available for other 
KMD users to download. Please take great care not 
to accidentally share files that are illegal, confidential 
or which you do not have the right to distribute. You 
should not share your entire hard drive or My Docu-
ments folder.
For this reason, it is safest to use ‘My Shared Fold-
er,’ which will be set up automatically as the default 
folder. This means that all files inside ‘My Shared 
Folder’ are available for other KMD users to find and 
download from you. New files that you download 
will automatically go into ‘My Shared Folder.’
Kazaa’s statements regarding the levels of control available to users 
were all true. It was possible and not especially difficult to adjust the 
settings to achieve the goals outlined. But Kazaa’s emphasis on the de-
gree of control afforded to users was countered by the following para-
graph’s suggestion that the default settings are the “safest” option. For 
most any piece of information technology the default settings are, for 
many users, the only settings ever used. Anyone who doubts this need 
only begin tracking how many of their neighbors’ and friends’ VCRs 
are blinking “12:00.” One of the unfortunate truths of the informa-
tion age is that most people have become too impatient to read and 
understand the various user agreements and manuals that determine 
the limits for their use of technologies. And even if people did attempt 
to read this information, more often than not they would face skeins 
of impenetrable legalese that does not help them understand where the 
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property lines are drawn. Kazaa’s approach to peer-to-peer depended 
upon users’ fatigue with technical and legal details. Indeed, Kazaa de-
pended on many, if not most, users accepting the defaults.
From a legal standpoint, Kazaa’s settings were and are potentially 
disastrous. Users who followed what was here described as the “safe” 
approach became distributors of every file they downloaded from 
Kazaa, and they continued serving files to Kazaa for however long 
their computers remained powered up and connected to the Internet. 
For many broadband users, this meant that they were constantly feed-
ing files to the Kazaa network. These Kazaa users were “sharing” not 
because of any conscious commitment to exchange, but because the 
software’s default settings imposed that on them.
The RIAA lawsuits have had one inarguably positive outcome: an 
increase in consumers’ attentiveness to the user agreements and default 
settings of the peer-to-peer software that they are using. Increasingly, 
Kazaa users have taken control of their software and adjusted the de-
fault settings to protect themselves from RIAA lawsuits. In practical 
terms, this means that most Kazaa users now download songs with-
out maintaining any songs in the “My Shared Folder.” A small sub-
set of Kazaa users, for whatever reason, choose to continue serving 
files to the network, while the majority of users are now “free riders.” 
This pattern was also observed, years ago, on the Gnutella network. 
While the Kazaa front-end is user-friendly enough that it lured many 
users new to peer-to-peer, Gnutella clients have historically required a 
greater measure of technical knowledge. With most Gnutella clients, 
users exercise a higher level of control over their personal settings than 
with Kazaa. For this reason, the core conclusion of Eytan Adar and 
Bernardo Huberman’s 2000 study of the usage patterns of Gnutella 
users—that roughly 70 percent of Gnutella users distribute no files—
is perhaps not surprising. Thus, while peer-to-peer technologies are 
rooted in the establishment of level relationships among networked 
computers (the “peers” in peer-to-peer) the people using peer-to-peer 
technologies typically pursue imbalanced relationships. As a result, a 
small subset of peer-to-peer users account for the bulk of the distribu-
tion of authorized and unauthorized files to peer-to-peer networks, 
thereby assuming the bulk of the risks associated with the transmis-
sion of these files. It is these users who have earned the right to frame 
arguments that their activities constitute “sharing.” By contrast, peer-
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to-peer users who scrupulously avoid making files available to others 
are not sharing, but taking.
The uncritical maintenance of “sharing” as an overarching met-
aphor for peer-to-peer file transfers distorts the debate. Thus, while 
advocates of peer-to-peer technologies are right to reject formulations 
that position them as thieves or pirates by dint of their participation 
on peer-to-peer networks, they also should acknowledge that peer-to-
peer transfers are not a form of “sharing” as the term is conventionally 
understood. Yet the term “file sharing” has become so entrenched that 
it is used even by those who elsewhere demonstrate real sensitivity to 
the complexities of ownership and distribution in digital contexts.
For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation is one of the fin-
est and most important defenders of the public interest with respect to 
the Internet and digital media. I generally endorse the organization, 
often reference it in classroom discussions, and have cited its founders 
in my scholarly work. The front page of the EFF’s website for many 
months featured a small ad that read: “Let the Music Play. Tired of 
being treated like a criminal for sharing music online?” The ad linked 
to a page headlined, “File-Sharing: It’s Music to our Ears.” While this 
pun is admittedly clever, the headline bespeaks an overly broad accep-
tance of “sharing” as a descriptor for the activities that drive peer-to-
peer file transfers, especially when Kazaa’s slippery usage of the term 
is taken into account.
The EFF has also maintained a Web page entitled “How Not to 
Get Sued by the RIAA for File-Sharing” that features the following 
advice:
Make sure there are no potentially infringing files in 
your shared folder. This would ordinarily mean that 
your shared folder contains only files 1) that are in 
the public domain, 2) for which you have permission 
to share, or 3) that are made available under pro-shar-
ing licenses, such as the Creative Commons license or 
other open media licenses [. . .].
While I would welcome (at least for purposes of illustration) a peer-to-
peer client that delivered only files that met one of these three criteria, 
my suspicion is that the general public and the EFF would be disap-
pointed by the aggregate content in such a network.
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Figure 7. The EFF’s campaign in support of “File-Sharing.” Copyright © 
2003, Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
I’ll examine the likely scope of available content for each of these class-
es of “sharable” files in turn.
Public Domain Files. The overarching effect of the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1999 was the addition of 20 years 
to all extant and future copyright terms. This halted the movement 
of works from 1923 forward into the public domain. So the peer-to-
peer client that adhered to the EFF’s guidelines would primarily fea-
ture music from before 1923. This music would stretch from Thomas 
Edison’s 1877 recording of “Mary Had a Little Lamb” to Al Jolson’s 
1922 recording of “Toot, Toot, Tootsie! (Good-Bye)” and for subse-
quent years feature only that music where through oversight or lack of 
interest, copyrights were not renewed.
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Files For Which You Have Permission to Share. While some musicians 
have made an occasional song available without restricting its circula-
tion or distribution, these cases are altogether rare. More commonly, 
some strings are attached to the distribution. While the band Wilco 
is celebrated for having made the whole of its album “Yankee Hotel 
Foxtrot” available via the Web while the band’s label, weighed (at 
great length) whether the record should be released. Wilco’s album 
was available only via streaming media, and peer-to-peer transfers of 
MP3 files of the “Yankee Hotel Foxtrot” songs were not authorized by 
the band or the label (Nonesuch) that ultimately released the album. 
Similarly, while Wilco made MP3 files of a follow-up EP available via 
the Web, visitors to the band’s website were required to enter a code 
found within the “Yankee Hotel Foxtrot” CD packaging to access the 
MP3s. Wilco is rightly celebrated for pursuing innovative approaches 
to distribution of its music via the Internet. But while the public per-
ception is that Wilco has put a lot of music “on the Web,” the real-
ity is that none of the above-cited files could fairly be uploaded to a 
peer-to-peer client that honored the EFF’s above-cited criteria. Wilco’s 
generosity, while considerable, does not extend all the way to general 
permission to circulate its music. And this approach is both common 
and understandable among acts with any significant commercial vi-
ability.
Files That Are Made Available Under Pro-Sharing License Like Creative 
Commons Licenses. There is now a growing body of material (estimated 
at over 50 million files of all types) now circulating under Creative 
Commons licenses. Most, but not all of the CC licenses would permit 
distribution via a peer-to-peer network. There is considerable potential 
for musicians and others to build audiences by releasing material with-
out restriction. But we have yet to witness a song achieving general 
popularity (as measured by, say, the Billboard charts) while being dis-
tributed freely under a Creative Commons license. Lawrence Lessig’s 
Free Culture demonstrated that a book released simultaneously as a free 
and largely unrestricted computer file would still sell. Adhering to the 
EFF’s standard would mean that a peer-to-peer network could feature 
tracks like the Beastie Boys’ “Now Get Busy,” which was released as 
part of WIRED magazine’s November 2004 compilation of tracks dis-
tributed under Creative Commons licenses. The disc’s subtitle, “Rip. 
wwwww.parlorpress.comParlor Press
The Problem of “Sharing” in Digital Environments 103
Sample. Mash. Share.” constitutes an open invitation for purchasers to 
upload the files to peer-to-peer services.
Taken together, there is considerable work that could be made 
available via peer-to-peer networks that is public domain, permitted, 
or licensed via Creative Commons and its analogs. But this is not what 
most peer-to-peer users are choosing to distribute (or inadvertently 
distributing).  
In August of 2005, less than a year after the initial release of “Now 
Get Busy” I logged on to Limewire to see how many copies of the 
song were available as a rough index of the song’s popularity among 
downloaders. This method is of only limited value, as the number of 
songs available can ebb and flow as users log on and off the service. 
Additionally, one is only able to determine the number of uploaders 
offering a song at a particular point in time. There is no necessary cor-
respondence between the number of files offered and the number of 
files ultimately downloaded, because (as stated earlier) many users dis-
able their shared folders. Nevertheless, the results of my brief survey of 
song availability provide at least a suggestion of degrees of demand for 
particular songs. The Beastie Boys’ song—featuring both a Creative 
Commons license and a title that reinforces the WIRED CD’s general 
invitation to share and remix—was available from a respectable nine-
teen uploaders. A representative public domain track, Jolson’s “Toot-
Toot, Tootsie!” was available from six. Works distributed with express 
permission from the musician, but not a Creative Commons license, 
are hard to come by, but a former member of Wilco, Jay Bennett, had 
three MP3 downloads available at his website. Bennett’s website fea-
tured no notice or indication of the terms under which the files were 
being distributed, and a visitor could infer (rightly or wrongly) that 
neither Bennett nor his record company would object to further dis-
tribution of the songs via peer-to-peer networks. Even so, there was no 
trace of any of the three Bennett MP3s on Limewire when I searched. 
Admittedly, given the availability of the songs on the website, there is 
little incentive for any one user to take the initiative to further distrib-
ute the songs.
This brief canvass offers a snapshot of what peer-to-peer adhering 
to the EFF’s guidelines might look like.
Meanwhile, Limewire’s uploaders were offering hundreds of cop-
ies of expressly commercial files for which no permissions of any kind 
have been granted. Sheryl Crow, a vocal critic of unauthorized peer-
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to-peer downloads, had a 2004 chart single with her cover of Cat Ste-
vens’s “The First Cut is the Deepest.” The Crow track was available 
from over 300 uploaders. The band most associated with opposition 
to unauthorized downloads, Metallica, also remains popular among 
Limewire’s users. Over 200 uploaders were offering MP3s of the song 
“. . . And Justice For All.” These uploads are occurring in spite of clear 
and unequivocal opposition from both the artists involved and the 
music companies to whom the artists sold their copyrights.
There are circumstances in which it might be considered reason-
able or ethical to distribute music files without permission. But the 
nature of peer-to-peer distribution is such that files made available for 
a particular, and arguably ethical, reason are also available to all of the 
individuals on a given network. And there is no way to ensure that all 
of the uses of a given file are fair uses, de minimis uses, or otherwise 
ethical exceptions to copyright. In this context, the decision to over-
ride an artist’s or copyright holder’s stated objections to peer-to-peer 
distribution, if intended as a form of protest or political action, carries 
with it an obligation to state forthrightly and publicly the rationale for 
the distribution, and, in the grand tradition of the best civil disobedi-
ence, to be prepared to accept the consequences for one’s actions, even 
if the laws involved might be unjust.
At present, however, the bulk of the Internet-based distribution 
of MP3 files occurs anonymously, with no interaction or conversa-
tion between the people whose computers are engaging in peer-to-peer 
transfers. There are many terms we might use to fairly and accurately 
describe these distributions.
“Sharing” ought not be among them.
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6 Peer-to-Peer as Combat
There is a sad progression to the charges directed against peer-to-peer 
file transfers by the leaders of the content industries. When Napster 
brought peer-to-peer technology into the mainstream, it was attacked 
as an extension of the suspect and criminal exploits of hackers. Because 
trespass is the core of this charge, the content industries next focused 
on repositioning peer-to-peer transfers as theft, with “shoplifting” rou-
tinely cited as the best available parallel. “Theft” in turn, gave way to 
an expansionist recasting of “piracy.” The term was detached from its 
conventional association with counterfeit goods, and deployed repeat-
edly to reinforce the notion that peer-to-peer users were pillaging the 
music and film industries. Once the implicit violence embedded in the 
piracy analogy took root, the stage was set for the ultimate rhetorical 
gambit: the equation of peer-to-peer technologies with warfare.
In a January 2002 New York Times article, Jack Valenti, then Presi-
dent of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), likened 
his organization’s efforts in opposing peer-to-peer downloads of mo-
tion pictures via the Internet to a military engagement. Valenti said, 
“We’re fighting our own terrorist war,” adding, “the great moat that 
protects us, and it is only temporary, is lack of broadband access” 
(Harmon).
Valenti’s remarks position the film industry as both a victim and a 
target, and span centuries of military history. The timing of Valenti’s 
comments makes it clear that his reference to a “terrorist war” was 
meant to be understood in the context of the U.S.’s response to the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pen-
tagon. Valenti was inviting readers of a newspaper serving the city 
hardest hit by these attacks to understand the film industry as having 
endured a parallel trauma. By contrast, Valenti’s description of the in-
dustry as temporarily protected by a “great moat” positions the MPAA 
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as, at best, a medieval protectorate, and at worst, the sort of plutocratic 
castle-keep regularly targeted by Robin Hood and his Merry Men.
Valenti’s remarks are especially striking given the remarkable suc-
cess the film industry was experiencing at roughly the same time he 
was speaking. For the U.S. motion picture industry, the 2002 Memo-
rial Day holiday weekend was among the most lucrative in history. 
American moviegoers stampeded box offices, spending over $200 mil-
lion on admissions. In June, 2002, Business Week Online reported that 
“box office receipts are 21 percent ahead of last year’s pace” (Grover). 
By any reasonable measure, the film industry was in the midst of a 
very good year.
But Jack Valenti was not happy. According to the Boston-based 
“digital solutions” corporation Viant, 2002’s 21 percent increase in 
box office receipts was counterbalanced by a 20 percent rise in illicit 
downloads of films, with roughly half a million copies downloaded 
each day (Chmielewski). These statistics prompted Valenti to observe, 
“It’s getting clear—alarmingly clear, I might add—that we are in the 
midst of the possibility of Armageddon.” Valenti continued: “Eight 
out of 10 [movies] have to go to airlines, to hotels, to Blockbuster, to 
HBO, then to basic cable—to get their money back. If you are am-
bushed in the early days of your theatrical exhibition, the chances of 
you recouping in a world that is mostly broadband would be very, very 
different” (Chmielewski).
Valenti’s “Armageddon” is thus understandable as a “mostly broad-
band” world in which secondary and tertiary revenue streams for Hol-
lywood films are threatened by unauthorized Internet-enabled down-
loads. These comments reflect a loss of perspective all too common in 
Hollywood. But Valenti’s biography reveals that he has more than a 
passing acquaintance with the kind of apocalyptic threat his language 
trivializes.
Valenti is a decorated veteran of the Second World War. He was 
a close associate of Lyndon Johnson, and served that President as the 
U.S. ramped up its involvement in the Vietnam War. In short, prior to 
Valenti’s assumption of the MPAA Presidency in 1966, he was a true 
Cold Warrior, writing and supervising the bulk of Johnson’s speeches. 
He likely played a key role in the Johnson administration’s withering 
attack on Barry Goldwater, the 1964 Republican nominee for U.S. 
President. Goldwater had a well-earned reputation as a hard right-
winger, once defending himself by claiming that “extremism in the 
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defense of liberty is no vice.” Valenti seized on this, arguing behind 
closed doors that “we ought to treat Goldwater not as an equal, who 
has credentials to be president, but as a radical, a preposterous candi-
date who would ruin this country and our future” (Gould).
Valenti’s successful deployment of this argument is testified to by 
the “Daisy” television commercial, in which the image of a small girl 
counting daisy petals is supplanted by the countdown to the launch 
of an intercontinental ballistic missile and scenes of apparent nuclear 
devastation. Without directly naming Goldwater, Johnson’s voice in-
tones: “These are the stakes. To make a world in which all of God’s 
children can live, or to go into the darkness. We must either love each 
other, or we must die.” Thus, the commercial expressly equated a vote 
for Goldwater with a vote for nuclear conflict, and four decades later 
it stands as one of the most questionable and extreme advertisements 
in the often sordid history of American political rhetoric. The Daisy 
commercial aired only once during the 1964 Presidential campaign, 
but it is generally understood to have had a devastating effect on the 
Goldwater campaign.
Given Valenti’s experience as an architect of Johnson’s most ex-
treme media messages, Valenti’s invocation of “Armageddon” should 
almost certainly be seen as a calculated statement from a man familiar 
with the particularities of both public speaking and political conflict. 
Even so, it remains tempting to dismiss Valenti’s statements as rhetori-
cal excesses of a man predisposed to hyperbole. Valenti did, after all, 
claim in 1983 that “the VCR is to the American film producer and the 
American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone” 
in sworn testimony before the U.S. Senate (qtd. in Wu). But Valenti’s 
rhetorical performances are far from anomalous in the ongoing de-
bates over peer-to-peer downloads, in which the use and transmission 
of copyrighted materials are often recast as tactical warfare.
This chapter offers critical analysis of recent discourse on peer-to-
peer file transfers, illustrating the degree to which participants in the 
debates over the legality of Napster and its successors position them-
selves as combatants. Further, this chapter maps this debate against 
the model of the Cold War (a model expressly invoked by Valenti and 
other participants in the debate) in part to point up how distant copy-
right questions are from actual warfare, and partly to illuminate the 
relative immaturity of the peer-to-peer debates. This point is under-
scored when the peer-to-peer debate is evaluated in terms of stasis the-
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ory, a classical rhetorical technique that, despite its vintage, provides 
a specific diagnosis for the impoverished discourse that has, to date, 
characterized this important public policy debate.
Since the advent of Napster, the content industries have grown in-
creasingly comfortable with positioning peer-to-peer transfers as acts 
of war. Napter’s arrival prompted a wave of rhetoric notable for its ag-
gressively militaristic tone. In August 2000 Sony vice-president Steve 
Heckler mobilized a rhetorical gear which Trevor Merriden, author 
of the Napster history Irresistible Forces, properly describes as “almost 
Churchillian.” Heckler stated:
The industry will take whatever steps it needs to pro-
tect itself and protect its revenue streams. It will not 
lose that revenue stream, no matter what. [. . .] We 
will develop technology that transcends the individ-
ual user. We will firewall Napster at its source—we 
will block it at your cable company, we will block it at 
your phone company, we will block it at your ISP. We 
will firewall it at your PC. (qtd. in Merriden 35)
Indeed, Merriden is understating his case by describing Heckler’s 
verbiage as almost Churchillian. Heckler’s presentation is expressly 
Churchillian, in that it effectively parodies a specific Churchill speech 
from 1940—routinely cited as an exemplary use of the rhetorical de-
vice of anaphora—in which Churchill famously declared his opposi-
tion to the threat posed by Hitler’s armies: “We shall fight on the 
beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the 
fields, and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills.” To the extent 
that Heckler’s language invites comparison with Churchill’s, Heckler 
should be understood to be tacitly linking those he would describe as 
intellectual property pirates with Nazis.
Warner Music executive Edgar Bronfman struck a similarly extreme 
tone when he argued, “If intellectual property is not protected—across 
the board, in every case, with no exceptions and no sophistry about 
a changing world—what will happen? Intellectual property will suf-
fer the fate of the Buffalo” (qtd. in Alderman, Sonic 139). Bronfman 
is here proposing a standard that is both impossible and impractical. 
The U.S. no longer has notice or registration requirements, so, in ef-
fect, everything is copyrighted once it is fixed in a tangible form of 
expression. And U.S. courts have expressly ruled that digital media are 
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“tangible” enough to establish “fixity.” So every e-mail message, every 
Web page, every completed scrap of information, digital or printed, is 
copyrighted—and presumably subject to Bronfman’s call for protec-
tion “across the board, in every case, with no exceptions.” Bronfman’s 
suggestion that without this maximal protection, intellectual property 
will tilt toward extinction is, in a word, absurd.
Intellectual property is a thriving industry in the U.S. According 
to recent estimates, the copyright industries account for roughly six 
percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, up from five percent in 
2002. Clearly, intellectual property industries have thrived in the ab-
sence of the kinds of maximal protection Bronfman seeks. Neverthe-
less Bronfman proposed to counter his specious claims of the threat 
of extinction with his own program of extermination: “I am warring 
against the culture of the Internet, threatening to depopulate Silicon 
Valley as I move a Roman legion of Wall Street lawyers to litigate in 
Bellevue and San Jose” (qtd. in Alderman 139).
The above-cited examples of extreme rhetoric have all been drawn 
from opponents of peer-to-peer file exchanges, but peer-to-peer pur-
veyors and enthusiasts are also implicated in the violent and milita-
ristic rhetoric that too often characterizes these debates. In testimony 
delivered before the U.S. Senate, Napster CEO Hank Barry wrapped 
his defenses of his company in repeated descriptions of the software 
as heralding a vaguely defined “revolution.” Barry first positions Nap-
ster inventor Shawn Fanning as a liberator: “Shawn Fanning began a 
revolution that is returning the Internet to its roots. [. . .] Napster does 
not copy files. It does not provide the technology for copying files. 
Napster does not make MP3 files. It does not transfer files” (Barry). 
But Barry’s attempts to reposition Napster as an essentially innocuous 
technology are undermined by Barry’s insistence on positioning Nap-
ster as marking a breaking point: “Napster simply facilitates commu-
nication among people interested in music. It is a return to the original 
information sharing approach of the Internet, allowing for a depth 
and a scale of information that is truly revolutionary” (Barry). “Revo-
lutionary” is, of course, a term that, in and of itself, constitutes effec-
tive marketing of any Internet-directed product, and Barry’s usage of 
the term should be understood as an attempt to establish novelty and 
primacy for Napster. But the language of revolution also carries with 
it an unmistakable threat to an established order.
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As the debate between Napster and the major labels heated up, 
Napster enthusiasts took up their own rhetorical weaponry in order to 
join Barry’s purported “revolution.” On a Web site featuring the rally-
ing cry, “Fight RIAA—Let’s Get Those Bastards,” we see Hank Bar-
ry’s rhetoric echoed in the site creator’s choice of “Live Free or Die”—a 
phrase now synonymous with the American Revolution.
Figure 8. The logo for an anti-RIAA site; note the use of “Live Free or Die!” 
Copyright © 2001, L. Anderson. 
The implicit argument of this site is that the RIAA is to Napster us-
ers as King George III and the British were to the Yankee colonists. 
We do well to recall, at least momentarily, that the Declaration of 
Independence indicts George III as follows:
He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt 
our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.
He is at this time transporting large Armies of 
foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, 
desolation and tyranny, already begun with circum-
stances of Cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in 
the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the 
Head of a civilized nation.
While overpriced compact discs and outrageously one-sided record-
ing contracts can and should prompt sharp criticism, the Fight-RIAA 
site’s hyperbolic characterizations of the conflict between peer-to-peer 
“colonists” and the “tyrant” RIAA undermine efforts to engage with 
peer-to-peer technologies in their rich complexity.
A contemporaneous hacker site is even more violent in its rhetoric, 
headlining itself “Kill the RIAA.” The site promotes a code-based pro-
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tocol for direct artist-to-fan distribution. While welling up from with-
in hacker culture, this proposal is fairly benign. It involves extension of 
code for MP3 files to facilitate listeners making direct contributions to 
the music’s creators, thereby cutting the RIAA and similar copyright 
holders out of the exchange, and eventually “killing” them.
Figure 9: The “Kill the RIAA” Protocol. 
The hacker’s attempt to develop a protocol which would, in ef-
fect, eliminate the need for the RIAA is grounded in a utopian vision. 
The impulse driving the hacker’s discussion is a probably naïve pre-
sumption that the development of an effective code-based payment 
mechanism would be able to transform the existing music industry 
into something like “shareware,” in which satisfied users of freely dis-
tributed software choose, on a voluntary basis, to compensate software 
developers. Unfortunately, this utopian vision is counterbalanced by 
the violence of the hacker’s rhetoric. Over the course of this discussion, 
the emphasis on a positive exchange between artists and fans is at odds 
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with the “killing” invoked to set the stage. And the RIAA is consis-
tently positioned as an enemy combatant, foreclosing the possibility of 
negotiation or cooperation. The hacker’s attempts to find a code-based 
means of bringing the RIAA to its knees suggest an “arms race” of 
sorts, playing out in cyberspaces where music files are circulating.
As the RIAA ramped up its criticism of Napster, the war metaphor 
became increasingly common. In a February 2000 exchange on Slash-
dot, we see correspondents debating whether a particular Cold War 
era model ought to be applied to their circumstances. A correspondent 
going by “Rader” begins the exchange by observing:
RADER: We are possibly watching the breakup of a 
major cartel. My parents had Vietnam. I’ve got the 
dawning of the digital age. A digital world impact-
ing huge corporations that spend 200 million dol-
lars a year just in legal expenses. Why does Napster 
get more bad publicity than the PROOF of the Big-5 
[the five largest record companies] collaborating and 
setting illegal prices in stores? Proof that Bo Didley 
[sic] has no money to his name, yet created Rock & 
Roll?
Maybe I’m the guy who ran to Canada instead of 
going to Vietnam, and you’re the ROTC punk who 
thinks it’s your duty to go to war. Whichever was 
right or wrong, it’s still a controversy today, much 
like this issue could possibly be.
Rader’s comments are, at first blush, not particularly coherent or 
persuasive. Rader’s strongest argument is that the core allegations 
lodged in an ultimately successful class action lawsuit against the 
RIAA for price fixing had been under-reported. Rader’s argument was 
borne out in part when, in 2004, the five major record labels paid out 
$67.4 million and $75.7 million worth of CDs to settle the case. But 
ultimately Rader’s argument devolves to an allegation that there is an 
imbalance in the public criticism of disreputable behavior by both re-
cord companies and music consumers. Later, it is not clear whether 
Rader means for the “breakup of [the] major cartel,” or the “dawn of 
the digital age” to serve as the basis for his comparison to Vietnam. 
That said, Rader does demonstrate some understanding of the his-
tory of the Vietnam era, and allies himself with the so-called “draft 
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dodgers” while lambasting another correspondent for, in effect, being 
a government dupe, much as military volunteers and conscripts were 
sometimes criticized in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
But the carelessness with which Rader draws this analogy prompt-
ed an incredulous response from another Slashdot correspondent:
ZIKZAK: Holy shit! Are you really claiming that the 
battle over MP3 pirating could be equivalent in im-
portance to the Vietnam War? Fuck, I have now seen 
the absolute pinnacle of pathetic justification. Equat-
ing the slightly over-priced and admittedly greedy re-
cording industry’s practices to the death of thousands 
and thousands of young men is absolutely the lowest 
thing I’ve ever seen on slashdot.
Congratulations. You have scraped absolute bot-
tom. 
Zikzak’s outburst prompted what appeared to be an embarrassed si-
lence from Rader, and other participants, in what had, to that point, 
been a lively discussion. Eventually another participant in the discus-
sion rose up to defend Rader’s analogy:
WAH: Well, there’s at least one part of the analogy 
that holds. Both are (were) being drawn up as a fight 
against communism (while the reality is (was) much 
less drastic). And if the laws we have here in the U.S. 
were universally enforced, you would have about 30 
million people in jail for their entire lifetime. Some 
people are just trying to avoid another catastrophe, 
over-the-top analogies (as this is) are one way to make 
the direction we are currently headed (unwinnable 
war with massive loss of life(time) looming) clear. 
Wah’s post features a link to a legal website that houses Chapter 12 of 
Title 17 of the United States Code, in which the substantial penalties 
established by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act are outlined. 
The Act specifies penalties of up to $1,000,000 and ten years in prison 
for those who circumvent copyright protection measures. Wah’s esti-
mate of thirty million in prison is highly questionable. Most Americans 
have neither the interest nor the technical skill needed to circumvent 
copyright protection systems. But within the context of Slashdot’s dis-
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cussion over whether the Napster debate parallels Vietnam, Wah’s post 
draws a link between the conscientious objectors and draft dodgers 
imprisoned during the Vietnam era, and the potential prisoners who, 
in Wah’s estimation, conscientiously object to or “dodge” copyright 
protection in virtual spaces.
The positioning of peer-to-peer transfers and their attendant de-
bates as acts of war are becoming increasingly codified. Litman’s 2002 
article “War Stories,” features a conclusion in which she flatly equates 
the peer-to-peer debates with warfare:
Commercial content owners (and their copyright 
lawyers) believe they are in a war for their own sur-
vival, and are committing extraordinary resources to 
ensure that they emerge victorious. They are fighting 
the copyright wars using all of the public relations 
tools at their disposal. They are fielding armies of 
copyright lobbyists and making campaign contribu-
tions so substantial that members of Congress have 
started to wage turf battles of their own to get juris-
diction over copyright legislation.
Litman is an astute critic of the copyright lobby, and her work as a 
whole points up the degree to which the public’s interest has been 
compromised by recent shifts in copyright law. Litman’s “Choosing 
Metaphors” chapter in Digital Copyright offers a sustained examina-
tion of the degree to which copyright policy has been influenced by a 
variety of suspect metaphoric constructions. And yet, the war meta-
phor is so entrenched that Litman here invokes it to frame her discus-
sion despite her certain recognition of the profound distance between 
copyright violations and combat. We do well to ask why this metaphor 
has proven so resilient, persisting even as video and Internet-circulated 
images of the second U.S.-led war in Iraq offered a jarring reminder of 
the horrific consequences of military conflict.
While participants in the peer-to-peer debate from all sides of 
the issue routinely pursue analogies drawn from across centuries of 
military history, the most common comparisons remain those which 
repurpose the language and history of the Cold War (and of Vietnam, 
the paradigmatic “little war” within the bloated corpus of the Cold 
War). These comparisons grossly inflate the stakes of the debate. As 
Zikzak’s eruption rightly reminds us, there is no body count associated 
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with peer-to-peer file transmission. Whatever the costs associated with 
“illegal” downloading might be, they pale before the awful human toll 
of Vietnam and the Cold War. Why then does the analogy prove irre-
sistible to participants in this debate? The answer is, in part, that there 
are a number of superficial similarities between the history of the Cold 
War and the history of the peer-to-peer debates.
Historians typically date the Cold War as stretching from roughly 
1947 to 1989. Most accounts point to the Cold War commencing dur-
ing a brutal winter in Europe, which ratcheted up a contest between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union over which country could provide more 
aid to the affected nations (most of which were already reeling from 
the after-effects of World War II). There is near-universal agreement 
that the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 
9, 1989. While various labels are applied to the intervening periods, 
there is general agreement that the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged 
in a pitched conflict with the very real possibility of nuclear confron-
tation after reaching a point of schism in the late 1940s. This nuclear 
threat persisted until the inauguration of a mutually acknowledged 
period of détente in 1968.
For years, no one was certain how close the two superpowers had 
come to what was then referred to as a “tactical nuclear exchange.” 
But a recent conference on the 40th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis pointed up how real the danger had been. The New York Times’s 
coverage of the conference contained a harrowing account of the peak 
of the crisis, in which a Soviet submarine commander, responding to 
depth charges dropped by an American destroyer, ordered the prepa-
ration of the submarine’s nuclear torpedo. The Times report quotes 
the commander as having said: “Maybe the war has already started up 
there, while we are doing somersaults here! [. . .] We’re going to blast 
them now! We will die, but we will sink them all. We will not dis-
grace our navy!” (Gonzalez) The Cuban Missile Crisis functions as a 
generally recognized “flashpoint” within the history of the Cold War. 
It is the point at which the confrontation between the then-extant 
superpowers was most pitched, most pointed, and potentially, most 
destructive.
Within the context of the peer-to-peer debates, the showdown be-
tween the RIAA and Napster that culminated in the injunction that 
closed Napster parallels the Cuban Missile Crisis, featuring similar-
ly intransigent parties mixing secret tactical exchanges with aggres-
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sive public posturing. Like the Missile Crisis, the peer-to-peer debate 
prompted high-level government hearings, with representatives from 
the parties concerned campaigning to earn comparisons to Adlai Ste-
venson, who famously unveiled the “smoking gun” photographs of So-
viet military installations in Cuba in October 1962 United Nations 
hearings. 
Surprisingly, Metallica drummer Lars Ulrich’s testimony has come 
to be regarded as the parallel rhetorical “flashpoint” within the peer-
to-peer debate. Ulrich’s arguments, cited repeatedly in this book, 
neatly encapsulate the array of arguments promoted by the content 
industries. Further, Ulrich managed to successfully negotiate the high 
drama of the superficially absurd proceedings, and speak in a way that 
prompted sustained discussions among all parties to the debate.
Ulrich closed his testimony by quoting New York Times columnist 
Edward Rothstein, who, in an essay entitled “Swashbuckling Anar-
chists Try to Eliminate Copyright from Cyberspace,” wrote:
Information doesn’t want to be free; only the trans-
mission of information wants to be free. Information, 
like culture, is the result of a labor and devotion, in-
vestment and risk; it has a value. And nothing will 
lead to a more deafening cultural silence than ignor-
ing that value and celebrating “the near perfect anar-
chy” of Freenet and Napster running amok.
Ulrich subtly revised Rothstein, adjusting the final sentences to 
read “celebrating . . . [companies like] Napster,” suggesting that, as a 
member of a band that foregrounds its anti-authoritarian, oppositional 
stance, Ulrich was uncomfortable with the positioning of the debate 
as a dispute between “investors” on his side of the argument, and “an-
archists” as his opponents. Indeed, Metallica’s sharply critical assess-
ment of the status quo on records like And Justice For All made the 
band an especially unlikely ally for the record industry. Yet by citing 
Rothstein’s essay, Ulrich trafficked in Rothstein’s polarizing rhetoric, 
which positioned Napster and similar programs as cultural doomsday 
devices.
It remains important to recall that the question addressed by the 
U.S. Senate hearings on peer-to-peer was ultimately nothing more 
than whether the RIAA or Napster (or, perhaps, both) would ulti-
mately profit from peer-to-peer file transfers. Further, while the peer-
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to-peer debates spiraled from courtrooms to the court of public opin-
ion, all of the parties involved agreed to respect the will of U.S. judges 
and legislative bodies.
With the parallels between “flashpoint” confrontations in place, 
an extended chronology for Cold War comparisons can be established. 
The roots of the peer-to-peer debates can be traced back to the re-
cord industry’s shift from the 45 rpm vinyl single to the long play-
ing album, followed by attempted shifts to reel-to-reel, 8-track tape, 
cassette, and, ultimately, the successful replacement of vinyl with the 
compact disc. The near-elimination of the single as a medium effec-
tively required music consumers to purchase entire albums to secure 
copies of the individual songs they favored. And the introduction of 
four “long-playing” formats in a quarter century (each touted as supe-
rior to its predecessor) prompted many consumers to purchase their 
favorite music on as many as four different media. Prior to Napster, 
music consumers had become understandably wary of the record in-
dustry, and increasingly critical of the high prices of compact discs. 
The settlement agreement in the price-fixing case referenced by Rader 
was all the evidence many consumers needed of the music industry’s 
bad faith. And this was compounded when the record companies in 
the settlement complied in a desultory fashion with an order to supple-
ment the suit’s mandatory financial settlement with donations of com-
pact discs to libraries. A 2004 USA Today article suggests that that the 
companies involved complied with the letter, but not the spirit of the 
settlement:
[T]he shipments included many unpopular titles that 
library officials wouldn’t have chosen for their collec-
tions. And other usable titles arrived in such quantity 
that the supply will exceed demand.
“These are old materials, unpopular materials 
the companies had left over,” said Lynda Murray, di-
rector of government relations for the Ohio Library 
Council. “For the most part, these are CDs that li-
braries would have never purchased or included in 
their collections.”
For example, in suburban Worthington, the li-
braries’ take included 19 copies of The Mystery of 
Santo Domingo De Silos, an album of Gregorian 
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chants, while suburban Bexley Public Library em-
ployees found in their shipment 15 copies of Whit-
ney Houston’s 1991 recording of The Star Spangled 
Banner. (“Free Compact Discs”)
The record industry has, in some circumstances, shown itself to be 
remarkably tone-deaf with respect to the consequences of its actions. 
Few industries are more widely loathed by their customer base. And 
the distaste many music consumers voice for the record industry is 
compounded by the complaints of working musicians.
Five years before Napster, musician and producer Steve Albini 
wrote a scathing essay entitled “The Problem With Music,” in which 
he documented how a successful major-label record release would net 
its record company over $700,000, while the members of the band 
responsible for the record would receive less than $5,000 each. As 
Napster gained steam, rocker Courtney Love gave a speech, later pub-
lished as “Courtney Love Does the Math” where she offered a similar 
financial analysis, with a band grossing $11 million, but ending up 
with “zero.” Love observes: “The system’s set up so almost nobody 
gets paid” (Love). With these complaints circulating and meshing 
with high CD prices throughout the 1990s, it seems clear that if Nap-
ster hadn’t offered an avenue for music consumers to lash back at the 
record companies, another similar “flashpoint” would have material-
ized. While the slow-burning narrative of consumer dissatisfaction 
with the record industry does not offer the relatively sharp schism of 
the Cold War, it does provide a portrait of escalating hostilities setting 
the stage for a dramatic confrontation in which one side is ultimately 
forced to “stand down.”
The period immediately following the Napster “crisis,” recalled 
the pitched period in the 1960s when the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
heated up the nuclear rhetoric while confining themselves to indirect 
confrontations via espionage and “little wars” against small nations 
positioned as emblematic of “the enemy.” Skirmishes between the re-
cord industry (and industry-supporting performers) and file-traders 
became increasingly common, and some of these battles had the jittery 
energy of the spy culture celebrated in the wake of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.
In 2003, Madonna, fresh from having recorded the theme for the 
latest installment in the James Bond series, completed an album enti-
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tled American Life to surround the Bond theme (formally listed on the 
album as “‘Die Another Day’ from the MGM motion picture Die An-
other Day”). In coordination with the Warner Music Group, Madonna 
recorded a profane challenge to downloaders (she snarls “what the fuck 
do you think you’re doing?”) which was then disguised as leaked tracks 
from the American Life album, and uploaded onto the major file-trans-
fer systems that rose up in Napster’s wake (e.g., Kazaa, Limewire). 
By flooding these networks with bogus files, Warner and Madonna 
hoped to at least slow, and perhaps impede altogether the traffic in 
American Life downloads. Shortly after the bogus files were uploaded, 
a hacker cracked Madonna’s site and posted a parodic response (“This 
is what the fuck I think I’m doing”) followed by five genuine music 
files from American Life. In addition to the hack, the Madonna sound-
clip became the focus of “The Madonna Remix Project” with dozens 
of downloaders preparing musical compositions featuring the snippet, 
usually mixed in with fierce and/or hilarious attacks on Madonna and 
Warner Music Group.
The following year, the RIAA acknowledged that it had under-
taken a broader campaign of larding peer-to-peer networks with bogus 
files. While these files featured artists’ names and song titles, and ap-
peared to be MP3 files of appropriate size and length, downloaders 
would hear only static or silence, or sometimes a recording warning 
against “illegal downloading.” In response, the P2P company Altnet 
sued the RIAA for violating Altnet’s patent on an algorithm used by 
the company to “properly” identify MP3 files.
Thus, as in the middle stages of the Cold War, the “official” politi-
cal actions of the competing parties are underscored by waves of secret, 
often anonymous activity directed at technologically undermining the 
opposition. As with their Cold War predecessors, all parties concerned 
appear to find this approach preferable to the “hot war” alternative. 
But my ultimate goal in this review of the superficial similarities be-
tween the Cold War and the history of peer-to-peer file transfers is not 
merely to find the right sort of war to function as an analogy for this 
ongoing debate. Indeed, the acceptance of war as metaphor gives away 
too much of the game for those who hope for expanded opportunities 
for peer-to-peer exchanges because it accepts military conflicts over 
real property as exemplary.
Law professor Dan Burk has pointedly and persistently argued 
against the impulse to simply “port” law from terrestrial spaces to their 
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supposed cyberspace counterparts. As early as 1997, Burk recognized, 
rightly, that there is “no coherent homology between cyberspace and 
real space,” and that the real space analogies routinely deployed to 
explain cyberspaces were likely obscuring at least as much as they il-
luminated about the Internet. In a similar vein, I argue here that the 
physical realities of terrestrial war (whether hot or cold) are absolutely 
removed from disagreements over even the wholesale appropriation of 
intellectual property. Recourse to war as the metaphoric frame for the 
debate obscures the degree to which peer-to-peer exchanges comple-
ment and extend pre-computer modes of distributing and exchanging 
information.
The corrupted status of much of the rhetoric surrounding peer-to-
peer exchanges is thrown into sharp relief by even ancient tools for un-
derstanding arguments. Though initially developed as an invention-
al technique for ancient Greek courts, the stasis theory advanced by 
Hermagoras of Temnos in the second century BCE. offers a powerful 
diagnosis of the disconnections in the peer-to-peer debates. Hermag-
oras’s theory offers four focus points (conjecture, definition, quality, 
and policy) as a means of tracing whether parties to an argument have 
identified the true source of their conflict. Janet Davis describes the 
process as follows:
The rhetor proceeds through a prescribed series of di-
chotomizing questions to locate and identify the un-
resolved matter. Locating the stasis within the system 
presents the rhetor with not only a name for the cat-
egory of argument but also a recommended strategy 
for pursuing it. (693)
As Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor have pointed out, Hermagoras’s 
questions are presented in hierarchical order. They observe:
Questions of fact or conjecture in the first stasis are 
prior to those of definition in the second; defini-
tions in turn must be established before the quality 
is debated; and finally all three must be answered or 
assumed before an action can be recommended or 
taken in a specific case. (137)
Thus, according to first step in the stasis process, parties must arrive 
at an agreement that a specific act is occurring or has occurred. In 
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the peer-to-peer debates, it seems clear that all parties involved would 
agree that peer-to-peer transfers of copyright-protected materials have 
occurred and will continue to occur via peer-to-peer systems, so stasis 
has been achieved with respect to questions of conjecture. Having es-
tablished that a particular act has occurred and is occurring, we move 
to the second stasis.
The second stasis is the stasis of definition. Sharon Crowley and 
Debra Hawhee identify “How can the act be defined?” and “What 
kind of thing or event is it?” as core questions for the second stasis (47, 
50). These questions foreground the fault lines in the ongoing debates 
with absolute clarity. The content industries have to a great degree 
shaped this debate in apocalyptic terms, with peer-to-peer exchanges 
positioned as at best failures of will, more typically as examples of 
hacking, theft, piracy, or war. As suggested by the examples above, 
even peer-to-peer advocates have too often accepted these terms. Cur-
rent references to peer-to-peer transfers as “file sharing” more accurate-
ly reflect the sentiments of the many communities taking advantage of 
peer-to-peer networks. But this usage is grounded in a knowing refusal 
to engage with the complex ethical questions surrounding the unau-
thorized sharing of non-rivalrous, readily reproducible digital files.
The peer-to-peer debate is clearly stalled at the second stasis. The 
definitions used by the participants in the debate are so distant and 
so distorted that it is sometimes difficult to recognize that the act of 
transferring files between computers is, in and of itself, common, un-
remarkable, and morally neutral. While stasis theory advises partici-
pants in a debate to defer questions of policy until both the definition 
and the quality of an action are understood, the current debate has 
vaulted the second and third stases. The U.S. Congress is now actively 
considering the policy questions without these definitions and evalu-
ations having stabilized, and the consequence will almost certainly be 
continuing imbalance in intellectual property policies as they relate to 
peer-to-peer technologies.
Despite a wave of speculation in the wake of the RIAA lawsuits, 
suggesting that content industries and leading peer-to-peer compa-
nies might achieve something akin to détente, the “border skirmishes” 
continue unabated. The RIAA has settled comfortably into a roughly 
monthly pattern of announcing lawsuits against hundreds of peer-to-
peer users.
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So it was surprising when, on August 22, 2005, at an industry 
summit, Warner Music CEO Edgar Bronfman unilaterally stated that 
armistice had been achieved:
[T]he war between the music companies and con-
sumers has been fought. We lost. Okay? So, let’s just 
move on. Which is to say, we’ve got to make our 
music available to people. We just need to be allowed 
to have a business model that allows copyright hold-
ers and owners to be compensated for their work. But 
our job is to get music to everyone, everywhere, as 
readily and as seamlessly as possible. (Bronfman)
Bronfman made this statement in the same month when the Japanese 
version of Apple’s iTunes Music Store opened without songs from the 
catalogs of Sony and Bronfman’s Warner Music Group because they 
were unable to agree on appropriate terms for the licenses. The typical 
share for the major labels on each 99 cent download is currently about 
70 cents. According to the New York Times Sony and Warner favored 
eliminating Apple’s fixed 99 cent pricing in favor of a variable pricing 
structure.
[T]he one-price model that iTunes has adopted—99 
cents to download any song—could be replaced with 
a more complex structure that prices songs by popu-
larity. A hot new single, for example, could sell for 
$1.49, while a golden oldie could go for substantially 
less than 99 cents. (Leeds)
The iTunes Music Store is far and away the most successful retailer 
of online music, though subscription services like those offered by 
Rhapsody and Napster 2.0 appear to be making some inroads. Relative 
to the subscription services, Apple’s sales of over 500,000,000 down-
loaded songs in the two-and-a-half years since its April, 2003 launch 
make a clear case for iTunes as the goose that is presently laying the 
golden eggs. The Times quoted one industry analyst who responded 
to the variable pricing proposal by suggesting that the music industry 
should leave well enough alone:
“As I recall, three years ago these guys were wander-
ing around with their hands out looking for some-
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one to save them,” said Mike McGuire, an analyst 
at Gartner G2. “It’d be rather silly to try to destabi-
lize him because iTunes is one of the few bright spots 
in the industry right now. He’s got something that’s 
working.” (Leeds)
The Times also referenced unnamed executives who had concluded that 
the proposal was at least untimely and probably unwise as well: “Music 
executives who support Mr. Jobs say the higher prices could backfire, 
sending iTunes’ customers in search of songs on free, unauthorized 
file-swapping networks.” Bronfman’s purported cessation of hostilities 
did not appear to preclude second-guessing the price structure of the 
sole truly successful approach to online distribution of music.
At the same time, the other major content industry association, the 
MPAA, was pursuing the latest phases of its own lawsuit campaign. 
On August 25, 2005, the MPAA filed 286 lawsuits against users of 
peer-to-peer technologies. MPAA Senior Vice President John Malcom 
issued a statement, stating: “Internet movie thieves be warned: You 
have no friends in the online community when you are engaging in 
copyright theft” (MPAA, “Illegal Downloading”). The MPAA had 
also seized and shuttered a popular website named “LokiTorrent,” that 
had offered streamlined connectivity to the BitTorrent peer-to-peer 
network, a major source for downloads of large files, including mo-
tion pictures and television programs. The MPAA posted a threaten-
ing notice to the site, warning LokiTorrent users that they could run, 
but not hide from prosecution.
The MPAA’s LokiTorrent notice reflects the hyperbolic inaccura-
cies now all too common in the peer-to-peer debates. From the blus-
tering headline to the flat equation of downloading with theft, the 
former LokiTorrent site reflects the continuing rhetoric of threat and 
hostility. For this reason, it was an obvious target for parody.
As the creators of the site entitled “The MPAA vs. An Army of 
Mice” clearly know, parody remains one of the most successful defens-
es against a charge of infringement. Indeed, the site’s creators even in-
cluded a link to the Parody Doctrine at the bottom of their page. One 
website approvingly citing the “Army of Mice” page refers to it as a 
“remix,” thereby invoking a key term for those who seek broader access 
to copyrighted materials. Remixing is arguably the signature art form 
of the digital era. While the term stems from the practices of dub and 
wwwww.parlorpress.comParlor Press
Peers, Pirates, and Persuasion124
reggae mixmasters like Lee “Scratch” Perry, who created multiple ver-
sions of a basic music track, the concept has come to describe a broad 
array of cultural practices in a digital context. Digital media make the 
appropriation and recontextualization of snippets of culture remark-
ably easy. As with the above-cited Madonna Remix Project, when the 
content industries insult a broad swath of their core consumers, the re-
sponse, more often then not, is for their own words to be sliced, diced, 
and reworked into a fierce counterpunch.
While it is tempting to simply celebrate the “Army of Mice” parody 
as the one of the latest examples of the virtual impossibility of contain-
ing creativity, the site’s own rhetorical excesses position it as a saber-rat-
tling tit-for-tat exchange in an ongoing race to the rhetorical bottom. 
Figure 10: The warning posted by the MPAA to the former LokiTorrent site. 
Copyright © 2005, Motion Picture Association of America. 
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The site is on fairly solid footing when it complains about copyright 
laws being “distorted beyond their original intent” and also when it 
challenges the MPAA’s flat equation of downloading as tangible theft. 
But when the site casts its lot with the goal of “den[ying] thousands of 
dishonest, lazy executives of their crack smoking livelihood,” we are in 
the familiar rhetorical gutter of the baseless ad hominem attack, even 
when the language is likely intended as hyperbolic humor. Though 
the “Army of Mice” parody responds to the MPAA with creativity and 
wit, it also accepts and perpetuates the characterization of the peer-to-
peer debates as a “war.” While composed of “mice” the ShutdownThis 
website is still marshalling an “army.”
The path to fair and appropriate policies addressing peer-to-peer 
technologies continues to be obscured by the polarizing rhetoric often 
used by the participants in the debate. The content industries have re-
peatedly attempted to position peer-to-peer technologies as weapons, 
Figure 11: The ShutdownThis.com “Army of Mice” parody.
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and peer-to-peer users as criminals and terrorists. These arguments 
tend to conflate peer-to-peer technologies with the uses to which they 
are being put. While some of these uses are at least unethical and po-
tentially illegal, many are not. The content industries’ arguments to 
date threaten to disrupt growth and innovation in peer-to-peer tech-
nologies, which already offer computer users far more than free, easy 
access to the latest Top-40 hit. Peer-to-peer networks’ true potential 
will only be realized once U.S. culture settles on a means of expedit-
ing the movement of cultural artifacts into the public domain. The 
content industries’ continuing positioning of peer-to-peer as an assault 
on the producers of intellectual property will, inevitably, delay this 
realization.
Too often, those who seek a more principled discussion of the 
power and potential of peer-to-peer technologies accept and perpetu-
ate the framing of the peer-to-peer debates as war. The consequences 
of the continuing hostilities now threaten, as is so often the case with 
warfare, to leave no possibility for a true “winner.” In a 2005 speech, 
Litman sharply criticized the combatants:
We are not going to be able to rebuild the law that we’re 
destroying in this war without a great deal of compro-
mise, many concessions, and a large dose of mutual 
trust, and we’ve just spent the past ten years proving 
to one another that we can’t be trusted. There’s a great 
deal of mistrust right now and it certainly looks to me 
as if most of it is richly deserved. There’s been an inor-
dinate amount of bullying and threats, a fair amount 
over-zealous advocacy on all sides that has sometimes 
crossed the line into bad faith litigation or deceptive 
lobbying. (“War and Peace”)
Litman’s language here echoes the Cold War threat of “mutually as-
sured destruction,” and even if the stakes of the copyright cold war are 
comparatively minor, the time has come for the combatants to stand 
down. Refusal to engage in the rhetoric of warfare is both a form of 
conscientious objection and a long overdue step on the path toward 
copyright policies tailored to the practical realities and the immense 
potential of digital media. The next step is the articulation of ethical 
stances that reflect the conscience implicit in the objection. 
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7 Conclusion: The Cat Came Back
Today, the striking iconography developed by the Napster corporation 
(including the impish headphone-wearing Napster “cat” logo) lives on 
as the public face of Napster 2.0, a pay-for-play music service offered 
by Roxio. But Napster 2.0 is demonstrably not Napster. Indeed, the 
Napster 2.0 pay-for-play service eliminates the community-building 
features (e.g., chat functionality among uploaders and downloaders) 
that made Napster both distinctive and especially efficient. And the 
licensing agreements that repositioned Napster on the safe side of the 
law give the lie to Napster’s still anti-authoritarian advertising, in 
which the iconic cat momentarily appears as a metalhead, a gangsta 
rapper, or a stoned reggae fan. Napster 2.0 is struggling to find its way 
as a pay-for-play service. The cultural phenomenon of napsterization 
remains wild and on the loose. While Napster limited itself to music 
files, the latest generation of peer-to-peer clients is open to anything in 
digital form, leaving Napsters 1.0 and 2.0 looking tame by compari-
son.
The relative wildness of Napster’s offspring has driven the increas-
ingly pitched debates over the ethics and legality of peer-to-peer down-
loads to the point where the continuing availability and utility of the 
technology itself is by no means assured. (By this I mean legal avail-
ability. If we set aside potential shifts in the law, it is clear that peer-
to-peer technologies will be forever with us. The efficiencies that can 
be achieved by leveraging peer-to-peer’s economies of scale are just too 
irresistible now that the P2P cat is well out of the bag.) The increasing 
association of peer-to-peer technologies with criminality is especially 
worrisome because there is broad agreement across academic disci-
plines that peer-to-peer technologies are both a foundational structure 
and a critical element of the current Internet. In his 2001 book Copy-
rights and Copywrongs, Vaidhyanathan argues that peer-to-peer prin-
ciples are embedded throughout the Internet:
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The Internet as originally conceived in the late 1960s 
was a peer-to-peer system. The goal of the original 
ARPANET was to share computing resources around 
the U.S. The challenge for this effort was to integrate 
different kinds of existing networks as well as future 
technologies with one common network that would 
allow every host to be an equal player[. . .]. The AR-
PANET connected them together not in a master/
slave or client/server relationship, but rather as equal 
computing peers. (180)
Four years later, Vaidhyanathan’s argument was underscored when a 
group of seventeen prominent computer science professors submitted 
an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in the high-profile case of 
MGM v. Grokster. The Grokster case centered on a post-Napster gen-
eration of peer-to-peer software that eliminated the central cataloging 
servers that ultimately proved Napster’s undoing. Because Napster po-
tentially could determine whether specific infringing files were listed 
on its servers, the company arguably had an obligation to block access 
to those files. The peer-to-peer companies enmeshed in Grokster side-
stepped this issue by employing participants’ computers to construct 
the catalog of available files. These companies argued that they had 
both no control over and no knowledge of the specific files transferred 
via their software. The seventeen computer scientists, writing in sup-
port of the peer-to-peer software companies, argued that “P2P net-
works are not new developments in network design, but rather the 
design on which the Internet itself is based” (Abelson, et al.) To the 
extent that the current debates over securing compensation for copy-
righted materials effectively challenge the legality of peer-to-peer net-
works, they also challenge the legality of a significant portion of the 
Internet itself.
While much of the activity on the contemporary Internet might 
be described as client-server (and thus predicated on an imbalanced 
relationship between participants) there are also numerous sites within 
the Internet that depend on a roughly level relationship among partici-
pants. The most prominent example is the Usenet news groups (e.g., 
alt.music.no-depression) that prior to the advent of the World Wide 
Web, were, taken together, the most popular spaces on the Internet. 
Usenet is, to this day, a peer-to-peer application, with level relation-
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ships among the NNTP servers that store and forward articles to one 
another. Thus, the need for informed policies with regard to the use 
and circulation of copyrighted works is critical, not just for the Unit-
ed States, but in an international context, because the Internet itself is 
(among other things) a peer-to-peer network.
Nevertheless, countering the computer science professors’ brief was 
a contemporaneous New York Times editorial, addressing the Grokster 
case, and egregiously entitled “When David Steals Goliath’s Music.” 
The Times editorial offers a clear indication of just how much was at 
stake in the Grokster case, and is at stake in the peer-to-peer debates. 
After commencing with a title that tacitly equates peer-to-peer tech-
nologies with theft, the Times editorial board concludes with this stun-
ning argument:
Grokster’s supporters are justified in worrying that 
if the courts are too quick to rein in new technol-
ogy, innovation can be stifled. They are also right to 
point out that copyright has sometimes been given 
too much protection, notably in the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, which gratuitously added 20 years to 
existing copyrights. But these concerns do not erase 
the continuing importance of intellectual property, 
which is unquestionably under assault.
Both the court and Congress should be sensi-
tive to evolving technologies. But they should not let 
technology evolve in a way that deprives people who 
create of the ability to be paid for their work. (“When 
David Steals”)
Despite a paragraph ably documenting some of the more troubling re-
cent shifts in intellectual property policy, the Times ultimately argues 
against “letting technology evolve” if that evolution might deprive in-
tellectual property creators of “the ability to be paid for their work.” Of 
course, technological innovation does just that all the time. The twen-
tieth entury is replete with inventions, from the player piano to the 
VCR, each of which posed a significant threat to an existing structure 
of compensation for creative work. Yet the Constitutional clause that 
is the basis for U.S. copyright law announces the goal of “promot[ing] 
the progress of science and useful arts.” That a newspaper with a repu-
tation as strong as the Times’ is now arguing that copyright effectively 
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requires the suppression of technology is an indication of how far we 
have traveled from Thomas Jefferson’s sensibilities. And I regret to say 
that my own disciplinary forebears in rhetoric and composition studies 
played a significant role in shaping our current circumstance, in which 
the “people who create” are often privileged to the point that techno-
logical development is stifled.
In 1996 article entitled “Intellectual Property and Composition 
Studies,” Andrea Lunsford and Susan West offer a sharply critical as-
sessment of their own discipline:
[T]he teaching of writing has traditionally been in-
vested in a model of composing that makes solitary 
reflection central to the production of “original” texts 
absolutely “owned” by their creators, a model of sin-
gular authorship and ownership perpetuated effec-
tively by teachers of writing (and educational systems 
in general). [. . .] [A] vision of singular, stable author-
ship and autonomous creative acts has profoundly in-
fluenced copyright doctrine. (387)
Lunsford (along with another collaborator, Lisa Ede) had already chal-
lenged this model by identifying, acknowledging, and celebrating the 
degree to which many writers collaborate successfully and efficiently 
to produce written work. Lunsford’s work dovetailed with work by 
many other scholars in rhetoric and composition who expressly cri-
tiqued the construct of the Romantic author—described by Martha 
Woodmansee as “solitary, originary, and proprietary”—as the nec-
essary model for all writers. Especially notable among these scholars 
were Karen Burke LeFevre, whose 1986 book, Invention as a Social 
Act, pointed up the degree to which rhetorical invention is not the 
by-product of isolated individuals, but rather of participants in com-
municative networks; James E. Porter, whose 1984 Rhetoric Review 
article “Intertextuality and the Discourse Community” described the 
degree to which composers of texts depended upon and responded 
to their social contexts; and Gail Hawisher and Cynthia Selfe, who 
founded the journal Computers and Composition in 1983 and therein 
published dozens of articles addressing the profound implications of 
digital media for the practice of writing.
When Lunsford and West wrote “Intellectual Property and Com-
position Studies” they were certainly aware of the excellent work cri-
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tiquing and challenging traditional approaches to the teaching of writ-
ing. But their conclusion was that the bulk of composition pedagogy 
was nevertheless directed at perpetuating the solitary author/owner 
as the preferred “model composer.” Further, Lunsford and West saw 
this flawed pedagogical approach as having significant implications 
beyond the boundaries of the composition classroom: They wrote, “ 
[I]t seems not too much of a stretch to read composition theories and 
pedagogies as deeply complicit in the expansion of copyright and the 
tilt towards a strong protectionist policy regarding “authorial” rights” 
(397). Indeed, composition classes are never merely about the produc-
tion of written work. They are the spaces in which colleges and univer-
sities most directly address and model the creative process.
Composition classes are also among the first college-level classes 
where the politics and mechanics of using and appropriating others’ 
work are points of focus. Composition classes routinely devote sig-
nificant time and energy to teaching the proper use of quotations and 
scholarly citation practices. They are also the spaces within colleges 
and universities where instructors are most likely to devote more than 
a few minutes to the topic of plagiarism. For these reasons, composi-
tion classes have a profound influence on students’ sense of their own 
actions as writers and producers of creative work. Composition classes 
are often the spaces in which students cultivate an informed under-
standing of how to navigate the boundaries between their own work 
and the work of others. The principles embedded in the pedagogies of 
composition classrooms are likely at the heart of most college gradu-
ates’ perceptions of copyright and intellectual property.
As late as 1996, Lunsford and West could reasonably argue that 
despite many significant and positive efforts by their colleagues, the 
bulk of composition pedagogy was perpetuating a narrow and flawed 
construction of the creator as an owner. Indeed, it is this bias toward 
understanding writing and creative work as the production of property 
that underpins the New York Times editorial. When considering the 
then-pending Grokster case, the Times editorial writers could identi-
fy no value more compelling than ensuring that “people who create” 
would retain “the ability to be paid for their work.” This bias would 
also be reflected in the Supreme Court’s decision, widely reported as 
a unanimous rebuke to Grokster, Streamcast, and all purveyors of 
similar software. When one considers the composition pedagogies 
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that dominated the intellectual landscape when our current Supreme 
Court justices were educated, this result begins to seem inevitable.
As of this writing, the average age of the Supreme Court Justices is 
66. The “average Justice” would have entered college in the late 1950s 
and graduated during the early 1960s. I cannot fully interrogate the 
range of possible approaches to teaching writing that the Justices may 
have encountered. Composition classrooms have historically been 
contested sites, rife with competing theories and pedagogies. Space 
precludes a full account of these contests. For my purposes, it will 
be enough to point to a representative moment from a well-regarded 
history of U.S. composition instruction that speaks to a baseline un-
derstanding that almost certainly colored approaches to composition 
pedagogy for much of the second half of the twentieth century.
In his Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Col-
leges, 1900–1985, James Berlin cites an article from the first volume 
of College Composition and Communication—published in 1950—by 
Occidental College Professor Kenneth Oliver. Oliver writes: “[Self-ex-
pressive writing] is what has given us the best perspective of man in his 
process-civilization. Persuasion, inevitably geared down to the mass-
es, can never give us as full a perspective” (qtd. in Berlin109). Berlin 
glosses this by writing, “Since it is the individual genius who makes 
for salutary developments in society [. . .] it is the individual genius 
who should be encouraged in the composition class through literature 
and expressive writing” (109). The reification of the individual genius, 
exemplified by Oliver’s approach, necessarily reinforces an interpreta-
tion of intellectual property law that emphasizes the ownership rights 
of authors and inventors, and not the public’s rights to access, use, and 
repurpose existing works. Oliver’s article thus offers a telling snapshot 
of the theoretical approaches to the teaching of writing that domi-
nated the U.S. universities when most of our current Supreme Court 
justices were educated.
My analysis of the written opinions in the Grokster case points up 
the degree to which the current Justices were influenced by the kind of 
traditionalist composition pedagogy that Lunsford and West critique. 
The Grokster decision is heavily biased toward encouraging the indi-
vidual genius by rewarding the middlemen who purchase copyrighted 
work from geniuses. If the public’s supposed rights of access and use 
are compromised by the encouragement of genius (and the concomi-
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tant policing of copyright) then that—the Court argues—is the price 
we must now pay.
Supreme Court decisions have historically offered the best available 
index as to where the floating line between use and infringement of 
others’ work has settled at any given moment. For this reason, MGM 
v. Grokster has routinely been described as “the most important copy-
right case in two decades “ or, sometimes, “in a generation.” These 
timelines acknowledge, inferentially, that up until Grokster the most 
significant copyright case involving technologies of reproduction was 
certainly the 1984 case of Sony v. Universal Studios, colloquially known 
as “the Betamax case.” In the wake of the July 2005 decision, we can 
now understand Grokster as the first major challenge to the principle 
at the heart of Betamax, which is articulated quite directly in Justice 
John Paul Stevens’s Betamax opinion:
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike 
a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate de-
mand for effective—not merely symbolic—protec-
tion of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of oth-
ers freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of 
commerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying equip-
ment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the 
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substan-
tial noninfringing uses. (emphasis added)
I am by no means the first to suggest that there is a bit of a lacuna be-
tween this excerpt’s concluding sentence and its predecessors. Stevens 
begins this critical portion of the opinion by importing a concept from 
patent law, the notion of a “staple article of commerce.” The idea un-
derlying the staple article of commerce doctrine is that it is possible 
for courts and for the patent office to weigh and determine whether 
particular inventions were designed for the core purpose of infringing 
on an existing patent or not. According to the section 35 of the U.S. 
Code, if a given invention, or component of an invention is “suitable 
for substantial noninfringing use” it is a “staple article of commerce.”
In Betamax, Stevens imported the “staple article” from patent law 
to copyright, and critics have complained that this does violence to 
the doctrine. Even so, the above-excerpted sentence seems to move 
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from a strong affirmation of the copyright holder’s need for protec-
tion, to a suggestion that “wide use” for “legitimate, unobjectionable 
purposes” might constitute a defense against a charge of infringement, 
before concluding that the mere capability of substantial noninfringing 
uses can serve as a defense against the charge of infringement. This is 
a remarkable evolution in the space of three sentences. Stevens’s last 
sentence is routinely cited by those who support maximal access to 
information and to copying technologies. Its predecessors are cited by 
those pursuing a more restrictive approach.
Taken together, Stevens’ sentences form a sort of Rorshach Test. 
What Stevens said has since been superseded by what others have seen 
in his sentences. For two decades, the holding in Betamax has largely 
been understood as articulating a principle of judicial non-interference 
with technologies that have both legal and potentially illegal applica-
tions. While the Court’s decision does not directly address the legality 
of the videotape libraries of premium movies that users of the VCR 
were demonstrably compiling at the time of the decision, the Court 
was certain that time-shifting programs was a fair use, and elected, in 
effect, to overlook the infringing applications of the VCR in order to 
preserve the clearly fair applications.
The Betamax standard is necessary for the ongoing development 
of computer technologies because copying data is fundamental to the 
operation of computer technologies. In addition to the various copying 
and shifting of data that is needed to sustain operating systems, the 
overwhelming majority of computer interactions with the Internet in-
volve at least ephemeral copies of e-mail messages, websites, and other 
scraps of information, all of which are ostensibly protected by copy-
right. It should go without saying that I believe the personal computer 
to be a staple article of commerce. Indeed, I believe it to be, in effect, 
the direct successor to the Betamax videotape recorder as the “poster 
child” for the staple article of commerce doctrine. The networked per-
sonal computer infringes copyrights all the time. But the overwhelm-
ing majority of these infringements are de minimis multiplied by de 
minimis. The ephemeral copies that sustain our computers are instru-
mental in enabling the sort of “wide use for legitimate, unobjection-
able purposes” that the Supreme Court determined to protect in the 
Betamax case.
But as late as 2000, the RIAA was publicly arguing against the le-
gality of such “staple” uses as storing music on a computer’s hard drive. 
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In a “Frequently Asked Questions” page that built upon the RIAA’s 
campaign against “home taping,” the RIAA first acknowledged that 
“essentially, all copying onto analog media is generally allowed,” in 
order to set the stage for the following argument:
WHAT YOU CAN’T COPY
Computers and general-purpose computer peripheral 
devices are not covered by the Audio Home Record-
ing Act. This means they do not pay royalties and 
they do not incorporate technology to prevent serial 
copying. As a result, this also means that copying 
music onto a computer hard drive is not permitted. 
It is copyright infringement, and a violation of fed-
eral law. This is true whether the source being cop-
ied is analog or digital; whether you are copying an 
entire album or just one song or even part of a song; 
or whether you are making a compilation of songs 
from albums you already own. The same holds true 
for copying music off the Internet. While MP3s may 
be popular, if the artist and record company have not 
specifically authorized the music to be freely traded 
on the Net, then posting MP3s to an Internet site or 
downloading them to your computer hard drive is 
copyright infringement.
The bottom line: the only digital copying of music 
that is allowed is with digital recorders that are covered 
by and comply with the Audio Home Recording Act.
Of course, most digital recorders could not hope to function with-
out the intermediate step of songs being copied to a computer’s hard 
drive. In 1999, the RIAA attempted to sue an early MP3 player (the 
Diamond “Rio”) out of existence using this forlorn line of argument. 
Judge Diarmud O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
thankfully, demonstrated little patience for the RIAA’s claims. The 
RIAA has that judge to thank for the half a billion dollars in revenue 
generated to date by the iTunes Music Store, to say nothing of the 
music industry’s share of subscription fees generated by licensed music 
services like Rhapsody and Napster 2.0.
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Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, Grokster promised to defini-
tively answer whether the principles the Court had established for the 
analog recording medium of the VCR could be productively ported 
into digital spaces, or, in the alternative, the restrictive approaches to 
digital media favored by the content industries would carry the day. 
Grokster arrived at the Supreme Court because the RIAA-affiliated 
MGM records sued the three leading post-Napster peer-to-peer appli-
cations: Grokster, Streamcast (the parent of the Morpheus peer-to-peer 
client) and Sharman BV (at the time the parent of Kazaa) for contribu-
tory infringement due to their enabling of unauthorized peer-to-peer 
downloads. The Australian-based Sharman/Kazaa was split off from 
the case because of jurisdiction questions. Judge Stephen V. Wilson, of 
the Los Angeles-based 9th Circuit Court of Appeals surprised many 
observers by issuing a summary judgment in favor of Grokster and 
Streamcast, grounded in what appeared to be a flat application of the 
Betamax standard. Wilson wrote:
Defendants distribute and support software, the users 
of which can and do choose to employ it for both 
lawful and unlawful ends. Grokster and StreamCast 
are not significantly different from companies that 
sell home video recorders or copy machines, both of 
which can be and are used to infringe copyrights. 
(MGM v. Grokster)
It is a testament to how much the copyright landscape has shifted that 
Wilson’s ruling surprised anyone. Inevitably, MGM and its RIAA af-
filiates appealed, and a broad swath of legal scholars settled in, antici-
pating a ruling that, like Betamax, could offer clear guidelines for the 
fair and reasonable use of a potentially infringing technology.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court punted.
The Justices’ points of agreement are far more circumscribed than 
the reported “9–0 ruling” suggests. Specifically, the Justices agreed 
that the Grokster case should head back to the 9th Circuit where, 
in their estimation, summary judgment was improperly awarded to 
Grokster and Streamcast, and that the 9th Circuit must now rule on 
whether Grokster and Streamcast should be held liable for having ac-
tively induced copyright infringement. With respect to all other is-
sues, this “unanimous” court is strikingly divided, albeit in neat little 
groups of three. I’ll examine each group in turn.
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The “Majority” Opinion: Written by Souter, 
and Joined by Thomas and Scalia
This opinion is resolutely focused on protecting the rights of owners 
(i.e., the copyright holders for popular music and motion pictures that 
were circulating over peer-to-peer networks). While Souter pays lip 
service to the notion of public access, the opinion’s core focus is estab-
lishing the degree to which Grokster and Streamcast structured their 
businesses to encourage infringement. According to this opinion, the 
incursion into the copyright holders’ rights must be corrected, even 
at the expense of significant legal usage of Grokster and Streamcast’s 
networks. To this end, Souter’s opinion offers a clear substitute for 
the generally recognized Betamax standard. Where in Betamax, the 
Court ruled in favor of the VCR, arguing that it and similar copy-
ing technologies “need merely be capable of substantial non-infring-
ing uses.” This opinion revises the Betamax standard, presenting it 
as supporting technologies “capable of substantial lawful use.” This 
distinction is important. Both the shift to “capable” from “merely ca-
pable” and the substitution of “lawful uses” for “non-infringing uses” 
are evidence of Souter, Thomas, and Scalia attempting to raise the bar 
for companies invoking the Betamax defense. Judge Wilson suggested 
that if 10 percent of the material distributed on a peer-to-peer network 
was non-infringing, then that network had met the Betamax standard. 
This Grokster triumvirate would look askance at that assertion, argu-
ing that the “substantial lawful use threshold had not been reached. 
Souter and his colleagues misstate Sony in a concluding paragraph 
when they write, “Sony dealt with a claim of liability based solely on 
distributing a product with alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with 
knowledge that some users would follow the unlawful course.” The 
suggestion here is that for the Betamax Court, the expectation was that 
most of the anticipated uses of the VCR would be lawful (i.e., “time-
shifting”) and that the Court imagined that only a small minority of 
the VCR users would engage in arguably illicit behavior (i.e., archiving 
videotapes of programs as substitutes for commercial releases).
In a critical paragraph, these three judges articulate what may come 
to be known as the “Grokster standard.”
Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a mat-
ter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distrib-
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uted product. But nothing in Sony requires courts 
to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, 
and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of 
fault-based liability derived from the common law.
In other words, while you can’t go after Grokster for the design of 
its products, and the ease with which the products can be used for 
infringing activities, you are free to pursue Grokster for knowingly 
and actively structuring its business around the expectation that its 
software would be used primarily for traffic in infringing files.
The First Concurring Opinion: Written by 
Breyer, and Joined by Stevens and O’Connor
While Souter’s emphasis falls squarely on the maintenance of copyright 
holders’ rights, this opinion offers a realistic assessment of the degree 
to which all copyrights are subject to low-level infringements, many of 
which do not merit the time or attention of the judiciary. Where the 
Souter opinion casts the rights associated with copyright ownership as 
near-absolute, Breyer describes these rights as sites of contest and near-
constant negotiation. For example, Breyer counters the claim that the 
Betamax Court did not anticipate significant infringing use of VCRs 
by pointing out that Sony had advertised that Betamax owners could 
use their machines to build libraries of taped copyrighted programs. 
According to the standard in the Souter decision, this would argu-
ably constitute active inducement of infringement by Sony, but Breyer 
clearly believes the Betamax case was rightly decided, and that the 
VCR should remain legal. Breyer also questions where the threshold 
for “non-infringing use” ought to lie, pointing to the “9% or so of au-
thorized time-shifting uses of the VCR” on which the Betamax verdict 
apparently rested.
Breyer’s opinion opens with the statement “I agree with the Court 
that the distributor of a dual-use technology may be liable for the in-
fringing activities of third parties where he or she actively seeks to ad-
vance the infringement,” but elsewhere in his decision Breyer suggests 
that the 9th Circuit did not err in awarding summary judgment in 
this case. The heart of Breyer’s opinion is an elegiac testament to the 
Betamax standard, which he endorses on four grounds: 1) Sony’s rule 
is clear; 2) Sony’s rule is strongly technology protecting; 3) Sony’s rule 
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is forward looking; and 4) Sony’s rule is mindful of the limitations 
facing judges where matters of technology are concerned. The import 
of Breyer’s argument is that while the 9th Circuit may have erred in 
issuing a summary judgment, the proper outcome of the trial ought to 
again be an affirmation of the Betamax standard.
The Second Concurring opinion: Written by 
Ginsburg, and Joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy
Ginsburg effectively rewrites the Betamax doctrine. No longer is the 
“capability” of substantial non-infringing use the standard. Now, the 
actual patterns of usage are, apparently, fair game, at least for this trio. 
This group’s distaste for Grokster and Streamcast is readily apparent 
in a core paragraph, wherein Ginsburg suggests that she, like Souter 
et al., favors a significantly higher standard than the Betamax case’s 
“mere capability.” Ginsburg writes:
Even if the absolute number of noninfringing files 
copied using the Grokster and StreamCast soft-
ware is large, it does not follow that the products are 
therefore put to substantial noninfringing uses and 
are thus immune from liability. The number of non-
infringing copies may be reflective of, and dwarfed 
by, the huge total volume of files shared. Further, 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not 
sharply distinguish between uses of Grokster’s and 
StreamCast’s software products (which this case is 
about) and uses of peer-to-peer technology generally 
(which this case is not about).
Not only is Ginsburg here proposing a radical revision of the Sony 
standard, she concludes her opinion by pointedly suggesting that the 
9th Circuit got the case 180 degrees wrong:
If, on remand, the case is not resolved on summa-
ry judgment in favor of MGM based on Grokster 
and StreamCast actively inducing infringement, the 
Court of Appeals, I would emphasize, should recon-
sider, on a fuller record, its interpretation of Sony’s 
product distribution holding.
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Ginsburg is here strongly suggesting that the initial summary judg-
ment for Grokster and Streamcast should be replaced by a summary 
judgment for MGM. Ginsburg’s bias towards maintaining the rights 
of copyright owners is even more absolute than Souter’s. According 
to Ginsburg, a “large” number of non-infringing files does not equal 
“substantial non-infringing use.” Her argument appears to invert 
Betamax, in that it requires courts to focus primarily on the amount of 
infringing files, and not on the legal activities facilitated by them.
In summary, the Supreme Court’s remand of the Grokster case to 
the 9th Circuit carries with it the following advice to the lower court:
• Summary judgment for Grokster and Streamcast was inap-
propriate. Rehear on the question of whether Grokster and 
Streamcast actively induced infringement; OR
• Summary judgment for Grokster and Streamcast was inappro-
priate because you should hold a trial in order to absolve them 
according to the Betamax standard; OR
• Summary judgment was appropriate, but not for Grokster and 
Streamcast. And by the way, that Betamax case got it back-
wards. Focus on the infringing files, not the non-infringing 
files.
This is a trainwreck.
The aggregate effect of the Grokster decision is to raise the possi-
bility that an examination of a technology inventor’s purported intent 
will likely determine the case if the invention ultimately proves to have 
infringing uses. Grokster thus represents the culmination of a series of 
incremental steps in which copyright jurisprudence has moved away 
from a focus on the tangible effects of infringement and toward assess-
ments of whether the developers of a particular information technol-
ogy or software system adequately addressed the possibility that their 
products might be used not only for duplication but also for infringe-
ment. Such a standard would have made the initial distribution of 
the photocopier a legally dubious proposition. The Grokster decision 
threatens, in a very real sense, to stifle innovation in digital media 
until inventors once again sense that intellectual property law pro-
motes the progress of science and useful arts.
Western Rhetoric traces its roots back to the courts and legislature 
of Athens in the fifth century BCE. The art of persuasive communica-
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tion has a long history of helping people address, in productive ways, 
the social and technological challenges they face as citizens of civil so-
ciety. But the decision in the Grokster case makes all too clear that the 
rhetorical strategies, the metaphors, the tropes, the habits of argument, 
that were developed for the management of physical property cannot 
be comfortably and effectively ported to the virtual environs we some-
times call cyberspace. To the extent that a data file is property, it is 
property that moves and reproduces like nothing in the physical land-
scape, and Grokster demonstrates that even our finest jurists lack the 
rhetorical and theoretical tools needed to productively address digital 
technologies and their applications. The radical shifts now underway 
in the teaching of composition and rhetoric hold promise for a future 
that achieves a better balance between creators’ rights and public ac-
cess. But it will be many years before students educated in this more 
balanced approach sit on the federal bench, or even achieve majority 
status in Congress.
As the preceding chapters make clear, my sense is that the U.S. is 
currently in the process of fumbling an opportunity to productive-
ly engage with the intellectual property questions prompted by the 
rise of the Internet. The past decade’s major legislative amendments 
to copyright—in particular the Copyright Term Extension Act, the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the No Electronic Theft Act, and 
the TEACH Act—collectively constitute a disastrous appropriation of 
rights, privileges, and opportunities formerly understood to belong to 
the public at large. At the very moment that the most powerful cul-
tural tool in human history—the networked personal computer—has 
become both widely available and largely affordable, the U.S. is busily 
drafting laws that reinforce a copyright model optimized long ago for 
the circulation of print-based media. Never mind that the increasingly 
broadband network of linked computers can easily send cultural arti-
facts hurtling around the globe in the space of a few heartbeats. The 
networked computer, when paired with the processing power avail-
able via peer-to-peer networks, offers almost limitless opportunities for 
the transmission of and access to data. Or rather, these opportunities 
would be almost limitless, were it not for the increasingly restrictive 
force of intellectual property laws, especially copyright laws.
In fact, over the course of my decade of scholarship directed at un-
derstanding the consequences of the Internet for intellectual property 
policies, I have becoming increasingly pessimistic about the future of 
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the Internet. While Moore’s Law continues to deliver substantially 
faster, smaller, and more affordable computer chips every eighteen 
months, and broadband access moves from institutions to homes, and 
even whole cities, the aggregate effect of recent policy decisions and 
court rulings has been the cordoning off of more than three-quarters 
of the information that was produced in the twentieth century.
In our overly protected circumstance, paying the full purchase price 
for a copyrighted work no longer guarantees consistent, efficient access 
to that work. As I was completing this project, I realized that I was 
unable to locate my copy of a book that I’ve cited repeatedly in these 
pages, Joseph Menn’s All the Rave. I searched my departmental office, 
my home office, the stacks of books in my bedroom and the overflow 
storage in my basement. The book was nowhere to be found. I consid-
ered buying a used copy from Amazon, and discovered that they were 
quite inexpensive. More than one dealer had settled on $3.30 as an 
appropriate price for a hardcover described as appearing “new.” With 
postage, I could have had a copy within a week or so for under $10.
But as I considered this purchase, I noted that Amazon’s website 
allowed me to search inside the text of Menn’s book. I was able to 
double-check all of my citations, though the interface was a bit cum-
bersome. At no cost to me, over and above the fees I pay for high-speed 
broadband access to the Internet, Amazon was offering me a func-
tional copy of my missing print text. In fact, Amazon’s version was 
more readily functional for my purposes (checking citations) than the 
lost print text. I could readily search the whole of the text, using key-
words. I was struck by the ease with which I located passages that had 
wandered into my text with incomplete or lost page references. This 
was immeasurably better than the index in my lost print edition. But 
Amazon would only allow me to read a few pages in sequence. This, 
no doubt, was based on their interpretation of the reasonable limits of 
the fair use exception to copyright law. And this made it hard when-
ever part of a sought after quote hovered on the other side of Amazon’s 
self-imposed limits.
Then I noticed that a digital edition of the text, using Adobe’s 
eBook Reader software, was available from Amazon for $9.95. Having 
grown habituated to instant gratification, I pulled out my debit card 
and purchased my second copy of Menn’s book. When I opened up 
this digital copy, I noticed a striking quote that I had, to that point, 
neglected to include in this project. I highlighted the quote with the 
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“select” feature in my Adobe Reader software and prepared to paste it 
into my manuscript. And [. . .] got . . . nothing.
Through some combination of determinations by Adobe and 
Crown Business, the Menn book’s publisher, the cut-and-paste fea-
ture that is available for many PDF files had been disabled for this 
one. Why? Copyright. And so, as a researcher, I lost a few hours of 
time. I stopped researching the rhetoric of the peer-to-peer debates and 
started researching the levels of permission available to purchasers of 
Adobe ebooks.
This particular Adobe ebook edition was intentionally pro-
grammed to eliminate basic functionality because there is the pos-
sibility, indeed—given the topic of the book—the likelihood that cut-
and-pasted versions of the book’s text would circulate online. There is 
no technological limitation that prevents Adobe from offering more 
malleable and functional editions of its ebooks. Indeed, some ebooks 
circulate with no such limitations. This is not a programming prob-
lem. Rather, it a problem embedded in the U.S.’s current approach to 
intellectual property.
Imagine if, instead of a paper copy of this text, my university li-
brary, or better yet, the local public library had a copy of the ebook 
and would lend it to patrons via the Internet. Imagine further that the 
copy allowed not for wholesale cutting and pasting, but limited cut-
ting and pasting—for the sake of argument, we’ll use the 10 percent 
“fair use rule of thumb” that was considered but ultimately rejected by 
the groups contributing to the 1976 revision of copyright. In a nod to 
publishers’ existing business models, the library would guarantee that 
only one patron could “check out” the copy at any given time. Many 
libraries already have “digital reserve” programs that accomplish this 
sort of restriction. In exchange for this access, library patrons would 
agree to make available a small amount of bandwidth and processing 
power, for use in sustaining a peer-to-peer network managed by the 
libraries in a given state or region. Excess processing power could be 
sold by the libraries and the revenue could be used to reinforce their 
collections and sustain the peer-to-peer network.
Everyone would be better off.
Researchers would spend less time tediously retyping the quota-
tions they need to situate their own research. In the event of a recall 
notice from one patron who urgently needed the text, the timeline 
for the return of the digital edition would likely be dramatically com-
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pressed relative to the timelines for the return of physical texts. Indeed, 
patrons could arrange novel and expeditious sharing agreements. A 
night-owl researcher could have the book from sundown to sun-up, 
while her lark counterpart could access the work as soon as the cock 
crowed.
Imagine further that the significant bandwidth costs of moving all 
of these digital materials were predominantly borne not by the librar-
ies (most of which appear to have enough demands on their limited 
resources) but by the patrons, who would offer spare processing cycles 
as part of their membership and participation in the library’s digi-
tal lending program. Perhaps the greatest flaw in the existing frame-
works for the delivery of digital materials is the failure to properly take 
advantage of latent computer power that is now being squandered. 
The G4 Power Macintosh computer, introduced the same year Shawn 
Fanning released Napster, was so powerful that the U.S. government 
initially classified the machines as munitions, and restricted their ex-
port to countries perceived as posing a potential risk to the U.S. Most 
people are using only a small fraction of the processing power within 
their computer, and wouldn’t miss their spare cycles if they were being 
used elsewhere.
In early 2006, the best estimates were that 70 percent of U.S. ac-
tive Internet users had access to broadband connections in their homes 
or workplaces. Broadband connections are conventionally described 
as “always on.” Indeed, part of the appeal of broadband is its ready 
availability. Users gain almost instant access to the Internet without 
the shriek of a modem or its attendant delay because ISPs are now ha-
bitually offering constantly available bandwidth—bandwidth that in 
most homes goes unused for at least a portion of most nights, or some 
afternoons, or the occasional morning. We could pool these resources 
and move mountains of data.
But this won’t happen. Indeed, it can’t, given the structures cur-
rently in place. Technology currently exits that would likely halve the 
time required to produce research-based writing. But still researchers 
wade through a swamp of proprietary databases, often unable to re-
member which of their discipline’s journals are available electronically 
and which are not. Libraries make agonizing decisions about whether 
to stock particular publications. In the wake of budget cuts, most uni-
versity libraries have had to make cuts that they rued. This loss of 
access to research materials is unfolding while the existing network of 
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high-speed computers with broadband connections to the Internet—
if combined with a streamlined peer-to-peer application and work-
able guidelines for the preparation of manuscripts—could deliver the 
whole of recent scholarly research with astonishing efficiency.
The case for peer-to-peer distribution of copyrighted materials does 
not begin and end with access to last year’s big Sheryl Crow hit, or 
even the complete works of Metallica. The case for peer-to-peer distri-
bution of copyrighted works also involves cultural artifacts like Jeanne 
Fahnestock’s germinal article on the rhetorical shifts in scientific dis-
course as it moves from disciplinary journals to the popular press, en-
titled “Accommodating Science.” A colleague recently forwarded me a 
PDF copy of this article that she had, apparently, located while surfing 
the Internet. I immediately attempted to locate the Internet source for 
the PDF, and Google was, for once, of no assistance. I know not from 
whence it came (but there is a copyright notice on the first page).
I assign Fahnestock’s article regularly in my science writing course. 
Circulating multiple copies of an article for classroom use is specifi-
cally endorsed in the statutory language describing fair use. Most of 
my students would prefer an electronic copy to a photocopied hand-
out. But am I free to redistribute this e-copy of uncertain provenance? 
A strict reading of the copyright notice appended to the PDF suggests 
that I am not. That said, all of my students and I would be allowed to 
download PDFs of this article were we able to successfully navigate our 
way through the specific database that houses the archives for Written 
Communication within our university’s library system.
But this involves a process that sometimes hinges on psychically 
divining which of the various electronic databases archives Written 
Communication, or worse, staring blankly at a screen demanding the 
year, volume, issue, and start page for the article, but not allowing 
me use obvious and distinctive search terms like, say, “Fahnestock” or 
“Accommodating Science.”
Now imagine, for a moment, that the process of locating an aca-
demic article or research study was as simple as navigating Napster 1.0 
used to be. Participants in this research-based peer-to-peer network—
let’s call it “Edster” would commit to storing and making available at 
least ten articles they considered especially helpful. On Edster, you 
would type in a few key search terms in order to determine whether 
the article you needed existed in electronic form on the computers of 
all of the students and colleagues at your university, your region, and/
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or throughout your discipline. Imagine receiving a PDF of that article 
in under a minute without navigating through a series of databases, 
without even firing up the library’s proprietary search engine. Imagine 
how much more efficiently researchers, students, and scholars of all 
stripes could pursue their research.
But “Edster” can’t happen for two reasons. The first is that aca-
demic texts, by and large, are subject to the same copyright regime 
that was developed to protect works like Sheryl Crow’s most recent 
hit single. The second reason is that advocates for broader and fairer 
use of peer-to-peer technologies have yet to produce an argument as 
superficially compelling as “stealing music hurts artists.” The content 
industries are winning this debate in large part by drawing upon es-
tablished tropes that portray college campuses as enclaves of lawless-
ness and unethical behavior. And when the image most people have 
of peer-to-peer technologies is yoked to Shawn Fanning’s perpetuation 
of his hacker/undergraduate persona well past its expiration date, the 
task of rewriting and redirecting the peer-to-peer debate grows incre-
mentally more difficult.
I do not call or wish for the end of copyright. Rather, I seek copy-
rights calibrated not to print delivered by ponies, but to the torrents 
of information now spanning the globe via broadband peer-to-peer 
networks.
The consequences of a failure to revise the current peer-to-peer 
narrative are, ultimately, the abandonment of the principles that 
prompted the first Congress to title the first U.S. Copyright law, “An 
Act for the Encouragement of Learning.” At this moment, there is no 
technical hurdle that precludes the distribution of the whole of the 
Library of Congress’ holdings via the Internet. The peer-to-peer proto-
cols that would be required were invented in the last millennium. The 
bandwidth is available. The scanning will take some time . . . prob-
ably years, but the copyright questions (which are, if course, ultimately 
questions of compensation) are far and away the most challenging as-
pect of putting scholarly and artistic work online.
In late 2004, the Internet megagiant Google announced, with great 
fanfare, its plan to digitize the library holdings of five major universi-
ties. Google intended to display small portions of the books, limiting 
users to reviewing a page at a time, and blocking printing. Less than 
a year later some members of the American Association of University 
Presses were petitioning the courts, demanding the right to opt out 
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of having their authors’ books scanned. Other publishers are now de-
manding that Google request and receive permissions for each book it 
scans. And, for good measure, free speech advocates are encouraging 
Google to refuse to honor the publishers’ wishes and publish every-
thing based on a hard-line fair use claim. Once again, U.S. Copyright 
Law has magically transformed an attempt to build Borges’s Library 
of Babel into the Tower of Babel, wherein the participants are unable 
to communicate with one another, and progress toward lofty goals is 
impossible.
That said, peer-to-peer technologies have been reaching for the 
heavens for some time, and doing so with a remarkable coordination 
and efficiency. According to recent estimates, over five million users of 
the SETI@home peer-to-peer network have donated nineteen billion 
cycles of processing power to searching the heavens for signs of intel-
ligent extraterrestrial life. To put this in a kind of perspective, a single 
computer would need to work well over two million years to process 
the data that the collective network of computers has processed since 
1999. And even this is a false comparison, as SETI@Home depends, 
in significant part, on the presence of an array of networked computers 
for its functionality. But to date, this massive investment of computer 
power has delivered only silence. The SETI project is visionary and 
exciting, and well removed from the kinds of copyright squabbles and 
concerns that have hamstrung other peer-to-peer endeavors.
Back here on earth, in the U.S., our national keeper of the puta-
tively public notices of copyright registration and renewal—the in-
formation needed to determine whether a given work is protected by 
copyright or public domain—is the Library of Congress. Those wish-
ing to determine whether a particular work was renewed can search in 
vain on the Library of Congress’s website, until they eventually arrive 
at this notice:
Can you tell me who owns a copyright?
We can provide you with the information available in 
our records. A search of registrations, renewals, and 
recorded transfers of ownership made before 1978 re-
quires a manual search of our files. Upon request, 
our staff will search our records at the statutory rate 
of $150 for each hour. There is no fee if you conduct 
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a search in person at the Copyright Office. (U.S. 
Copyright Office)
With a measure of initiative, and a collective commitment to an ethi-
cal and equitable rebalancing of our nation’s copyright laws, the rich 
storehouses of information within this, the world’s second largest li-
brary, could be available not only to those who have $150 an hour to 
spare, not only to those who have the opportunity to search at the 
Library in person, but to anyone with a networked computer. We could 
assure the bandwidth and processing power needed for this project if 
we required each visitor to—however briefly—repurpose his or her 
computer as a “peer,” helping to catalog and circulate the Library’s 
staggering collection. We might even leverage this processing power 
to generate revenue, and thereby compensate copyright holders. We 
have the technologies required. The only question is whether we have 
the will to constructively challenge and revise the laws that now make 
this idea impossible.
To date, the most successful implementation of peer-to-peer tech-
nologies is dedicated to marking off quadrants of space where there 
are, so far, no traces of intelligent extraterrestrial life. Surely, with SE-
TI’s success as a model, a few million people could be persuaded to 
contribute their spare cycles and excess bandwidth to the peer-to-peer 
enabled project of searching the libraries of earth for the traces of intel-
ligent terrestrial life.
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Appendix: On Images 
and Permissions
Earlier in this text, I write, following Rebecca Moore Howard, that 
“contemporary scholarship absolutely depends on building on others’ 
work. There are many circumstances when a requirement to secure 
permission would be recognized as unnecessary, or would result in 
de facto censorship.” These words echoed in my mind as I weighed 
how to respond to my publisher’s request for permission information 
for some of the images reproduced in this book. In reviewing my use 
of others’ materials within this text, I have arrived at the conclusion 
that all of my uses fall well within the orbit of fair use, as outlined 
in the U.S. Copyright Code. While I have done my best to identify 
and acknowledge the copyright holders for these images, I have deter-
mined not to seek permissions for these obviously fair uses. Further, I 
believe it would be outrageous if, through overt denial of a permissions 
request or even tardy response, an organization like, say, the MPAA 
could foreclose my reproduction and critical assessment of a screenshot 
from a website the MPAA had made generally available throughout 
the Internet. Such a result would, in my estimation, be a suppression 
of critical speech in violation of the First Amendment. It would also 
be an absurd result if contemporary U.S. copyright law, descended 
from a 1790 law entitled “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning 
. . .” were to be mobilized to strip a text like this of its few, necessary 
illustrations. 
My University of Minnesota colleague, Laura Gurak, arrived at a 
similar conclusion as she reviewed her use of others’ materials within 
her 2001 book, Cyberliteracy: Navigating the Internet with Awareness, 
published by Yale University Press. Gurak describes her use of materi-
als as meeting the conventional standards for fair use: 
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My use of the material in this book, along with its 
purpose for scholarly criticism, is educational, based 
on previously published material, uses only the 
amount needed to make the point, and does not have 
any negative impact on the value of the original. (If 
anything, the examples used in this book bring posi-
tive value to the original by pointing readers to these 
sources.) 
I thus have made the choice to obtain written per-
mission only on items that were more of an embel-
lishment to my narrative than an item used for overt 
criticism. Also, I have not obtained permission to use 
Web pages. For one, the Web pages used herein are 
used for criticism. In addition, when a person or or-
ganization makes a Web site available to the world, 
that person or organization knows full well that the 
resulting Web page will be uploaded onto thousands 
of computer screens, linked to by other Web sites, and 
printed out on desktop laser printers. None of these 
uses requires written permission, and a book, espe-
cially an act of criticism, is hardly different. (162)
In the half-decade since Gurak wrote these words, little has changed. 
While the Internet is a core tool for most twenty-first century research-
ers, most of us still face uncertainty with respect to fundamental ques-
tions of scholarly use and access. But this much seems clear. When a 
researcher takes a screenshot of a Web page and then analyzes and cri-
tiques it, this must not be understood as either infringement or theft. 
Rather, this activity is the very essence of what our laws have protected 
for more than two centuries. 
We must not surrender this tradition to a process that would, func-
tionally, allow the targets of criticism to hamper or dilute that criticism 
based on a specious or arbitrary denial of permission to reproduce the 
object under discussion. 
It is conventional for Web-based composers to clip and critique ma-
terial found elsewhere on the Web. Indeed, the relatively new and ex-
citing genre of blogs (or, more formally, Web Logs) would be crippled 
by a projection of the print permissions culture into cyberspace. This 
book makes modest, and fair use of materials found on the Internet. 
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Were it a website, these uses would be unremarkable. Even within this 
book they are not especially remarkable. What is remarkable, however, 
is that we as a culture remain uncertain as to whether a composer in 
my position needs to ask permission before critiquing, or not. My fond 
wish, as the preceding pages make clear, is that books like this one 
help move us toward a culture that more thoughtfully and knowledg-
ably examines the practical, ethical, and legal consequences of digital 
media.
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